






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THE

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NECESSARY EXISTENCE

OF

DEITY:

*Gilchrist, William Hayman*

SECOND EDITION.



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1840

Had not *revelation* discovered the true principles of *religion*, they had without doubt continued altogether unknown. Yet on their discovery, they appeared so consonant to human reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it.

*Warburton's Div. Leg. B. III. Sect. v.*

AN  
EXAMINATION  
OF  
ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION

"OF THE  
"ARGUMENT A PRIORI FOR THE BEING  
"AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD."

---

BY  
WILLIAM GILLESPIE.

---

ISSUED  
BY THE SOCIETY  
FOR PEACEABLY REPRESSING INFIDELITY.

—— τὸν εἰδέποτ' ἄνδρες εἴωμεν

Ἄρρητον· μεσαι δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἄγυιαι,  
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεσῇ δὲ θάλασσα,  
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·  
Τῷ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

*Aratus.*

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## ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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The first edition, of 1000 copies, being now exhausted, a second is become necessary.

In presenting which to the public, it is right briefly to state wherein it differs, in any essential respect, from the preceding edition.

In the present edition, the *head lines*, indicating *Part* and *Section*,† will be a great help to readers, in a work containing so many *references* backwards and forwards.

Besides a few alterations, some less some more important, a good deal of new matter has been introduced, which we presume to think will not be found either useless or uninteresting.

To say nothing more concerning the improvements which have been made, in a few instances: the new matter includes a passage of great moment, occurring in the fourth Part,‡ and an Appendix big with the fates of an Atheistical Society, and of an Atheistical Newspaper.||

† It may be proper to mention on what principle the *sectioning* proceeds. A section-mark (§) occurs at the beginning of every *paragraph*; the section-marks being used for the sake of reference merely. In short, they denote *topical* as opposed to *logical* divisions.

‡ See the note (†) to § 22.

|| See APPENDIX to Part. XII: *Appendix* בב.

From the many highly favourable opinions, expressed by persons whose authority is entitled to much weight, which have been communicated to the author, he feels very confident as to the ultimate result of his undertaking, to establish *the necessary existence of DEITY*. Whatever misgivings the author may have had as to the *reception* which his mode of treating his subject might meet with; he never allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the *goodness* of his cause, generally or particularly: Generally, or as to the Being of A GOD; particularly, or as to the applicableness and validity of *a priori* reasonings in reference to that momentous topic. The age we live in is certainly the age of superficialness. Much ground is indeed gone over, but then little of the ground is thoroughly explored: Men rather knowing that there are many sciences, and having at command a few common-places with regard to each, than caring to be complete proficient in any one branch of knowledge. But notwithstanding this circumstance, the author has now no uneasiness as to the fate of his production. The age is superficial, but there are exceptions to the general rule: And it is very fortunate that no age receives those impressions which are to be lasting, and to influence the sentiments of posterity, from any but the more profound thinkers. The skimmers over the surfaces of things may make a little noise as they pass along, but in a short while all trace of them is vanished.

The author, then, anticipates that ere long a great change will take place in the public mind, in relation to the question of the *fitness and value* of the species of reasonings employed in this work. 'Tis beyond all question, that *a priori* reasonings on subjects out of the mathematical sciences have descended to a low point in the general estimation, though it is equally certain, that at a former period such reasonings used to occupy a very high and conspicuous position. But there are signs that better treatment is awaiting argumentation from the necessity of the case for a *First Cause*.

The immediate consequences, or rather the concomitants, of a change so ardently desired, would be the following—to specify no more at present. 1. A sudden stop in the tune of your mere *a posteriori* men. We should no longer have thrust into our hands whole volumes of *anatomy, botany, astronomy*, and what not, called, in virtue of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter, treatises on *Natural Theology*; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust

upon us as containing the only sound arguments to be met with, for proving the first grand article of all religion. We should no longer, therefore, be told, that the *infinity*† and the *unity* of the Divine Nature cannot be made out. 2. The quick disappearance of speculative, or avowed, atheism—a consummation, however devoutly to be wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, presumptuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the *experimental* School.

Who does not at once perceive of what mighty consequence it were to have the mouth of avowed speculative atheism closed for ever? Have not the *very bad* kinds of *practical* atheism too often been prone to seek shelter under the wings of *speculative* atheism? To live in all respects as if there were no GOD: Therefore, to wish most anxiously that there were no GOD: Therefore, to confirm oneself in saying that there is no GOD:—Are not these not unfrequently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain?‡ And to make application to the circumstances of the present day: Where is it that *Socialism*, the prevalent form of Infidelity, takes refuge when hard pressed by pursuers? Where, but in downright atheism?

There are very few persons among us who are not aware of the alarming progress which *Socialism*, or *Owenism*, is making in the *British* dominions,—to say nothing of the state of matters on the *Continent*. *Socialism* is just another name for *Infidelity*. It was just the favourite disguise under which Infidelity proceeded to extend itself in all directions. Certain events, which are still but recent, have had the effect of tearing off the mask which *Socialism* chose to wear on many occasions, and of rendering apparent, to all but the most stupid and unthinking, that that widely-spread system is at bottom nothing less than a thoroughly *God-denying* system.

In conclusion: It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of A GOD constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the

† This word is here taken in the *popular*, that is the *loosest*, acceptation.

‡ Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,  
And these reciprocally those again.  
The mind and conduct mutually imprint  
And stamp their image in each other's mint:  
Each, sire and dam, of an infernal race,  
Begetting and conceiving all that's base.

doctrine of human immortality and future retribution, Theism is a necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this foundation—*There is A GOD.* Remember at all times, therefore, that to set out the proof for the existence of GOD, is the first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description soever the Infidelity may be.

EDINBURGH; *August, 1840.*

## PREFACE.

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It seems to be a duty which is due to the public in general, to give some account of the circumstances which led to the present controversy. *Antitheos's* production was "called forth" in consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of "An Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of God," to a society of *professed atheists in Glasgow*, "to answer and refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." The letter containing the challenge gave a detail of those incidents which had conducted to it. And for this reason, and for another to be subsequently alluded to, that letter shall be inserted here, word for word.

"To the Society of Atheists which calls itself 'The Areopagus,' or 'The Zetetic Society,' *Glasgow*.

"Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, it may be but proper to give you a short account of the manner in which I was led to think of addressing you.

"Some months ago, seeing, in the window of a small bookshop in a conspicuous street in this city, a newly printed copy of *Paine's 'Age of Reason,'* I determined on speaking to the person who sold the work, in order to know whether he believed the book to be infamous, and sold it merely for the

“ sake of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of  
 “ so infamous a publication.†

“ In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person who  
 “ gave me to understand, there was a society of Atheists in  
 “ *Edinburgh*, who met on the Sunday evenings, for the sake of  
 “ confirming each other in infidelity.‡ Subsequently, I met a  
 “ member of the Society, (who is said to be one of their best  
 “ hands,) who, indeed, made no secret of his sentiments. He  
 “ told me, that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe,  
 “ any being greater than himself;|| that his body and brain (for  
 “ he positively assured me, he had no soul but his brain,) had  
 “ been produced by *unintelligent necessary causes*; and that,  
 “ after his death, the particles of his body and brain might  
 “ compose a cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance,  
 “ compose, again, *the person* — —, for so *this (by no means*  
 “ *fortuitous) concurrence of atoms* was called.

“ — — undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that  
 “ could be urged in favour of Theism. I challenged him, and,  
 “ through him, all his atheistical associates, to refute my ‘ Ar-  
 “ gument *a priori*,’ &c. \* \* \* A copy of which had been  
 “ forwarded to the body. I was soon informed, that — —  
 “ did not hesitate for a moment to engage to refute me. With

† The sight of infidel works, in a *public* shop, was new to me three years ago. Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than *Paine’s*, may be seen, any day, vended publicly enough.

‡ An atheistical society is no rarity to me *now*. And that there are societies of atheists, and that the societies are studded, thickly studded, over the country, every one by this time knows; thanks to the Bishop of *Exeter* and the House of Lords.

|| All that was here meant to be conveyed was this: That the person spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being of a species superior to the human. Surely I *never could intend* to convey, that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for *very obvious reasons*.



“ regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on him two conditions only. 1st, That the answer should be *on paper*. And 2dly, That it pointed out some (alleged) *specific fallacy* in my alleged demonstration. After waiting long for the promised refutation, I was, at length, made aware, by a friend of ———’s, that the said ——— could not answer it. However, to make up for my disappointment, I was told, that there was a society of Atheists in *Glasgow*, more numerous, more clever, and more learned, and that there neither was, nor could be, any ground to doubt, that the ‘Areopagus’ would, on being challenged, step forward and (endeavour to) overturn my reasonings.

“ Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the determination of challenging you, each of you and all of you : As, accordingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work. Two copies of which are herewith sent to you.

“ You challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists an *Intelligent Great First Cause*. The work in question professes to demonstrate that matter by the *most rigid* ratiocination. It asks you to grant no proposition but those positions which constitute the starting points of your Atheism, to-wit, *that there is Infinity of Duration, and that there is Infinity of Extension*,—be that extension of matter *merely*, or of space *merely*, or of matter and space *together*. How plain must those truths be which are insisted on by all sound Theists, (I might have said, by all men sound in their minds,) and are the primary assumptions in Atheism itself.

“ We shall soon see whether you are able to do all that you profess to have a capacity for,† or whether, like the *Edinburgh*

† Certainly I formed an estimate of atheistical talent from what I had seen of the metropolitan atheists. But, it must be confessed, the western antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information alluded to in this challenge was quite correct.

“ Atheists, you must be altogether dumb before one of that class  
 “ of persons who are (in your opinion) so weak and foolish as  
 “ to believe in a necessary *Being* who contains within himself  
 “ all possible perfections.

“ I have to lay down to you the same conditions which I im-  
 “ posed on the Atheists here. The conditions are (in one re-  
 “ spect) not hard. I am, being very truly desirous of your  
 “ attaining to a better mind,”

(Signed) “ WILLIAM GILLESPIE.”

“ *Edinburgh, 21st August 1837.*”

To this letter and challenge, a letter, dated *Glasgow*, 28th  
 August 1837, was received in answer, in which it is said :  
 “ What you say of ——— denying to any one in the uni-  
 “ verse, an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of intelli-  
 “ gence, is not exactly the mode in which atheists commonly  
 “ express themselves. \* \* \* \* It has frequently been said,  
 “ that we know of no intelligence superior to that of man (and  
 “ I think any one is warranted in so saying.)”

The concluding paragraph, &c. are as follows : “ Relative to  
 “ your challenge, it is hereby accepted upon your own terms.  
 “ A reply to your ‘ Argument ’ will be commenced forthwith ;  
 “ but as the writer has not much time to spare, it cannot be  
 “ expected to proceed very rapidly. But as the Society intend  
 “ publishing it at their own charges, and are anxious that the  
 “ thing should be proceeded with, you may rely on no time  
 “ being lost. A copy will be forwarded to you as soon as it  
 “ comes out of the press.” I have the honor to be,” &c.

(Signed) “ ——— ——— ———.”

“ *To William Gillespie, Esq.*”

About the middle of April 1838, I was put in possession by  
 the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of  
 his reply. It is entitled, “ Refutation of the Argument *a priori*  
 “ for the Being and Attributes of God ; shewing the Irrele-



“ vancy of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning  
 “ of *Dr Samuel Clarke* and others, especially of *Mr Gillespie*,  
 “ in support of it. By *ANTITHEOS*.”†

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a copy of the letter which contained the challenge. My adversary alleges in his Preface, that the letter was guilty of “ containing passages which could by no means militate in favor of the writer.” After asserting this, need it have been added that my respondent wished to take no advantage of the “ passages?” What ever operates more to one’s prejudice than to say that the conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the informant is too charitable to communicate the impropriety? But of the matter before us, the public have now been constituted the proper judges.

“ *Mr Gillespie*,” \* \* \* says *Mr Gillespie’s* opponent, “ had been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist elsewhere,‡ notwithstanding has anxious endeavours to provoke opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one “ was fully prepared to take it up.” (Preface.) If *Antitheos* had in his eye, as his words may tend to lead his readers to suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the *Edinburgh* Atheists, (who certainly, though they had taken up the gauntlet, had not been “ fully prepared” for the combat;) he might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon after the appearance of the “ Argument,” the author thereof found an antagonist, an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities, an antagonist who wrote laborious strictures on the work as long as the work itself.

† Published for the *Glasgow Zetetic Society*, 1838.

‡ *Mr Gillespie* had been disappointed—not in finding, as *Antitheos* has it but—in not finding an atheistic antagonist. See the narration in the challenge, (p. 14—15 hereof.)

The “ Refutation ” gives very satisfactory evidence that its author is a person of no mean talents. The topics which, incidentally and briefly, or otherwise, have been introduced into the work, are very numerous : so numerous, indeed, that there is very little one could say, in conjunction with that which is the grandest of all subjects, but what would find something bearing upon it there. For these two reasons,—in connection with this discussion, we propose to meet and to remove every metaphysical difficulty which atheists can possibly start ; in a word, we shall, first or last, entirely exhaust the subject, to the complete and everlasting confusion of the deniers of A God.

It is to be regretted that *Antitheos* has not numbered his paragraphs. When I quote or animadvert on his words, I shall give not only the chapter but the paragraph : the reader who wishes to look at the passage under discussion must count for himself.

In quoting, I may occasionally leave out, for brevity’s sake, or perspicuity’s sake, words which make nothing to the point as to which the passage is adduced. With regard to every such case, I most willingly leave it to others to decide, whether I have, to the *least* extent, misrepresented my author.

EXAMINATION  
OF  
ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION."



## PART I.

### THE RELEVANCY OF *A PRIORI* ARGUMENTATION FOR A REAL EXISTENCE.

§ 1. There are two things which the author of the "Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to shew that the *a priori* mode of procedure is directed wide of the mark when applied to the question of the being of A GOD; and the other is, to overturn the particular reasonings of those who have adopted that method of argumentation.

§ 2. The first chapter of that work is devoted to the former, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the latter undertaking.

§ 3. Our atheist begins by being very merry on the subject of the *irrelevancy* of *a priori* argument for the existence of DEITY. "To hear of the existence of a GOD† "being made the subject of demonstration by argument, "is," he remarks, "*altogether astounding*. The announcement on the other hand," he adds, "sounds so *oddly*, as to "mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to ex- "cite *ridicule* at the *wonderful discrepancy* between the

† We have given capitals to certain of the words used by *Anti-theos*, on which he had not bestowed one capital letter. That he is so desirous of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of letters, is a good evidence of *something*.

“ end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment  
“ of it.” (Chapter I. paragraph 1.)

§ 4. But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time to serve us up something more substantial, we are disappointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is, we shall probe every piece of it.

§ 5. It being *granted*, argues our author, that “ a God  
“ \* \* must be held as a real being,” “ argument” (he means *a priori* argument) “ appears quite out of place.”  
—Now for the *proof*, Sir, if you please?—“ It would  
“ never do to talk of proving the existence of the man  
“ in the moon by argument; neither would it be of any  
“ avail to employ a syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate  
“ the existence of a navigable channel between the At-  
“ lantic and Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of  
“ *America*.”—All that is here meant may be quite unobjectionable. Our author goes on:—“ If the reasoning  
“ under review be relevant, these must be so too. If  
“ an *a priori* argument be capable of proving the exist-  
“ ence of one thing, another may be proved by the same  
“ \* \* process.” (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this? where is it to be found?

§ 6. Passing over two pages and a half, where *not a word* on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth paragraph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to be what we want. “ The truth is, the argument in ques-  
“ tion” (the argument *a priori*) “ is nothing else than an attempt to establish the application of *mathematical*” (this word should be *metaphysical*, *vide infra*, § 47, *et sequentes*) “ reasoning to what it has nothing in earth or  
“ heaven to do with,—namely, real existences.”—The proof?—“ How vain and preposterous the attempt!”—This metal will not pass.—“ As well might it be main-  
“ tained, that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect  
“ quantity, it must contain within itself all the qualities

“ of the different parts of which it is composed ; that, as  
 “ some of these parts are small and some large, some  
 “ round and some square, some black and some white ;  
 “ it must be white and black, and square and round, and  
 “ large and small at the same time !”—Neither will this  
 do. Where is the proof of the AS WELL *might it be main-  
 tained*, &c.? the proof of the analogy between the cases ?  
 It is to seek. Well, we have had nothing like *proof* as  
 yet. But we approach a syllogism, and *Antitheos* does  
 not deny, that “ every sound argument is capable of  
 “ being reduced to the syllogistic form.” We may hope  
 then to get some satisfaction at length.

“ Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections  
 “ is GOD ;

“ Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec-  
 “ tions ;—

“ Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are GOD.”

§ 7. “ If this be not,” says *Antitheos*, “ a fair state-  
 “ ment of the *whole argument in the most logical form*, I  
 “ am at a loss to know what is.”—But I am not.—  
 “ Should it be any way wrong, and should some ardent  
 “ disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign  
 “ hereafter to take a part in this discussion, it would be  
 “ well were he to consult the Stagyrice and correct it.”  
 (Par. 9.) I mean to correct it, though I do not know  
 that the Stagyrice here will be of vast service, for the  
 principal fallacy to be pointed out is not of a strictly  
 logical character.

§ 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor  
 is, “ Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec-  
 tions.” What are metaphysical abstractions ? They  
 compose a certain class of thoughts. The minor propo-  
 sition therefore amounts to this ; A certain class of our  
 thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess ab-  
 solute perfections.—But by the bye, this minor proposition



omits a word, to us a very necessary word. *Antitheos* should have known that the Stagirite does not allow the middle term as it occurs in the major, to contain a complete element not to be found in the middle term when it appears in the minor. This instance of high treason against the Prince of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass. Supplying the word which has been kept back, we have “Metaphysical abstractions” “necessarily” “possess absolute perfections”——Do they indeed? Metaphysics have been in very bad repute for a good while. *Berkeley* and *Hume*, not to mention any other metaphysician, have, (it seems) brought them into everlasting disgrace with the majority of people. But behold how far *Antitheos* runs in an opposite direction. He is downright in love with metaphysics. Metaphysical abstractions, he has it, necessarily possess absolute perfections. The metaphysical abstractions which this gentleman has been conversant with, must be *very superior indeed* to the generality of those with which other people have been brought into acquaintance in these days.†

§ 9. After having said so much about the minor, we hardly need to draw the conclusion, the full and proper conclusion, to the premises set down by our author. It runs thus: Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, is GOD. The conclusion, like the minor, speaks for itself.

§ 10. Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what was promised, and shall now *correct Antitheos's* syllogism. I do not mean to say, it will be unobjectionable even in a

† *Antitheos* may say, that the absurdity of this minor proposition is not to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain collection of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The more shame to him! To write sheer nonsense is bad enough. But to write sheer nonsense, and call it other people's reasoning, is neither more nor less than—what *Antitheos* has done. But let him keep what is his own, and nobody's else.



corrected form. But if one make the best that can be made of it, he shall do very well. Here then it comes as corrected.

Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is GOD.

But *that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed* necessarily possesses absolute perfections.

Therefore, *that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed* is GOD.

§ 11. *Antitheos* next proceeds to say : " Our reasoners "*a priori* have either to acknowledge the absurdity here " set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological " science." These reasoners will not deny, that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science, but they will acknowledge the *absurdity there* set forth in mood and figure, and that even as has been shewn.

§ 12. We go on to the words which succeed : " If their " GOD be a real being—an agent, he cannot be a heap " of abstractions," that is, a heap of our thoughts, for abstractions are thoughts of ours.—True, He cannot.—" If made up of abstractions," or men's thoughts, " He " cannot be an agent."—Most true.—" No reasoning imaginable can make Him both."—Surely.—" Yet to nothing short of working out this impossibility does the " argument aim." How was that made out? By the syllogism? Oh, then, as I have *corrected* the syllogism—" I say no more."

§ 13. Well: no great things *as yet* in the way of proving, that if A GOD be a real being, *a priori* argument is quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing we are in search of, at last. Of a truth, the proof (such as it is) which we are seeking we come up to at the twelfth

paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute the proof are not *Antitheos's* own, nor yet those of the Reviewer who is cited, they having been employed by *Mr Hume*, and being very ancient indeed.

§ 14. "The character of irrelevancy here laid at the door of the *a priori* argument, is not unwarranted by the authority of good judges among the religious themselves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, but I shall content myself with an extract from the *Edinburgh Review* for October 1830, (vol. lii. p. 113,) in an article upon *Dr Morehead's* 'Dialogues on Natural and Revealed Religion.' That the reviewer reasons upon theistical principles is evident from the allusion he makes to 'the will of the Creator,' to which, I may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox latitude." (Why, does *Antitheos* suppose, he may meet an atheist at every corner he can turn?) "Relative to our argument *a priori* he observes:—'The truth is, it involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended to support. The question as to the being of a GOD, is purely a question of fact: HE either exists or HE does not exist. But *there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by argument a priori*; because *nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction*, and this can never be predicated of the negative of any proposition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. *Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent*, and consequently *there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, in other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable*. This must be evident to every one who knows what demonstration really means. It is a universal law, that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line di-

“ ‘ rected towards its centre. But the contrary of this  
 “ ‘ may easily be conceived, because it involves no contra-  
 “ ‘ diction ; for bodies might have fallen upward, if we  
 “ ‘ may so express it, as well as downward, had such  
 “ ‘ been the will of the Creator. But we cannot con-  
 “ ‘ ceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of  
 “ ‘ geometry—as, for example, that the three angles of  
 “ ‘ a triangle should be either greater or less than two  
 “ ‘ right angles—because this implies a contradiction.  
 “ ‘ The distinction, therefore, between necessary or de-  
 “ ‘ monstrable truths and matters of fact, consists in this,  
 “ ‘ —that the contrary of the former involves a contra-  
 “ ‘ diction, whereas that of the latter does not. But there  
 “ ‘ is no contradiction implied in conceiving the non-  
 “ ‘ existence of the DEITY ; and therefore His existence  
 “ ‘ is not a necessary truth, *a priori* demonstrable.’ ”†

§ 15. Of this extract from the *Edinburgh Review*, the words which are *here* put into *italic* characters are precisely the words of *Mr Hume*, as they are to be met with in the ninth Part of his “ Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.” We shall present our reader with the passage in the “ Dialogues” in which those words are to be found. An original, generally, is preferable to a copy.

§ 16. “ There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable.”

§ 17. *Mr Hume* has emphatically added: “ *I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.*” “Dialogues,” Part IX.

† The reader may consult, here, the note (†) to § 33 of Part VI.

§ 18. These words of *Mr Hume* contain all that is *argument* in the citation made by *Antitheos* from the *Edinburgh Review*. All the rest of the citation is mere illustration or repetition.

§ 19. Our author thus comments on the passage he has quoted: "To add any thing to the foregoing reasoning of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. It is clear and satisfactory." (Par. 13.)

§ 20. Clear and satisfactory the reasoning referred to I believe to be, with regard to what the first users of such ratiocination had *in their view*. But whether it be so clear and satisfactory in *every* case, we shall presently see.

§ 21. For reasons already hinted, I shall address myself to the ratiocination as contained in *Mr Hume's* words rather than in those of the Reviewer.

§ 22. It may be remarked, that since *Mr Hume* rests the whole controversy upon that argument, our atheist may be thoroughly assured, that if it turn out to be the very reverse of clear and satisfactory, his cause is a mighty bad one. Up to this stage of the business, our atheist's faith and trust in the argument are boundless.

§ 23. "There is," says *Mr Hume*, "*an evident absurdity* in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*." *Because Mr Hume has said so*, many take the existence of the absurdity for granted, who perhaps have never seriously weighed the evidence of its reality. The Sceptic's argument against any *a priori* argument for any matter of fact, is happily *very easily* answered. And, for the reason already brought out,† if it can but be shewn, that it

† Neither in the Dialogues on Natural Religion, nor in any other quarter of his writings, is there offered any other argument against the possibility of a valid *a priori* argument for the being of A DEITY.—The same argument substantially, a little differently set out, occurs again in the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." Sect. XII. part iii.

is weak and most unsatisfactory, we have his authority for the good sense there is in pretending to *demonstrate* at least one matter of fact.

§ 24. He opens his argument in the following manner. “Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction.” Both these propositions are granted to the fullest extent. But that which follows,—“Whatever we conceive as existent, *we can also conceive as non-existent*,”—is most completely to be denied. He appeals to the constitution of the human mind: “What-  
“ever WE conceive as existent, WE can also conceive as  
“non-existent.” Now, what this constitution is, in reference to the point at issue, let us call in a few witnesses to depose.

§ 25. “I demand of any one to *remove* any part of *pure space* from another, with which it is continued, even  
“so much *as in thought*.” — “I would fain meet  
“with that thinking man, that can, *in his thoughts*, set  
“any bounds to *space*, more than he can to duration;  
“or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either.”  
*Locke’s Essay*, B. II. ch. xiii. § 13. 21.

§ 26. “As the order of the parts of time is *immutable*,  
“so also is the order of the parts of *space*. To remove  
“these from their places, is to remove them from them-  
“selves.” *Newton’s Principia: Schol. ad Defin. 8.*

§ 27. “He that can suppose eternity and *immensity*  
“\* \* \* removed out of the universe; may, if he  
“please, as easily remove the relation of equality be-  
“tween twice two and four.” *Dr St. Clarke’s* “Demon-  
“stration,” under Prop. III.

§ 28. “We find within ourselves the idea of infinity,  
“*i. e. immensity* and eternity, *impossible, even in imagina-*  
“*tion, to be removed out of being.* We seem to discern



“*intuitively*, that there *must and cannot but be* some-  
 “ what, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or  
 “ the archetype of it.” *Butler’s* Analogy, Part I. ch. vi.

§ 29. “ We cannot conceive *space* possible to be  
 “ created, since *we cannot conceive it as non-existent* and  
 “ creatable, which may be conceived concerning every  
 “ created being. Nor can we conceive it properly as  
 “ *annihilated or annihilable.*” *Dr I. Watts’* Philosophical  
 Essays, Essay I. Sect. iv.

§ 30. “ We find that we can with ease conceive how  
 “ all other beings should not be. We can remove them  
 “ out of our minds, and place some other in the room of  
 “ them; but *space* is the very thing *that we can never*  
 “ *remove and conceive of its not being.* It is *self-evident*,  
 “ I believe, to every man, *that space is necessary.*” *Rev.*  
*Jonathan Edwards’* Notes.

§ 31. “ We see no absurdity in supposing a body to be  
 “ annihilated; but the *space* that contains it remains;  
 “ and *to suppose that annihilated, seems to be absurd.*”  
*Dr Reid’s* Essays, Essay II. chap. xix.

§ 32. “ It is certain that where the notions of magni-  
 “ tude and figure have once been acquired, the mind is  
 “ immediately led to consider them as attributes of *space*  
 “ no less than of body; and (abstracting them entirely  
 “ from the other sensible qualities perceived in conjunc-  
 “ tion with them) becomes impressed with an *irresistible*  
 “ *conviction that their existence is necessary* and eternal,  
 “ and that it would remain unchanged if all the bodies  
 “ in the universe were annihilated.” *Dugald Stewart’s*  
 Elements, Vol. II. chap. ii. § 3 & 3.

§ 33. Now, here we have, just by way of specimen,  
 eight individuals of the utmost veracity and intelligence,  
 asserting in express terms, or in terms from which the  
 inference is necessary, that they *cannot conceive the non-*

*existence of space.* To those authorities, we shall add only one more.

§ 34. "The first proposition,—‘*Infinity of extension is* “ ‘NECESSARILY *existing,*’—it would be *absurd* in the extreme to deny. No more can we imagine any limit prescribable to extension, than we can imagine the outside of a house to be in the inside of it.” *Antitheos. Refutation,*” Chap. VI. par. 3.

§ 35. "What, now, is the utmost value we can set upon the argument *a priori* for the being and attributes of GOD? Does it possess any value whatever? If it does, it has yet to be shown, for in the hands of the great Rector of *St James’s*, it only proves that something must have existed from all eternity; and in those of a learned and eminent logician of our northern metropolis, nothing more than *the necessary existence of infinite space and duration: none of which propositions were* [or was] “*ever disputed.*” *Antitheos. “Refutation,”* Chap. XIII. par. 1.

§ 36. "To add any thing to the foregoing” authorities “were perhaps superfluous.” They are “clear and satisfactory.” *Mr Hume*, therefore, is entirely wrong in appealing to our mental constitution, when he says: “Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent.” We cannot conceive *space* as non-existent. His proposition, therefore, must undergo this modification at least,—whatever, with the exception of space, we conceive to exist, we can also conceive not to exist. The conclusion from his argument,—“Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable,”—must therefore be limited to this extent, (if no farther;) consequently there is no being; except space, or, if space be not a being, the being which it necessarily supposes, whose existence is demonstrable.

§ 37. Now, as that exhibition of the *a priori* argu-

ment for the being of A DEITY which we are concerned to defend,† lays hold on space as its foundation, or groundwork ; *if* infinite space be a property, or mode of existence, as theologians express themselves, of a *Supreme Mind*, then, unless we cannot ascend from *the* property to *the* substance invested with it, the being of a Supreme Mind is a thing *demonstrable*, is a *necessary* truth, OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF BEING JUDGE.

§ 38. What has become now of *Mr Hume's* argument against any *a priori* argument for any matter of fact ? It has turned out to be indeed the farthest thing possible from being clear and satisfactory. And no wonder, when such a one as OUR ATHEIST APPEARED AS AN EVIDENCE AGAINST IT.

§ 39. So much has this gentleman turned the tables upon himself by venturing to appropriate the reasoning which to him seemed so irrefragable, and upon which he shewed no disinclination to peril his cause. What will he do now ? It is easy to see what he *should* do.

§ 40. Although the “ reasoning of the reviewer ” appeared to our author to be “ clear and satisfactory,” yet he follows it up by a remark of his own, which we shall notice. “ Men have often been made to suffer severely— “ on some occasions to the loss of life—for denying the “ being of a GOD. \* \* \* But was ever any one put to “ death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two “ make four ? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous ; but where- “ fore should it be so ? Simply because *it is not possible* “ there should be any difference of opinion about the mat- “ ter.” (Par. 13.) Surely it is possible to deny, that twice two make four ; though it is not possible to conceive the denial to be correct. And 'tis not to be *taken for*

† It is the only proper exhibition. And on this subject I would, with all humility, refer to “ Division II.” of the “ Introduction ” to the “ Argument,” especially, to the 3d section of that Division.



*granted, without proof*, that no one ever denied that twice two is four : Things as absurd have been said.†

§ 41. There may be assigned another reason why the civil magistrate in no country ever put any one to death for telling a certain lie, and denying that two and two are four : which reason is this,—a lie of that kind could injure no one's morals ; it could only shew the already wretched morals of him who uttered it. A denial of that arithmetical truth could go no way to undermine and loosen the foundations of civil society, *as some other denials have been supposed to tend to do.*‡ In fine, to say that twice two is not four, can never inflict a wound either on public or private morality.

§ 42. It must be granted to *Antitheos*, that it *is not possible* to conceive the denial of the proposition, that twice two make four, to be correct. But at the same time we must take care to remember this, that there are truths, as well as that arithmetical one, which, to use *Antitheos's* language, “it is *not possible* there should be any difference “of opinion about.” To instance in the case of the truth, There is infinite space ; that there is necessarily such, “is one of the first and most natural conclusions, that “any man, who thinks at all, can frame in his mind : “And no man can any more doubt of this, than he can “doubt whether twice two be equal to four. ’Tis possible “indeed a man may in some sense be ignorant of this “first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not “thinking at all : (For though it is absolutely impossible “for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may possibly

† *Vide Part. XI. § 18. not. ‡—quoq; Part. XII. Not. CC.*

‡ “—Those whose principles dissolve the first bonds of association, “and society, the ATHEISTS and *despisers of God and religion.*”—*Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses*, B. II. sect. iv. With reference to the subject before us, consult the whole of Books I. II. III. of that stupendous work.

“neglect to conceive this: Tho’ no man can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not.)”†

§ 43. I grant all this, *Antitheos* will say. But what of that? I was insinuating, not that the propositions concerning two and two making four, and concerning the existence of space, were not on a footing as to real undeniableness, but that the former of the propositions, and the one affirming the being of a GOD, are not on such a footing.

§ 44. The following is the reply which is to be made to what *Antitheos* has been supposed to advance:—Though it may require some thought and painstaking to rise from the truth, that space is necessary, to the Being who is, so to speak, the substratum, or, as logicians would say, the subject of inhesion, of space, and to the other properties or attributes of that Being; still IF we can so ascend, by legitimate ratiocination, then the proposition affirming the being of a GOD is on the same footing as to true undeniableness with that maintaining, two and two are equal to four,—*Antitheos* being to judge, for, as we have seen, he has lent his hand to constitute, and make firm for ever, the pillar which sustains the weight of the edifice. The steps in the reasoning may be many; the demonstration long: But the length of a demonstration is not allowed to be a presumption against its validity in mathematical affairs: Is there any reason why it should be so here? The truths of mathematics are not all intuitive or self-evident. To demonstrate the greatest mathema-

† These words are from *Clarke’s* “Demonstration,” under Prop. III. They are here used only as *accommodations*. What the Doctor has in view, is somewhat different from what I am upon. But I could not think of words better adapted to express my meaning in this place than those of his.

tical certainties, requires much thought, labour, and time, for the demonstrations can be effected only by means of perhaps some thousands of intermediate ideas.

§ 45. Our atheist, after making the observation we have thus noticed, proceeds in this way: "If, however, the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one," (which is the one that maintains the necessary existence of space,) "were capable of demonstration as mathematical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the respect due to doubts and denials in either case; or rather, it would be impossible to find doubters and deniers in the one more than in the other." A sentiment this with which we must entirely agree. If the primary dogma of theology be not capable of being demonstrated, it is because it is rather of the class of self-evident truths, and so stands in need of no demonstration: as we adduced eight witnesses, *and one over and above*, to depose to.

§ 46. So much for the "irrelevancy of the argument;" but the chapter treats of something more; it considers "the character" of the argument.

§ 47. "The argument in question," says *Antitheos*, "is nothing else than an attempt to establish the application of *mathematical* reasoning to \* \* real existences."† This is the character *Antitheos* gives of the argument: It employs *mathematical* reasoning, says he. How sad a misapplication of a word! Mathematical! What can any branch of the mathematics have to do in the case? Arithmetic or Algebra? You jest! Geometry? Nonsense! How can lines and angles and segments come this way? "How vain and preposterous the attempt," indeed, to apply mathematics to the proof of real existences!

† These words have been already adduced. *Vide supra*, § 6. Our purpose now is different.

§ 48. It may here be mentioned, that this curious misapplication of the word “mathematical” is to be found not only several times in this chapter, but very frequently throughout the “Refutation.†”

§ 49. If *Antitheos* will point out *one line, only one line*, wherein mathematical reasoning is employed to prove a real existence, in the whole of *Dr Clarke’s* “Demonstration,” or of “the Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and “Attributes of God;” I shall hold myself as wholly and for ever *refuted*, and reduced to so desperate a condition by my rout, as to be incapable of ever again taking up a weapon in the cause.

§ 50. I cannot do better than here quote a passage from the Quarterly Review for February, 1836. The article is on *Lord Brougham’s* Preliminary Discourse. “It is quite absurd to apply the phrase ‘mathematically impossible’ to a matter of fact.” “*Clarke* might “believe, that the existence of DEITY is as certain, by “*metaphysical* evidence, as any proposition in *Euclid* is by “mathematical evidence; but to speak of the existence “of the Maker of the universe as mathematically possible “or impossible, is *of all incongruities the most extravagant “and ridiculous.*” P. 401.‡

† *Vide infra*, § 57—*quoq*; Part. VIII. § 9. et Part. VI. § 2.—&c.

‡ *All men err at times* : And *Clarke* himself, in a moment of forgetfulness, lost his sense of the FITNESS, or rather UNFITNESS, (not of *things*—for he never forgot that—but) of *words*, for he speaks of the “*Mathematical* certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to “be obtained.”—*Evidences* : near beginning.

The simple truth is, this great man should have spoken, not of “mathematical certainty,” but of a certainty equal in naked demonstrative force to mathematical,—of a certainty which, as well as mathematical certainty, flows from, yet always rests on, what *Stewart* would designate “an ultimate and essential law of human thought.” (See *Philosophical Essays*. Essay II. ch. ii. sect. 2.)

But though *Clarke* gave, once, a wrong character to his Demon-



§ 51. The truth is, to give the truth in one word, our atheist has mistaken *metaphysical* reasoning for *mathematical*.

§ 52. One great distinction between these two species of reasoning is the following. Metaphysical reasoning may be exerted, to some extent, on almost any subject: Mathematical, that is, geometrical, reasoning, is applicable to one subject only.

§ 53. Geometry is the science of abstract magnitude, or, of *partial considerations* of bare extension. In one sense, it respects not any thing really existing; for the points, and lines, and superficies, and figures, from which it starts, can no where be found in the domain of nature: they exist only as conceptions—But indeed we really have no ideas corresponding to a line without breadth, and a point without magnitude. *Etc. etc.*†

§ 54.—1. No reasoning can be mathematical which does not refer to what we may call the *subjects* of the science, the angles, the triangles, the squares, the circles, &c. &c. &c. 2. And no reasoning, even though occurring in a professedly geometrical book, can be mathematical, unless it *works* by means of some of those subjects.

§ 55. Metaphysical reasoning, not unfrequently, is to be met with in mathematical authors. Many instances stration, this, in sooth, has no mathematics in it. Begging pardon of the Archbishop of *Dublin* for saying so: for this accomplished Logician, speaks of “the *futility*” (better, if he had spoken of the *non-existence*) “of the attempt of *Clarke* \* \* to demonstrate (in the MATHEMATICAL sense) the existence of a DEITY.” *Logic*. B. IV. ch. ii. § 1. (Sixth Edition.)

*Dr Whately*, who writes so much about “ambiguous terms,” may set one word more among his number, in the next edition.

† This assertion may seem odd, and may shock a mathematician’s ears. But it is true. And not much reflection will be required to shew that it is so. Of course, there is no need to prove here the truth, or, if you will, the falsehood, of the assertion. The matter between me and *Antitheos* has nothing to do with that.

of this might be given,† were these at all necessary. And a metaphysician may occasionally turn mathematician. But the boundaries of the two sciences remain always well-defined. No two things can be more distinct than the two species of reasoning.

§ 56. Thus have we examined what our author has advanced on the “character and irrelevancy of the argument.” There are various other topics touched upon in the first chapter, which shall all be considered *in their proper places*. On one only of these topics shall we say something at present.

§ 57. “Here, indeed, the grand secret, in managing the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those upon which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues and misapplies general language. *Necessity*, for instance, which by the way is the key-stone of the structure, is different from what it is found to be any where else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to the utmost fineness of its mathematical” (metaphysical)

† *Ex. gr.* Take the first Note (the Note on the first Definition) in *Wallace's Playfair's Euclid's Elements*. (Eighth Edition.) The reasoning is pitiable: And the Grecian Geometer's definition, in spite of the Commentator's assault on it, has as much propriety as ever.

Who could have suspected it? But the *reasoning* in the Note in question might be employed, with some success too, in behalf of the doctrine of unextended human spirits,‡—as well as in behalf of other vagaries, as wild, (but hardly any wilder,) and accompanied by still worse results.

How often one falls upon Mathematicians out of their road! And the grand misfortune is, your *genuine* mathematicians never go out of their road, but to be busied about what is sure to land in mischief. If the scales and compasses drop down from their hands, and an ill wind should blow any thing past problems and theorems up into their heads; then let us look to the consequences.

‡ *Vide Part. III. § 34. et seq.—quoq; Part. VIII. Appendic. B. § 24. et Part. IX. § 39. not. †*

“acceptation, although the weight of its common and real meaning is essential to the validity of the conclusion.” (Par. 11.)

§ 58. A single remark here in passing. Our atheist will find that *necessity*, and all the cognate words, are, by his opponent, used always in the same sense; in the premises they mean what they mean, and nothing more than they mean, in the conclusion. Let him detect me in an inconsistency in this matter, let him seize me falling fairly asleep between my premiss and my conclusion, and forgetting when I awaken and proceed to the latter, the sense in which I had used my words in the former; and I shall grant that *the day is his*.

§ 59. It will be a good thing to take the present opportunity to inform my opponent, once for all, what, and what only, is to be understood by *necessity*, and by *necessary existence*. In settling these points, we shall be affording the materials for answering the question, What is, in propriety, to be understood by an *a priori* argument for the being of A DEITY? A question which here to decide is of the utmost importance, for a reason that will be immediately gathered.

§ 60. When *Antitheos* says: “Up starts the logician of the new school \* \* It is irrefragably to be proved, not only that a GOD *does* exist, but that he *must* exist, and that too as necessarily as that two and two make four;—that his non-existence, in short, cannot even be conceived.” \* \* \* “A being existing by necessity is sought for; that is (according to the new logic) one whose non-existence it is not in the power of man to imagine.” (Par. 5 & 6.) When, I say, *Antitheos* writes in this manner, he gives the true state of the case, he words it as if he knew well enough what ought to be understood by an *a priori* argument.

§ 61. But when, no more than three pages down, he

quotes, with the utmost approbation, a writer who, as we observed,† states the question in this way: “The question as to the being of a GOD, is *purely* a question of fact: HE either *exists* or HE *does not exist*.‡” When, I say, *Antitheos* does this, he seems to have forgotten what he himself had laid down. By forgetting the *necessity*, he has suddenly lost his knowledge of what an *a priori* argument is. In fine, his own representations are quite inconsistent with each other.

§ 62. Since, therefore, our atheist’s views of an *a priori* argument seem so confused and inconsistent, seem

“Neither sea,

“Nor good dry land,”||

it becomes highly necessary to attempt setting him in the way to bring congruity and order out of the chaos. The disorder which exists among his ideas affects the very vitals of the subject in controversy.¶

§ 63. What, then, is necessity? In what direction is it that we are to look for necessity?

† *Supra*, § 14.

‡ In the very second paragraph (as we have quoted therefrom—*supra* § 5.) the same sort of representation occurs. Indeed, throughout the “Refutation,” sometimes the one sort of representation, sometimes the other, is to be met. A singular confusion of ideas! or, a singular way of making a *present* point good! Whatever be the *cause*, the confusion does no insignificant service to our atheist. But its services he must henceforth dispense with: The *consequences* of the confusion *are not* to be allowed.

|| *Milton*.

¶ It is not a singular thing not to have clear conceptions as to what *a priori* argumentation for a real existence is. Nay, to labour under a sad delusion upon this subject, is not an uncommon case. Many persons know not what is the proper meaning of the thing. And finding absurdities in their conceptions regarding it (no mighty matter, perhaps, after all), they fall to arguing, and to railing, against the production of their own fancy. But let them only banish the ugly thing that distracts them, and they may be presented with a more sightly shape. What that is which those persons have poured their wise contempt upon, *they* perhaps do not yet best know.



§ 64. Necessity does not concern things in themselves. Necessity is no predicate of a thing, any farther than it expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding the existence of the thing. In fine, necessity lies not in the *objective* reality, but in the *subjective* mind.

§ 65. To illustrate this doctrine by an example taken from the science of magnitude. That the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, is a truth which, if the demonstration has been followed, cannot *but be believed, when the subject is thought on*. It is therefore pronounced a *necessary* truth. But the necessity that is in the case is not to be found anywhere but *in the mind* of the demonstrator. One very good proof of which is, that—not the visible representatives of the mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles, but—the real mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles themselves, can exist nowhere but in our conceptions. (*Ut supra*, § 53.)

§ 66. In the next place, What are we to understand by a necessarily existing *being*? A necessary being, is one whose existence is *necessarily believed by us*;—a being, in a word, whose non-existence *we cannot conceive*. But is this all that is meant by a necessary being? It is indeed all: any thing more is inconceivable.

§ 67. It will now be very obvious what an *a priori* argument, that is, an argument from the necessity of the case, is. It is an argument drawn from those conceptions of the human mind *of which it cannot be divested*. In its essential parts, it founds on nothing but those ideas which arise in the mind *in the very act of thinking*, those ideas which are the *sine quâ non* of all other ideas.

§ 68. I shall conclude what I have to say on this topic, by an extract from an article in the Quarterly Review, to which we have been already indebted. (*Supra* § 50.) “The arguments which have been adduced by

“ theologians in favour of DEITY, have been generally  
 “ considered to be of two kinds, viz. arguments *a priori*,  
 “ and arguments *a posteriori*. In the strictly logical”  
 [or rather, etymological] “ sense of these terms, neither  
 “ of these modes of reasoning is applicable to the ques-  
 “ tion. For to reason *a priori* is to argue from the cause  
 “ to the effect: this evidently is to assume the cause, the  
 “ existence of which is the very point which is here to  
 “ be proved. To reason *a posteriori*, is to argue from  
 “ the nature of the effect to that of the cause. But this  
 “ argument, if applied to the question, would assume the  
 “ world to be an effect, a point equally necessary to be  
 “ proved before the argument can be legitimately ap-  
 “ plied. Though this is the strict and logical” [etymo-  
 logical] “ meaning of the terms, they are often employed,  
 “ *the former to denote speculative or abstract reasoning*,  
 “ the latter, that which is founded on facts or experience.”  
 —P. 399–400.†

† “ To confine—” says *Dr St. Clarke*, “ the use of the term [*a priori*],  
 “ to argumentations about such things only, as have other things *prior*  
 “ to them in time; is only quibbling about the signification of words.”  
 Ans. to 7th Letter.

## PART II.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. Having considered the relevancy of a *a priori* argumentation, when directed to the most important of all matters of fact, (the most important fact, if it be a fact at all,) we proceed to examine whether *Antitheos* has been at all successful, or signally unsuccessful, in his attempt to exhibit any *specific fallacy* in the “ Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of God.” Unless we mistake the matter very much, it will be discerned, both easily and obviously, that the gentleman in question has failed, failed in the most egregious manner, with regard to what he undertook to accomplish.

§ 2. “ *Mr Gillespie’s* argument, \* \* \* \*” our atheist assures us, “ is perhaps as well as can be expected of a work of *the sort*, and may probably supersede every thing of the kind that has gone before it.” (Ch. V. par. 1.) Of *the sort*, says he: willing to hint, the best of *any kind* is bad enough. If *Antitheos* is disposed to see no force in *a priori* reasonings for A GOD, he is, if any thing, less inclined to set value on the *a posteriori* method. “ The argument *a posteriori*,” he remarks, “ relies on experience, and deduces causes from their effects. This process, however, is *quite illogical*. \* \* It takes for granted the *existence* of an agent *capable* of producing the *effects* contemplated as the source of the argument—which of

"course is begging the principle." (Ch. I. par. 4.)† There can be nothing worse in argument, than to take for granted the principal thing to be proved. In fine, "the approval of the argument *a priori* by \* \* \* the most erudite and enlightened—of the Christian world," (ch. i. par. 1.) makes it evident, that the strength of the cause is held (by the best judges) to lie in the direction, not of the *a posteriori* method, but of the other. And since this is so, it is to the latter quarter that atheists must point their most formidable artillery.—Upon the whole, we may not unnaturally expect that our antagonist will bring all his powers to bear against *Mr Gillespie's* exhibition of the *argument a priori for the existence of DEITY*.

§ 3. It is in his fifth chapter that the author of the "Refutation" begins to consider his present opponent's work. *Antitheos* is, in that place, in a sort of rambling vein, and he stumbles over a good many matters, in a way that shall draw none of our attention at this time. There is, however, a certain thing propounded in the chapter referred to, which it will be well to take the opportunity now presented to set forth.

§ 4. "Our metaphysical opponents," says our anti-theist, are always for *stealing à-march* upon us. " \* \* \* "If *Mr Gillespie* had even told us what he meant by the word *being*, which he so frequently makes use of, we should have been able to say whether it could be proved necessarily to exist or not." ‡—The truth in this affair is, that *Mr Gillespie*|| has told what he meant by

† See, to the same effect, Chap. II. last par.

‡ The same sort of thing is iterated in another place.—"*Mr Gillespie* talks of a substance, it is true, a *being* of infinity of expansion, &c.; but why has he neglected to tell us of what sort this substance" [or *being*] "is?" Ch. XII. par. 2.

|| We shall occasionally speak of *Mr Gillespie* in the *third* person, to avoid the too frequent recurrence of a certain personal pronoun, and

the word *Being*, and that as soon as ever he made use of it. *Vide Part. XI. § 15. not.* † "If a mere abstraction," *viz.* a mere thought of your mind, or of mine, (*vide part. i. § 8.*) "is represented by it, we can have no quarrel with "any kind of demonstration about it he pleases. \* \* \*"—And no wonder.—"Should it, on the contrary, refer "to an agent of any kind—something possessing power—"something that acts—a thing, in short, having a real "existence, in the same sense as that in which we apply "reality of existence to common objects, there can be "no objection to his free use of the term. The author's "subsequent reasoning involves the latter construction " (*which construction, I may mention once for all, I shall* "UNIFORMLY adopt.")—Par. 4. Who now is the stealer of marches? *Mr Gillespie*, in Book II. seeks to prove, that the Being treated of in Book I. is necessarily an Intelligent, an All-powerful, and a Free Being. To give it in *Antitheos's* words. "This grand argument is laid out "in two books. In the *first*, the metaphysico-theologian "endeavours to prove that some being exists which is the "*sine qua non* of every other thing in existence. It consists of three parts, or series of propositions, maintaining, first, that Space is this being; second, that Duration is also a being of the same kind; and third, that "these are not different, but identical. The *second* "book ascribes to the subject of the fore-mentioned proofs, "the Divine attributes of *omniscience*,‡ unlimited power, "and freedom of agency." (Ch. VI. par. 1.) And could *Mr Gillespie* assume, that the Being he treats of is a Mind, possessing power, and freeness, *before* he had said one perhaps to steer clear of inconvenient circumlocutions in addition to the appearances of an offensive monosyllable. The separate, or the conjoined, presence of some third reason at times, may be detected. The reader is to determine.

‡ The word in the text of the "Refutation" is, "*Omnipresence*," but this, I take it, is an error of the press.



word by way of proof? How would this have been consistent with that “precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement” which *Antitheos* found to be present in the work we have him now commenting on? (See Ch. V. par. 1.) No: *Mr Gillespie* proceeded not to his business so illogically. But, quoth our atheist, I shall argue, ay, and *uniformly* too, against my opponent, as if he *had* done a thing so illogical, as if he *did* “refer to \* \* \* some-thing possessing power—something that acts”—before he had offered aught towards proving the possession of power, and of agency. Is not this stealing a march with a vengeance? If *Antitheos* be entitled to steal such a march, then one entertaining the whimsical wish to find flaws in *Euclid's* demonstrations, may accuse the *Elements* for not assuming the third book in the second, or the last in the first; one desirous of catching *Aristotle* at a disadvantage, may censure the *Analytics* because they do not take for granted the doctrine concerning valid syllogisms ere that of single propositions has been gone over. *Antitheos* had truly good reasons for calling his production a *refutation*, if his opponent “makes intelligence, and power, and freedom of agency, part of his argument,” (ch. v. par. 4.) before producing any reasons for what he does.

§ 5. The secret is this: Our atheist is quite unable to overturn *Mr Gillespie's* “Argument,” and therefore, as he must needs overturn it, he *turns it over*, and places the tail of it where the head should be. But as often as we find *Antitheos* busying himself at this play, we shall run to the rescue, and lose no time in setting things in their natural positions.

§ 6. The paragraph in Chapter V. from which we have been quoting concludes as follows, the words being connected with the passage we have cited at large. “For the tenability of his position, however, respecting the

"necessary existence of such a being, according to his own view of necessity, I would refer him to what has been stated in the first chapter of this Refutation." Here he refers to something supposed to be established in a previous portion of his work. And in our turn, we would point to what the reader will find advanced in relation to that portion in Part I.

§ 7. "It is more easy to censure an argument in general terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair and open grounds." So says *Antitheos* (ch. i. last par.), and we shall not quarrel with what he says. It may be *more easy* to do one thing than another, while to do, with propriety, either the one thing or the other, is very far from being easy. In Part I. we have considered the general censure, and our present business is to inquire whether or not our atheist has met, on fair and open grounds, *the particular parts* of the "alleged demonstration." That the grounds on which he has met these are any thing but *fair*, will, we are confident, be very apparent by and bye. But we shall have, or we are mistaken, but little to complain of on the score of the grounds not being *open* enough.

§ 8. "We shall take," says our author, "the most laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous way† of combating *Mr Gillespie's* principles,—book by book, and proposition by proposition. This course *is the more necessary*, as the argument *a priori*, unlike that derived from experience, depends upon a chain of reasoning,—not upon the pointed putting of a single case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand." Ch. VI. par. 2. "This labour, \*" he informs us in another place, "I cheerfully undertake, that there may

† Why the "*least* advantageous way"? (Would any way have been advantageous?) Has *Antitheos* his own defeat in view, and is there a willingness on his part to make us anticipate it?

“be nothing left to suppose on the score of disingenuousness,” &c.—Ch. I. par. 14. Because the argument *a priori* depends on, or rather consists of, a *chain* of reasoning; this appears of itself a sufficient reason why it should be examined *link by link*. But *Antitheos* had assigned another reason for his doing that which leaves nothing to be supposed on the score of disingenuousness. “Authors,” he had remarked, “are peculiarly jealous of their privileges, and tetchy and froward with regard to any freedom used in the treatment of their expressions.” Ch. VI. par. 2. Especially—(it is worth while to notice it—) where the freedom used extends so far as to turn the end round upon the beginning. *Vide supra*, § 5.

§ 9. Our atheist is now come to the first of *Mr Gillespie’s* Propositions.—“The first Proposition,—‘Infinity of extension is necessarily existing,’—it would,” *Antitheos* declares, “be absurd in the extreme to deny,” &c. &c. *Vide Part. I.* § 34.

§ 10. But let us analyze that Proposition, and view attentively what it affirms, or, at least, involves. It lays down, there is necessarily infinity of extension. And in laying down that, it virtually lays down, there *is* extension. To which we direct attention for reasons that may be forthcoming afterwards.

§ 11. Thus *Antitheos* admits, to the fullest extent, the truth of Proposition I. To me, this is a most important admission. For if that Proposition is granted (and who can rationally deny it?) I undertake to make out all the rest, *by necessary consequence*. The other Propositions are necessarily true, if this one is so.

§ 12. As, therefore, the first Proposition is of such vital importance, we shall adduce what is said in connection with it in the “Argument.”

§ 13. “PROPOSITION I. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing*. For even when the mind endeavours to



"remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Extension non-existent; every one, by a review, or reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is utterly beyond his power to do so.

§ 14. "Now, since even when we would remove Infinity of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must exist by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, or, by substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension for Infinity of Extension taken away; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing: For, every thing the existence of which we *cannot but* believe, which we *always suppose*, even though we *would not*, is necessarily existing.

§ 15. "To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, therefore, an utter contradiction. Just as much a contradiction as this, 1 is equal to 1, *therefore* 1 is not equal to 1, but to 2; 2 not being identical with 1.† As thus: Infinity of Extension is ever present to the mind, though we desire to banish it; *therefore*, it can be removed from the mind. This is just an *application* of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, and not be, at the same time."

§ 16. *Antitheos*, then, allows the full truth of Proposition I. "The same *unqualified assent*, however, cannot," he alleges, "be accorded to proposition the second; namely, that 'Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.'" Ch. VI. par. 3.

§ 17. We shall immediately proceed to examine whether he has offered any thing of worth to support this assertion. For a moment, we turn rather aside, to say

† "A contradiction which we can *no more* believe than that 1 is equal to 1, therefore 1 is not equal to 1," &c. Note in "Argument."

something as to the *importance* of the second Proposition, as a step in the reasoning.

§ 18. "It would be of *no great consequence*," our atheist maintains, "although the second proposition were as irrefragable as the first." Why so? "For it bears upon nothing at all applicable to any being, whether real or imaginary." Ch. VI. par. 6. Bravely said. Let the reader note the reason well. 'Tis natural to demand, What is the proof which *Antitheos* has given of his bold allegation? When we mention, that he has not even attempted to offer a single word of proof, we imagine the surprise into which our readers shall be thrown. The second Proposition of no great consequence! No? Why we have but to turn over a few pages of the "Refutation" to perceive that it, subsequently, rose to be of no little consequence, *even in our atheist's eyes*. "The *fourth* proposition of this 'Argument'—that 'the Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity,'—is founded upon \* \* extension" (it should be "infinity of extension," *vide infra*, § 23.) "being indivisible," &c. *i. e.* is founded upon Proposition II. &c. (Ch. VII. par. 1.) Is Proposition IV., too, of *no great consequence*? If so, May not every Proposition in the alleged demonstration be of no great consequence, in like manner? And a convenient mode of setting aside the whole argument, *in an easy way*, be at once happily fallen upon?

§ 19. The truth is, a *great part* of the reasoning in the "Argument" is built upon the second Proposition, in spite of its being now pronounced to be of no great consequence. The Proposition in question is founded on, to prove, not only that "the Being of Infinity of Extension" is necessarily of *unity and simplicity*," but that—But to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce no small portion of the work referred to; as the

reader may easily satisfy himself by turning it over, and glancing at the references occurring at the bottoms of the pages.

§ 20. Thus much as to the relative importance of Proposition II. *Antitheos* saw proper to be but brief with his objections to it. And his having seen that to be proper, might be the reason why he has chosen to say, its consequence is not great. An insignificant matter had no right to detain him long.

§ 21. And next for the objections themselves. We shall find them to be poor indeed: as weak as they are brief. But the brevity, great though it be, is out of proportion, when compared with the want of strength.—However, by reason of a certain interposed discussion, (with which Part III. shall be entirely occupied,) and because our antitheist has, in a small space, done a great deal to involve matters in confusion, (an easy undertaking, since 'twas rightly gone about,) a considerable time must elapse before we get to the end of those objections. It may be thought incumbent on us to unravel the whole perplexed clew,—and it cannot be so simple a business to get *Antitheos's* reader clear of the labyrinth, as it was for *Antitheos* to weave it for him.

§ 22. That the reader may be able, the more readily to pass just judgment upon those objections, we shall present him with what the "Argument" offers under the second Proposition. The great consequence, too, of the Proposition, (under *Antitheos's* leave be it spoken,) affords a warrant which would not otherwise exist for making the citation.

§ 23. "PROPOSITION II. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.* That is, its parts are necessarily "indivisible from each other.

§ 24. "*Indivisible* in this proposition means indivisible "either really or mentally: For there can be no objection

"to a *real*, which does not apply to a *mental* divisibility;  
 "and a *mental* divisibility, we are under the necessity of  
 "supposing, implies an *actual* divisibility, of Infinity of  
 "Extension.

§ 25. "The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are  
 "necessarily indivisible from each other really or men-  
 "tally.

§ 26. "For that which is divisible really, may be  
 "divided really: and a thing which is actually *divided*  
 "from another must have *superficies* of its own, every  
 "way, and be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing,  
 "be it by ever so little a distance. If any one should say  
 "that things really divided from each other have not  
 "real superficies of their own, every way; to be able to  
 "believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that  
 "a thing can be, and not be, at the same time: And if  
 "any one should say that things which are really divided  
 "from each other, which have real superficies of their  
 "own every way, can possibly be conceived without a  
 "certain distance, however little, being between them;  
 "as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good  
 "syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not ne-  
 "cessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided,  
 "and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing.†

27. "Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separa-  
 "tion: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of  
 "Extension can be separated; that is, *a part* of Infinity  
 "of Extension separated, by a certain distance *from* In-

† "A division by *mathematical lines*, (which are lines of length with-  
 "out breadth,) of the *real existence* of Infinity of Extension, does not  
 "infer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by  
 "something really existing: if the division by mathematical lines  
 "mean any thing more than a *partial apprehension or consideration* of  
 "Infinity of Extension: which is allowed to be possible, just as it is  
 "possible to consider length *without* breadth, or depth *without* breadth  
 "or length." Note in "Argument."



“ finity of Extension ; *there remaining Infinity of Extension*  
 “ *after part of it is taken away* ; the part of Infinity of  
 “ Extension so removed, being removed *from* the remain-  
 “ ing parts *to* these very same parts ; *the part, thus, being*  
 “ *at rest while it is taken away* ; the part so moved away,  
 “ being moved away *from itself* ; *it still remaining*, inas-  
 “ much as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension ; †  
 “ that is though *moved away*, being *not* moved away :  
 “ Which could not be, unless it be false, that *whatever is,*  
 “ *is* : As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity  
 “ of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contra-  
 “ diction to say it is not indivisible.”

§ 28. It will not be amiss to adduce the authority of a name than which there is none greater among metaphysicians ; as to the propriety of the doctrines insisted on (we speak not of the truth *demonstrated*) in the passage which has just been quoted from the “ Argument.”

§ 29. “ The parts of pure space are inseparable one  
 “ from the other ; so that the continuity cannot be sepa-  
 “ rated, *neither really nor mentally*. \* \* \* To divide  
 “ and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the  
 “ parts one from another, *to make two superficies, where*  
 “ *before there was a continuity* : and to divide mentally, is  
 “ to make in the mind two superficies, where before there  
 “ was a continuity ; and *consider them as removed* one from  
 “ the other ; which can only be done in things considered  
 “ by the mind as capable of being separated ; and by  
 “ separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which  
 “ they then have not, but are capable of : but *neither of*  
 “ *these ways of separation*, whether real or mental, is, as I  
 “ think, *compatible* to pure space.

§ 30. “ It is true, a man may consider so much of such  
 “ a space as is answerable or commensurable to a foot,

† “ Prop. I.” Note in “ Argument.” *Vide supra* § 14.

"without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a *partial consideration*, but not so much as mental separation or *division* : since a man can no more mentally divide without considering two superficieses, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide without making two superficieses disjoined one from the other : but a *partial consideration is not separating*." "Essay concerning Human Understanding." Book II. chap. xiii. § 13.

§ 31. Again : "*Expansion* and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no not even in thought." *Ibid.* chap. xv. § 10.

§ 32. "Here," it is thus that *Antitheos* unmask his battery, "the author has given up his abstract necessity, and looks for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him : for" (the proof we shall see is very notable,) "notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, intended to explain away this desertion of his own principles, he evidently insists upon a real division—an actual separation of parts, with some distance, however little between them, as that which he means by divisibility." Ch. VI. par. 4. *Unmeaning talk* : That's complimentary. *Unmeaning talk, to explain away the desertion of my own principles* : Better and better : The compliment, like a rolling snow-ball, grows as it advances. Why is *Mr Gillespie* to be brought in guilty of uttering unmeaning talk ? Because he cherished the felonious intent of explaining away a desertion of his own principles. But what is the evidence of the felonious intent ? Because he gives up abstract necessity, and looks for experiment. How is it proved that he does so ? The answer is truly marvellous. Mark it closely. "He evidently insists upon a real division—an actual separation of parts," &c. "as that which he means by divisibility." Where, in

the name of wonder, does he perpetrate such an offence? *Insists*, EVIDENTLY *insists*, upon *divisibility* meaning *real division—actual separation!* In what words does the author of the "Argument" attempt to set forth so remarkable a paradox? Present them to us, and we shall leave him to enjoy his paradox, undisturbed by any suggestions of common sense. *Mr Hume* was thought to have uttered a bold enough paradox, when he laid down, as a *maxim*, (that was the best of it,) "*that an object may exist and yet be no where.*" ("Treatise of Human Nature." Part IV. sect. v.) But this paradox of the metaphysical theist, that bare divisibility means an actual separation of parts, with some distance between the parts, is, every inch of it, as original and striking as that of the writer of the "Treatise of Human Nature." If *Antitheos* had said, *Mr Gillespie* insists on a real divisibility as that which he means by a real divisibility, or on a real division as that which he means by a real division, (and it may be mentioned, that *Mr Gillespie* knows of no divisibility but a real, that is, a true, divisibility, and of no division but a real, or true, division :) *Antitheos* had not spoken so far amiss.

§ 33. No : *Mr Gillespie* never did insist, either evidently or secretly, on any such paradox. And his adversary might have known that well, had it pleased him to know it. As the reader is by this time fully aware ; what the former insists on, and that evidently enough, is this : "That which is *divisible* really, *may be* divided really : " And this : "A thing which is *actually divided* from another " must \* \* \* \* be *removed* or *separated* from that " other thing, be it by ever so little a distance." *Vide supra* § 26. With *Mr Gillespie*, in a word, divisibility is divisibility and not division ; and to be actually divided, is something more than a mere capacity of being divided. *Antitheos's* cranium, we need have no doubt, is divisible



into two. Is it therefore really divided, actually separated? If so, we may continue the “Examination,” but there will be no *Antitheos* to read what shall be written. But notwithstanding the divisibility of his encephalon, we have hopes of obtaining him for a critic.

§ 34. Our author’s next words are the following: “If *Mr Gillespie* pleads not guilty to this charge;” the charge, to-wit, of evidently insisting upon a real division as that which he means by divisibility, and, as a *consequence*, of giving up abstract necessity, and looking for something like experiment to satisfy him. Of this reasoning, the major, or the suppressed proposition,—To insist evidently upon a real division being meant by divisibility, is to give up abstract necessity, &c. The minor,—*Mr Gillespie* evidently insists upon a real division being meant by divisibility: The conclusion,—*Ergo*, he gives up abstract necessity, &c.:—Are all *Antitheos*’s own. Nobody but our atheist can claim them. Grant, argues *Antitheos*, that *Mr Gillespie* gives not up his favourite necessity. Yea, and it shall be granted.

§ 35. Did our atheist not understand what he read? or is it that he only pretends not to have comprehended? ’Tis difficult to say. For that his opponent gives not up necessity, must be as manifest as any thing can be, to him who at all weighs the words which have been quoted from the “Argument.” These words contain the following reasoning.—Divisibility is another expression for capability of division. That which is actually divided from another, must be removed, or separated, from that other thing: To be really divided being the same thing as to be really separated. Now, therefore, since it is proved, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily inseparable, it is proved, that those parts are necessarily indivisible: That is, that the Infinity of Extension has no parts in the sense of capability of being divided.

§ 36. The proof that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily inseparable, the reader has had above, in the twenty-seventh section.

§ 37. And, by the way here, *Antitheos* has not ventured to breathe a syllable tending to call that proof in question. On the contrary, (and it is worthy of remark in this place,) he avows his belief in the entire validity of the proof. "In the discussion of his second proposition, the "author," says our antitheist, "*makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible.*" Ch. VII. par. 4.

§ 38. I must own, in passing, that I cannot, by any means, reconcile the passage which has just been quoted, wherein it is admitted, that it is *absurd* to suppose space divisible, with what the author of the "Refutation" has advanced elsewhere, namely, that it is *not* to be accorded, infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible. *Vide supra* § 16. Let him who can, reconcile the two statements. I must confess, that, to me, they look exceedingly like an arrant contradiction.

§ 39. Our author, I repeat, has not called in question what goes to prove, infinity of extension cannot be separated. By the very nature of *infinity* of extension, divisibility, or the possibility of division, is excluded. If infinity of extension were divisible, really or mentally, it would not be infinity of extension. "Indeed, that *divisibility* implies *finiteness* in extension, in the very notion "of it, will be evident to every one who considers the "relations of his clear ideas." "Argument, *a priori*," &c. Prop. II. § 7.

§ 40. To return. Divisibility implies capacity of separation: Therefore, infinity of extension is, of necessity, indivisible. This is the reasoning which, *Antitheos* alleges, renounces abstract necessity, and appeals to experience—to prove (I fancy) the necessary indivisibility

of infinity of extension. Verily if this be so, 'twould be hard to say what keeping by abstract necessity, and looking in another direction than to experiment, could be, when one would prove, that “Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,” or that “its parts are necessarily indivisible from each other.”

§ 41. When *Locke* argued as follows: “To divide and separate actually, is, \* \* by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity; and consider them as removed one from the other.” \* \* \* Therefore: “The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor mentally.” (*Vide supra*, § 29.) When, I say, the author of the “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” argued in that manner, did the idea ever enter his mind, (and we all know, how precious fond he was of every sort of idea,) that he was looking “for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him” as to the necessary inseparableness of the parts of pure space?

§ 42. When our atheist said: “The author” (of the “Argument”) “makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible, SINCE that would be to suppose the parts separated without having any space between them.” Ch. VII. par. 4. (The force of the reason shall be examined afterwards. *Vide Part. IV.* § 15.) That is, when our atheist employed this enthymeme: to suppose space really divisible, is to suppose its parts separated, &c.; therefore, to suppose space really divisible is absurd: The suppressed premiss of which expression of reasoning, being, To suppose the parts of space separated, &c. is absurd:—Did it *really* enter his *brain*, to fancy he was looking “for something like experiment as alone

"capable of satisfying him," that 'tis absurd to suppose space is really divisible?

§ 43. If, in Proposition II., there is any appeal made to experience, is the appeal made for the purpose of proving, that infinity of extension is *necessarily* indivisible? Nonsense this would be. If to experience any appeal be directed, it is only for the sake of getting an explanation of *divisibility, divided, division*. And to what other quarter than experience, or use, one could go for an explanation of what is understood by certain English words, it would be difficult to say. It would be impossible to say, with any sense.

§ 44. We have considered the *antecedent* of the hypothetical proposition: "If *Mr Gillespie* pleads not guilty "to this charge." We now pass on to the *consequent*: "(If *Mr Gillespie* pleads not guilty to this charge,) I "would ask him how mathematicians have always regarded the smallest particle of matter divisible to infinity?" Ch. VI. par. 4. Here he asks me to *account* to him for a thing alleged to be a fact. But the *fact itself* deserves to be looked into. *Mathematicians* very rarely condescend to treat of *matter*. It is not the pure Mathematician, but the Natural Philosopher, who considers the question, Is *matter* divisible infinitely? The question which the mathematician undertakes to decide is this, Are the parts of *bare extension* infinitely divisible? The two questions are commonly confounded. Very unfortunately. For thence no small portion of the confusion into which the subject has been thrown. The questions differ in most material respects.

§ 45. The great majority of natural philosophers have determined that matter *is* divisible infinitely. And all mathematicians are of opinion, that bare extension *must be* divisible infinitely. We take upon us, to *make* MANIFEST, in opposition to both, that matter *is not*, and that

mere extension *cannot be*, infinitely divisible—A bold undertaking, considering the overwhelming majority in the one case, and the entire unanimity in the other. To run counter to a thing which has, again and again, been demonstrated, and is received almost as an axiom, by mathematicians, needs some courage. To boast that they shall be utterly overthrown by our opposition, seems to be the height of towering temerity. But patience:—the task will be easy and successful in proportion to the apparent difficulty of the enterprise.



## PART III.

THE NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF EXTENSION AND OF  
MATTER.

§ 1. The propositions, then, which we have undertaken to establish are these :—That matter *is not* divisible to infinity : And, That extension *cannot be* divisible to infinity. In the one case we have to do with the men of experiments. In relation to the other, we have to engage with those who confine themselves to the properties of bare extension. We shall take the second proposition first in hand.

§ 2.—I. “ No priestly *dogmas*, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever *shocked common sense* more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences ; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians \* \*, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A \* quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on *in infinitum* ; this is an edifice so *bold and prodigious*, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it *shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason.*” Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. Sect. XII. part ii. So says *Mr Hume*, and who can refuse his assent to every word ? “ But,” continues he, and at this point the sceptic and we diverge into different routes, “ what renders the matter

“ more extraordinary is, that these seemingly *absurd*  
 “ *opinions* are supported by a chain of reasoning the  
 “ clearest and most natural ; nor is it possible for us to  
 “ allow the premises without admitting the consequences.”

*Ibid.* What ! absurd opinions supported by the clearest  
 and most natural reasoning ! the clearest and most natural  
 premises leading to the most absurd conclusion ! Well  
 might the sceptic when contemplating a matter so *extra-*  
*ordinary* (the epithet how appropriate !) as that which  
 here filled his view, proceed to infer : “ Reason here seems  
 “ to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense,  
 “ which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her  
 “ a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she  
 “ treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain  
 “ places ; but that light borders upon the most profound  
 “ darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and  
 “ confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with cer-  
 “ tainty and assurance concerning any one object.” *Ibid.*

§ 3. It admirably suited the sceptic to speak thus ; to  
 involve, and to lose, the whole subject in the *most profound*  
*darkness*. “ His aim,” as says a much admired writer,  
 “ was,” at all times was, “ not to *interrogate* Nature, with  
 “ a view to the discovery of truth, but by a *cross-examina-*  
 “ *tion* of Nature, to involve her in such contradictions, as  
 “ might set aside the whole of her evidence as good for  
 “ nothing.” Philosophical Essays by *Dugald Stewart*.  
 Essay II. chap. i. And therefore, it was quite in accord-  
 ance with *Hume's* object, to make one part of our nature  
 jar with the other, and, by way of illustrating the con-  
 tradictionousness of the decisions to which our faculties  
 come, to make a proposition shocking and prodigious,  
 follow, by necessary consequence, from propositions most  
 clear and natural. This, we say, was in perfect harmony  
 with *Hume's* grand purpose, and excites no surprise : but  
 to find those who profess no scepticism, staid and sober



mathematicians, rule-and-compasses-men, to find them backing the strongest effort of the sceptic, assisting him to lay the foundation for universal doubt; this, this is the matter for marvel. And it is matter for great marvel.

§ 4. But what can we do? However absurd the opinion be, that extension is infinitely divisible, still *Mr Hume* contends, it is supported by a clear and natural chain of reasoning, and the Mathematicians make their appearance to assure us, that it is even as he maintains. It is fortunate for us, that they bring their demonstrations along with them. For this circumstance puts it in our power to see whether or not common sense and our powers of reasoning are here to be set by the ears, as the Sceptic would have it, and as his supporters the Mathematicians seek not to hinder him from having.


§ 5. Now sundry demonstrations have been offered by geometricians in proof of the divisibility of extension to infinity. We shall select the demonstration propounded by the celebrated *Euler*. This demonstration requires no previous mathematical knowledge. It is simple and plain. And it is easy to see, that if it be not a good demonstration of the problem, how to divide extension infinitely, there cannot be a good demonstration any where else. In fine, 'tis the best that could be had for our purpose.

§ 6. "In geometry," said that eminent mathematician, "it is always possible to divide a line, however small, into two equal parts. We are likewise, by that science, instructed in the method of dividing a small line, as  $a$  i,† into any number of equal parts at pleasure, and the construction of this division is there demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubting its accuracy.

§ 7. "You have only to draw a line  $A I$  parallel to  $a i$  of any length, and at any distance you please, and to divide it into as many equal parts  $AB, BC, CD,$

† See diagram, next page.

“ DE, &c. as the small line given is to have divisions,  
 “ say eight. Draw afterwards, through the extremities  
 “ A, a, and I, i, the  
 “ straight lines A a O,  
 “ I i O, till they meet  
 “ in the point O : and  
 “ from O draw toward  
 “ the points of division  
 “ B, C, D, E, &c., the  
 “ straight lines OB,  
 “ OC, OD, OE, &c.,  
 “ which shall likewise  
 “ cut the small line a i  
 “ into eight equal parts. O



§ 8. “ This operation may be performed, however small  
 “ the given line a i, and however great the number of  
 “ parts into which you propose to divide it. True it is,  
 “ that in execution we are not permitted to go *too far* ;  
 “ the lines which we draw always have some breadth,  
 “ whereby they are at length confounded, as may be seen  
 “ in the figure near the point O ; but the question is not  
 “ what may be possible for us to execute, but what is  
 “ possible in itself. Now in geometry lines have no  
 “ breadth, and consequently can never be confounded.  
 “ Hence it follows that such division is illimitable.

§ 9. “ If it is once admitted that a line may be divided  
 “ into a thousand parts, by dividing each part into two  
 “ it will be divisible into two thousand parts, and for the  
 “ same reason into four thousand, and into eight thousand,  
 “ without ever arriving at parts indivisible. However  
 “ small a line may be supposed, it is still divisible into  
 “ halves, and each half again into two, and each of these  
 “ again in like manner, and so on to infinity.

§ 10. “ What I have said of a line is easily applicable  
 “ to a surface, and, *with greater strength of reasoning*, to  
 “ a solid endowed with three dimensions, length, breadth,

“and thickness. Hence it is affirmed that all extension “is divisible to infinity, and this property is denominated “*divisibility in infinitum*.” Letters to a German Princess. *Dr H. Hunter’s* translation. Vol. II. Letter viii.

§ 11. So we have had a *demonstration* of the infinite divisibility of extension, a demonstration referring to a diagram, according to wont. But whatever *Euler* may have imagined, there *is* a possibility of doubting the accuracy, not of the *construction* of the figure indeed, but of the statement of connection between the construction and the thing to be shewn thereby.

§ 12. “*You have ONLY*,” says the demonstrator, “to “draw a line *A I* parallel to *a i*” (*A I*) “of any length, “and at any distance” (from *a i*) “you please, and to *DI-* “*VIDE* it into as many equal parts *AB, BC, CD, DE, &c.*, “as the small line given is to have *DIVISIONS*, say eight.” *To divide* a line into eight parts, is to make eight lines of one line, each of the eight being *removed* or *separated* from the rest, be it by ever so small a distance. *Vide Part. II.* § 26. *et* 29. Without removal or separation of parts, there can be no division of one line into eight lines: *there can be nothing but the partial consideration of so much of the line to the exclusion of the rest, eight times.* *Euler*, for all mathematicians, has said: “In geometry lines have “no breadth.” How then can geometrical lines divide any thing? since division implies some breadth or interval between the things divided. Where there is no breadth or distance between things, there is no division of the things. They are one and the same thing: That is, we were mistaken when we said, there were more things than one. In short, *a i* “the small line given” has no divisions at all. How then can it have eight? The demonstration of infinite divisibility, has never touched *one instance* of division, and, to speak plainly, is no demonstration at all of the proposition with which it is connected.

§ 13. But mathematicians are to be held as busying themselves not with real, but with mental divisions. But still the same sort of objection falls to be made to a demonstration of the infinite divisibility of extension, when a mental divisibility only is concerned, as falls to be made to a demonstration of such divisibility, when a real divisibility is spoken of. To divide a line mentally into eight parts, is to conceive eight lines made out of one line, each of the eight being considered as separated from the rest. And as geometrical lines have no breadth, they cannot be conceived as dividing any thing. And since they cannot be conceived as dividing any thing, they cannot be conceived as dividing “the small line” *a i*.

§ 14. So much for *Euler's* demonstration. We shall now demonstrate, in our turn, that the extension with which mathematicians have to do, is not divisible to infinity, and that for this plain reason, that it is not divisible at all. Our demonstration must have one quality which *Euler's* has not..

§ 15. Were the lines and figures of which the geometer treats, some more some less elastic and compressible, no dependence could be placed on his science. Take an example for illustration. If in any right-angled triangle, the side subtending the right angle were compressible, then a square described on that side *might or might not* be equal to squares described upon the sides which contain the right angle: For it has not been proved that if the *hypotenuse* of the triangle be compressible, the *base* and *perpendicular* are, in proportion to the respective length of each, equally so, that is, it has not been proved, that equal spaces in the base and perpendicular are compressible in the same degree as equal spaces in the hypotenuse are. The lines and figures of geometry, then, are not elastic or compressible. But all matter is compressible. The extension, therefore, on which mathema-



ticians superstruct their science is not such extension as matter has. What extension can it be then ?

§ 16. In answering this question, we shall be under the necessity of forestalling, in some degree, what we have to say in another place ; but there appears to be no help for it, and a good thing will bear to be told oftener than once. The reader has had it shewn, that there is necessarily infinity of extension, (*vide part. ii. § 13, et seq.*) and has had it proved, that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible, (*vide part. ii. § 23, et seq.*) Now the parts of matter, or the material universe, are divisible from each other. Then, the parts of infinity of extension being necessarily indivisible from each other ; and it being *intuitively evident*, that the substratum of infinity of extension, if it have a substratum, can be no more divisible than infinity of extension itself ; and the parts of matter being, on the contrary, divisible from each other ; and it therefore following, that the material universe is not the substratum of infinity of extension, but is finite in extension :—(For were it truly of infinity of extension, it would, unquestionably, be the substratum thereof:† But it being not that substratum, therefore it is not of infinity of extension :—) Here are two sorts of extension. The one sort, that which matter has : And the other, the extension of infinity of extension. And as infinity of extension is necessarily existing, and as the material universe exists in the extension of infinity of extension ; a part of this (*part*, but in the sense of partial consideration, for otherwise infinity of extension can have no parts—*vide part. ii. § 27.*) must *penetrate* the material universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.

§ 17. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish be-

† “ Upon the hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, we may regard it as ‘the substratum of infinity of extension.’”—*Refutation.*” Chap. VIII. par. 3.

tween those two kinds of extension. And accordingly, confining to *matter*, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name *extension*; let us apply to the extension of infinity of extension, the name *expansion*, or *space*.†

§ 18. In answer then to the question, What is the extension on which geometry is superstructed? the reply is, it is the extension of space, the extension which is of infinity. For we know of no other sort of extension but that of matter, and that of space; or at least if we know of any other, it is altogether beside the purpose. Space, then, is the extension on which Geometry is superstructed. But the parts of space are indivisible. (*Vide Part. II. 27. et supra § 17. locis collatis.*) Therefore mathematical extension is indivisible.

§ 19. Thus have we accomplished what we took in hand, and proved, in opposition to the Mathematicians, that mere extension, or space, *cannot be* infinitely divisible. There is no “strength of reasoning,” greater or less, in *their* demonstrations. And, in the next place, we have positively, rigidly, irrefragably, made manifest the contrary.

§ 20. Should it be argued, that when our mathematician speaks of *divisions*, in demonstrating the infinite divisibility of extension, he does not mean divisions at all, but only partial apprehensions or considerations, which are not so much as mental divisions: as if he had said, it is demonstrable that extension is capable of being par-

† “To avoid confusion \* \*, it were possibly to be wished, that the “name extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the “extremities of particular bodies; and the term expansion to space in “general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say, “space is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has “liberty; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of “speaking.” *Locke’s Essay*, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27. See also Ch. xv. § 1.



tially considered, in the way of consideration of so much extension, and then of consideration of so much of that extension, and so on, *in infinitum*, or rather, without ever coming to any stage where the process of diminishing the extension by considerations must stop: Should this be argued, the reply is two-fold.

§ 21.—1. If our mathematician thought, that the divisibility of extension *in infinitum*, is an empty chimera, and never intended to demonstrate any such divisibility, his words are exceedingly bad indices to his thoughts, but his thoughts are good, as we have made manifest. If he, as standing for all mathematicians, take the divisibility of extension *in infinitum* to be a vain fancy, the point is given up in our favour, and we are entirely agreed with him.

§ 22.—2. If *Euler's* demonstration is to be viewed as a demonstration, that we can consider partially, by considering and again considering, so much extension, without ever being under a necessity of arriving at any termination to the process; in this case, his demonstration must stand good, for any thing we have to advance against it. We never engaged to do aught requiring that we should find a flaw in any demonstration of such a kind. What we took upon us to do was, to make manifest, that extension cannot be *divisible* to infinity. *Vide Part. II. § 45. et supra, § 1.* It may be, or it may not be, that *Euler* has strictly demonstrated the possibility of partial considerations of so much extension, *in infinitum*: But as we did not undertake to throw our authority, such as it is, or our arguments, upon either side of that topic, so we shall not now do what we never promised to do.†

† Perhaps, had it been our business to try to discover flaws in *Euler's* demonstration, considered as a demonstration of the possibility of partial considerations of a certain extension infinitely, we could have stumbled against enow. We shall drop only this one hint. No num-

§ 23. One thing, however, we shall permit ourselves to say upon that subject. Whether or not we can consider partially, by considering and again considering, so much extension, without being obliged to terminate the process somewhere; this very plainly seems to be capable of a test *at least as good* as any to be had in virtue of a *mere geometrical demonstration*. The test referred to is the testimony of our powers of conception, applied *immediately* to the subject; applied in asking an *immediate* answer to the question, Can we, or can we not, consider a certain extension without coming to any point where we must halt in the business of considering, and again considering, and considering yet again, and again, and again? We either can, or we can not, have considerations and sub-considerations without end, and to appeal, for the decision of the affair, somewhere else than to a diagram, and a relative demonstration, seems at least as natural a course as any other. *As natural*, did we say? Nay, (since we are upon the subject,) may we not, with all safety, affirm, that it is a very unnatural, and a very unexpected mode, of going to work, to set out to *demonstrate*, by the interposition of a *geometrical construction*, that our minds can have considerations and sub-considerations of a certain extension, without limit? And it may be worth while for one who is presented with a geometri-

ber of mathematical lines, laid alongside each other, can compose what has any breadth. Take the smallest line we can *draw* (for it would be taking too much for granted, here, to say, the smallest line we can *conceive*). Conceive that line crossed by only a *million* of mathematical lines—for we shall be moderate with our number. Does that enable us to consider, in the smallest line we can draw, a million of different, distinct parts? If not, does the interposition of any number of mathematical lines go any way to help us to consider partially, *in infinitum*, the least extension we can draw? We might prosecute, with some advantage too, the hint, which we have thus dropt, but having opened up the road, we refrain from following it out.

cal demonstration that we can consider so much extension partially, without ever halting with the diminutions, to ask this question, Is the *pertinency* of a geometrical demonstration in the case to be admitted, without proof?

§ 24. To him who should happen to be presented with a demonstration of that nature, (we cannot help saying it,) we would suggest, that there is another question which he might advantageously ask himself; which is this, *Admitting* the pertinency of a demonstration of such a character, does not the thing demonstrated run counter to the testimony which my mind bears as to what it can do? And if consciousness gives the lie to the *conclusion* to which the demonstrator reaches, what can his demonstration be good for?—But these are matters that lie entirely out of our way here.—

§ 25.—Much of what has here been urged in relation to a mathematical demonstration of the possibility of *partial considerations*, infinitely, of so much extension, might be advanced concerning a mathematical demonstration of the possibility of *mental divisions*, and indeed of *divisions simply*, of extension, *in infinitum*.—

§ 26.—II. We come now to the consideration, and the proof, of the first of the two propositions, the proposition which asserts, that matter is not divisible to infinity.

§ 27. There are two great arguments which are constantly employed, when the opinion of those who deny the infinite divisibility of matter, is attempted to be reduced to an absurdity, or a contradiction. And as those arguments may rightly be pronounced the chief *causes* of the prevalence of the doctrine maintaining the infinite divisibility of matter; if we can succeed in entirely breaking their force, or rather in exposing their want of all force, we shall be paving the way for a cordial reception to a doctrine of an opposite description. To bring into complete discredit what has been mainly relied on as giving

support to the sentiment we dissent from, is by no means to attain to the position we would reach, but it is to remove an obstruction lying in the way.

§ 28. We shall make the distinguished author of the Letters to a German Princess furnish us with that exhibition of the arguments referred to on which we shall comment. The mode of stating those arguments may be a little different when it is another than *Euler* who brings them forward, but we may always recognise the pith of the arguments under any covering.

§ 29. But ere we encounter the two arguments as exhibited by *Euler*, it is necessary to admit, there are sufficient grounds for thinking, that this writer, when he uses the words which shall all before long be quoted, supposes that he is treating concerning that extension the divisibility of which to infinity he had *demonstrated* (in such a way as we have seen). For those words immediately succeed to the *demonstration*, in which he was busied about geometrical extension; and in the letter which follows the one containing the *demonstration*, he expressly considers “whether *this* divisibility in *infinitum*” (such divisibility as geometrical extension was *demonstrated* to have) “takes place in existing *bodies* ;” *existing*, for *Euler* held the strange, the monstrous opinion, “that “simple extension, as considered in geometry, can have “*no real existence*,” it being “merely a chimerical object, “formed by abstraction.” Let. ix. True, when we compare this with what is subsequently advanced, that “as “geometry is, beyond contradiction, one of the most useful of sciences, its object cannot possibly be a mere chimerical ;” that “there is a necessity, then, of admitting, that “the object of geometry is at least the same apparent extension which those philosophers allow to body.” Let. x. He is alluding to the monadists; who, it seems, gave to body no more than a *quasi*, or *as-it-were* extension, af-



firming that bodies are not extended, but have only an appearance of extension. When, I say, we compare the assertions together, we find ourselves at a loss what to make of *Euler*. The one declaration seems to contradict the other. First, that extension which is the object of geometry has no real existence; it is a mere chimera. Next, the object of geometry cannot possibly be a mere chimera; the object being at least the same extension which the monadists allowed to body. It is a pity that the author of the Letters should have left us under the necessity of groping, in so much darkness, for his real opinion: his words (we say not his sentiments) contradicting each other. But when we have pondered the matter a good while, and considered the thing on all sides, we begin to perceive that probably *Euler's* opinion at bottom was this:—The object of geometry can have no real existence as a separate entity: The notion of it is gotten by abstraction, and in this sense it is a chimerical, or a *shadowy* object: But tho' the object of geometry exists not separately, it has a true existence, as true an existence as the extension of body, which undoubtedly exists, tho' it exists not by itself. This statement concerning what *Euler's* sentiments at bottom were, derives strength, or perhaps it becomes certain, when we consider other passages which are to be found in the Letters. “All general notions are as much abstract beings as geometrical extension.” “Extension is undoubtedly a general idea, formed in the same manner as that of man, or of tree in general, by abstraction; and as man or tree in general exists not, no more does extension in general exist. You are perfectly sensible, that individual beings alone exist, and that general notions are to be found only in the mind.” Letters vii. & ix. General notions, if we would speak with modern propriety, should not be designated *abstract beings*, nor beings of any kind. They



have being, but they are not beings. To have being, and to be a being, are by no means identical. All states or operations, all modes or qualities, have being, but notwithstanding, none of them constitutes a being.†—*Extension* is not undoubtedly a *general idea*, nor is it an idea at all. Of extension undoubtedly, we have an idea; whether the idea be a general idea, or not. But the idea, and that about which the idea is employed, the extension to-wit, are very different.—I cannot be even so much as positive *that we have* the idea of man, or of tree in *general*. How then can I be positive how the idea is *formed*?—Though extension *in general* exists not externally, still extension exists externally.—I am certain, not only that “general notions” are only in the mind, but that what *Euler* (Let. vii.) and others call “individual *notions*” are to be found nowhere else.—These remarks, in connection with the citations last made, appeared to be necessary, before saying, as we now say, that to *Euler’s* sentiments as we have explained them, his own words enforcing the explanation, we can give our most cordial assent. The object of geometry is an object having a real existence. The object is extension. But mere extension cannot exist separately.‡ The object of geometry is, then, only a *mode*. These are exactly our sentiments.—To return

† It must be conceded, that some of the older authors were accustomed to apply, on certain occasions, the term *being* to a *mode* or *property*, as well as to a *substance*. *Dr Watts* and *Dr Berkeley* may be given as instances. *Vide Part XI.*, §§ 33, 35, et § 39, *not.* † Yet “few writers,” the first (not in consequence) of these Doctors is constrained to admit, “allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is.” *Logic*, Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. A substance is a being: But to say that a mode is a being, is about all one with saying that a mode is *a*—substance, or *a*—something more than a mode.

‡ “To me nothing seems more absurd, than that there should “be extension without anything extended.” *Dr Reid’s Essays*, Es-

from this digression, which will not be without its use : Though it is supposed by *Euler*, that in the words about to be quoted, he is treating of the extension the divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated, still he is to be held as speaking rather of the extension of bodies, *i. e.* of matter. The words in which he expresses himself in the passages to be cited, refer far more naturally and properly to the extension of bodies than to that of space. For instance : To speak of “ *particles*”, attained by dividing a thing, and of the “ division of an inch”, surely savours much more of what relates to matter than of what relates to pure expansion. And true it is that *Euler’s* passing continuously from the extension of space to the extension of matter, without remarking any transition, will not appear at all so wonderful when we consider, that at times he expressly confounds the two kinds of extension. For example, he says : “ The object “ of geometry is at least *the same apparent extension* which “ those philosophers,” the monadists, “ allow to body.” *Ut supra*.—We said, he confounds the two species of extension *at times*. For on other occasions he speaks thus : “ The object of geometry, therefore, is a notion”—The object of geometry is not a notion. The object of geometry is space. *Vide supra* § 18. We have a notion of the object of geometry, but space is not a notion.—“ The object of geometry, therefore, is a notion *much* “ *more general than that of body*, as it comprehends not “ only bodies, but all beings simply extended without im- “ penetrability, if any such there be.” Let. vii.—The author of the Letters, we repeat, sometimes quite confounds the two species of extension. And therefore when,

say II. ch. xix. *Reid* is speaking of extension, having matter in his eye. But it may be demanded : Out of matter, as well as in it, can bare extension exist without any thing extended ?

on an occasion, he is dealing with the one species, he may well think he is also dealing with the other. But tho' *Euler* has confounded the extension of matter with that of space, there is no good reason why we should imitate his example.

§ 30. But even though *Euler's* words be held as being properly applicable to the simple extension of geometry; what matters it? 'Tis not of the least consequence to us on what principle they *ought*, as they stand in the Letters, to be construed. If they apply to the extension of space more naturally than to that of matter, all that our readers have to do, is to consider them in the light in which we have represented them. When set in that light, they contain the marrow of the two arguments which are so much relied on by Natural Philosophers, on behalf of their favourite dogma of the infinite divisibility of matter. And it is with these arguments that our business lies.

§ 31. *First* argument. "Whoever is disposed to deny "this property of extension," (matter,)—the property denominated, divisibility *in infinitum*—"is under the necessity of maintaining, that it is possible to arrive at "last at parts so minute as to be unsusceptible of any "farther division, *because they ceased to have any extension*. "Nevertheless all these *particles* taken together must re- "produce the whole, by the division of which you ac- "quired them; and as the quantity of each would be a "nothing or cypher 0, a combination of cyphers would "produce quantity, which is manifestly absurd. For you "know perfectly well, that in arithmetic, two or more "cyphers joined never produce any thing.

§ 32. "This opinion that in the division of extension, "or of *any quantity whatever*, we may come at last to "*particles* so minute as to be no longer divisible, because

“ they are so small, or” (which is far from being the same thing) “ *because quantity no longer exists*, is, therefore, a “ position absolutely untenable.” Let. viii.

§ 33. I am “ disposed to deny” the infinite divisibility of matter, and am “ under the necessity of maintaining, “ that it is possible to arrive at last at parts so minute “ as to be unsusceptible of any farther division ;” “ that “ \* \* we may come at last to particles so minute as “ to be no longer divisible ;” but I do not allow this is, “ *because they ceased to have any extension*,” “ or *because “ quantity no longer exists.*” Those who deny the infinite divisibility of matter, are under no necessity of assigning any such reason for their doctrine. *Euler*, for those whose sentiments he would represent, and does misrepresent, covertly assumes, that what is not extended is not divisible. For the causal proposition, Certain particles are unsusceptible of division, because they have not any extension ; involves the principle, that what has no extension is not divisible. Which principle is indeed to be admitted. But though we admit the principle, we cannot allow that it is at all applicable in this case : We cannot grant, that the reason why the minute particles are no longer divisible is because they have no quantity. In other words, we admit the truth of the major, we deny the truth of the minor premiss, of the syllogism : We deny, that certain particles have not any extension.

§ 34. It is to be granted, we repeat, that what has no extension is not divisible. And for this simple reason ; what has no extension is *nothing*.

§ 35. On this subject we shall cite a passage from the “ Introduction” to the “ Argument.” We have nothing better to say now. “ Can there be conceived a greater “ absurdity than the assertion, that a substance, cogita- “ tive or incogitative, \* \* \* may be without any ex- “ tension whatsoever ? To believe this indeed defies hu-

“ man nature. If reason can, with certainty, pronounce  
 “ any thing, it may pronounce this decision, that extension and existence are so necessary to each other, that  
 “ there can be no existence without extension. Talk of  
 “ a substance which has no extension : you present us  
 “ with words of amusement.

§ 36. “ If there be a subject on which *authority* should  
 “ be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the debate,  
 “ whether we must conceive, that to deny extension is to  
 “ deny existence. And, 'tis well, that in behalf of the  
 “ position, that existence cannot be without extension,  
 “ there are two as great authorities, in speculations of  
 “ this nature, as can any where be found.

§ 37. “ ‘ Perhaps, \* \* \* ’ (says *Mr Locke*,) ‘ it is  
 “ ‘ near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an  
 “ ‘ idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all  
 “ ‘ manner of expansion ; as it is to have the idea of any  
 “ ‘ real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner  
 “ ‘ of duration.’ Essay concerning Human Understanding, B. II. ch. xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any  
 “ real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of  
 “ duration is, surely, impossible.

§ 38. “ The Cartesians make mind and matter to be  
 “ different in their essence ; and make extension (the  
 “ correction of *Des Cartes*'s opinion is, solid extension,†)  
 “ to be the essence of matter : Consequently, with them,  
 “ a thinking substance cannot be extended. *Mr Locke*  
 “ wrote at a time when these Cartesian opinions were  
 “ generally received. But yet, (we see,) he held, that,  
 “ without extension, it is impossible to conceive existence.”

§ 39. We shall here introduce a sentence from a different part of *Mr Locke*'s work. “ He that considers

† “ This correction is by *Dr Isaac Watts*. See *Philosophical Essays*.”  
 Note in “ Introduction.”



“ *how hardly* sensation is, in our thoughts, *reconcilable* to  
 “ extended matter ; or *existence to any thing that hath no*  
 “ *extension at all*, will confess, that he is very far from  
 “ certainly knowing what his soul is. \* \* \* On which  
 “ side soever he views it, *either as an unextended sub-*  
 “ *stance*, or as a thinking extended matter ; *the difficulty*  
 “ *to conceive either*, will, whilst either alone is in his  
 “ thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side.” B. IV.  
 ch. iii. § 6.

§ 40. (Ought not the difficulties attending the hypothesis of unextended substance, or of thinking matter, have driven *Mr Locke*, not from the one side to the other, from *Scylla* to *Charibdis*, alternately, but to a third hypothesis attended with no apparent inconvenience ? The difficulties attending either of those hypotheses—difficulties, do we call them ? the utter absurdities rather. Sure we are, that there is no proper difficulty at all accompanying the opinion of unextended substance ; for no man can possibly conceive such a thing. And if the thing cannot be, it cannot have any consequences. Ought not the impossibility of believing either of those hypotheses, have made the author of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* to renounce both, and come over to the doctrine, that the soul, being really a substance, is extended, and, being a thinking substance, is immaterial ?) We return to our “ Introduction.”

§ 41. “ ‘ Extension does not belong to *thought*,’ (these  
 “ are the words of *Dr Samuel Clarke*,) ‘ because thought  
 “ ‘ is not a Being ; But there is *need* of extension to the  
 “ ‘ existence of every Being, to a Being which has or has  
 “ ‘ not thought, or any other quality whatsoever.’ Se-  
 “ cond letter to *Joseph Butler*, afterwards Bishop of  
 “ *Durham*.

§ 42. “ ‘Tis true, that in these words, *Dr Clarke* does  
 “ not say, that he *cannot conceive* the existence of a Being

“without extension, but that, ’tis certain, is what he means.” Division III.

§ 43. To these authorities, but for one reason, I might add another; the authority of *Euler* himself. In the passage last quoted from the “Letters,” he assumes that to be unextended is to be nothing. His words are: “The quantity of each,” to-wit, of the “particles,” “would be a *nothing*.” Why? “They ceased to have any extension.” With *Euler*, then, to cease to have any extension, is to cease to be any thing, is to become nothing.

§ 44. The reason why we cannot safely add *Euler* to those authorities is this: Though in that passage, as well as in many other passages, he reasons as if to be unextended were to be nothing, or have no existence, still in other places, he speaks of real existencies on which he bestows not the attribute of extension. To give just one instance: “*Monads*,” says he, “*having no extension, must be considered as points in geometry, or as we represent to ourselves spirits and souls*.” Let. xiv. In spite of all that the panegyrists of *Euler* have ever said, he is, on many occasions, any thing but a consistent reasoner, he is, too often, guilty of consequentially contradicting his own positions. But there is an excuse for him in the present affair. When he reasons as if there can be no existence without extension, he is *off his guard*. But when he talks of substances which have no extension, he is in a situation which must prove dangerous to a weak reasoner, he is a partisan of a favourite hypothesis, the foolish, the absurd, hypothesis of unextended spirit.

§ 45. What has no extension, then, is nothing. And nothing cannot be divisible. So, what is unextended cannot be divisible.

§ 46. When *Euler* gives as the reason why the minute particles are no longer divisible, the position, The parti-

cles have no extension ; he may be giving what the followers of the famous *Leibnitz*, in particular his distinguished disciple *Wolff*, the partizans of unextended *monads*, (things which made so much noise in their day,) gave as the reason why the minute parts of bodies are unsusceptible of division beyond a certain point ; but he is very far from giving the reason why any rational supporter of the doctrine of ultimate particles holds, that bodies are not divisible *in infinitum*.

§ 47. To speak of dividing extension into two non-extensions, that is, something into two nothings, is to mount to the highest pinnacle of absurdity. And it is precisely for this reason we deny, that the minute parts which we contend are no longer divisible, have ceased to have any extension. We cannot, then, by any process of division arrive at last at particles that have ceased to have any extension. And if we cannot arrive at them, if, in other words, they cannot exist, they cannot be unsusceptible, any more than they can be susceptible, of division. Upon the whole, the absence of extension can never be the reason why any particles are no longer divisible.

§ 48. Agreeing with *Euler*, we grant it is “*manifestly absurd*” to suppose, that a combination of nothings can produce something, or that a combination of non-extension with non-extension can produce extension. And this is just the reason, only viewed from a station different from that which it was viewed from before, why the minute particles which with us are unsusceptible of farther division are not altogether unextended.

§ 49. In fine, to be indivisible and to be unextended, are not admitted to be necessarily convertible. Every thing unextended is, *for that reason*, indivisible. But every thing indivisible is not *therefore* unextended : At least this has not yet been shewn. And it has not been

proved, that there is *any other reason* why every thing indivisible is unextended.

§ 50. No doubt, the advocates of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of body, are in the habit of taking for granted, that what admits of no farther division has no extension. “Let us suppose,” says *Euler*, “a line of an *inch* long, *divided* into a thousand parts, and that these “parts are *so small* as to admit of no farther division; “each part, *then*, would no longer have any length, *for*” [the proof is just the thing to be proved, in a different expression,] “*if it had any, it would be still divisible.*” Let. viii. What is indivisible is unextended. Why? Because, whatever is extended is divisible. But this is exactly equivalent to the point that was to be proved. And how is this, in its turn, to be proved? Because, what is indivisible is unextended. And this is the convenient circle in which the advocates of that doctrine go round. They reduce indivisibility to unextendedness, and prove unextendedness by indivisibility. That, then, which they are in the habit of assuming, to-wit, that nothing can admit of no farther division but what has no extension, we must deny their right to assume, till they produce a better title to the right than they do when they take for granted a thing precisely equivalent to the point to be proved.

§ 51. But in discussing the proof given of the assumption, that what is indivisible must be without extension, we have been betrayed into something like an anticipation of the consideration of the *second* argument: which is the following. “*Finally*,” says the author of the Letters, “however far you may have already carried, in “imagination, the division of an *inch*, it is always possible “to carry it still farther; and never will you be able to “carry on your subdivision so far, as that the last parts



“ shall be absolutely indivisible These parts will undoubtedly always become smaller, and their magnitude will approach nearer and nearer to 0, but can never reach it.” Let. viii.

§ 52. The former argument consisted of the assignation of a false ground for the doctrine of ultimate particles: (*Non causa pro causâ.*) This is composed of an entire begging of the question: (*Petitio principii.*) The thing in debate is, whether is the division *always* capable of being carried farther? And this argument says: “It is *always* possible to carry it still farther.” The question under discussion is, *whether* do the parts always become smaller? And this argument declares: “These parts will *undoubtedly* always become smaller.” This argument, then, takes entirely for granted, the thing that was to be proved.

§ 53. We shall indulge ourselves so far as to give, in addition to *Euler's* exhibition of this argument, the vulgar method of stating it. The man of Natural Science usually speaks after this manner: “*Certainly* every portion of matter, however minute, must have two surfaces at least, and then \* \* it follows *of course* that it is divisible; that is, the upper and lower surfaces may be separated.” *Rev. J. Joyce's* Scientific Dialogues, p. 5. So convincing is this reasoning esteemed, it is all that is said on the subject; so plain is it held, it is the pupil, and not the preceptor, who falls in with it. The question for resolution is, has every portion of matter, surfaces that are divisible? The resolution is: To have surfaces *does imply* being divisible. The question is, has every particle an upper and an under surface separable from each other? The resolution says: To have an upper and an under surface *does imply* having separable surfaces. Why, the resolutions do no more than bare-facedly assume the very positions which the opponent of the dogma of infinite di-



visibility would ask proof for. The best that can be said on behalf of that sort of argument which begs the question is, that it is at hand in every case, and therefore can never be utterly overcome, as

When a battle's won,  
The war's as far from being done.†

§ 54. Having thus removed an obstruction that lay between us and the position we would reach ; an obstruction which, indeed, we might have made a circuit round, or have stepped over, but still an obstruction ; we shall evince, that as by the two arguments which have been considered, it *has not* been proved that in dividing a body we may proceed *in infinitum*, so it *will never be* proved that we can go on to infinity, a satisfactory proof of the contrary being to be had.

§ 55. The question, *Is matter*, to-wit, any particular piece of matter our thoughts may be occupied about, divisible to infinity ? may be more conveniently, not to say more properly, stated in another way : Can we divide any particular particle without coming to any point in our divisions and subdivisions where we must stop ? Which question may be divided into two branches. The question which the first of the two composes is this : In dividing any particle by a real process, is it true that we can carry on the process without ever arriving at any point beyond which it is impossible for us to go ? The second question is the following : If there be indeed a limit past which we cannot *perceive* any division of a body, cannot we *conceive*, at any rate, the divisions and subdivisions to go on, without our coming to any termination in the business ?

§ 56. The answers which are to be given to those questions will determine the controversy, whether matter is infinitely divisible. We have seen that philosophers have made the attempt to determine it otherwise than by ap-

† *Hudibras*. Part III. Canto iii.

pealing to what may be really perceived, or at most imagined,—in other words, otherwise than by appealing to facts and experience. But such an attempt is vain in the extreme. If it be not competent to the senses, or at least to the imagination, to decide the controversy, then the decision of it falls under the cognizance of no tribunal that we know of. The topic, without doubt, is to be discussed on no very abstract grounds, if we are to discuss it with any properly founded hopes of bringing it to a determinate conclusion.

§ 57. Now as far as the topic is to be decided on by an appeal to observation, there will be very little difficulty in the case. We may boldly pronounce, without fear of any contradiction, that no one ever perceived the division of any piece of matter carried beyond a certain point. Our senses conduct us to fixed limits in our divisions and subdivisions. Observation, then, so far as it goes, does the very contrary to establishing the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter.

§ 58. For the sake of those who are disposed to be more moved by authorities, than by any appeal to facts, we adduce the following testimonies.

§ 59. “There is a limit beyond which we cannot perceive any division of a body. The parts become too small to be perceived by our senses.” *Reid's Essays*. Essay II. ch. xix.

§ 60. “We must allow that there are physical points, that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or”—&c. *Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Sect. XII. Part ii. Note.

§ 61. “In speaking of the divisibility of body, we must carefully distinguish what is in our power, from what is possible in itself. In the first sense, it cannot be denied, that such a division of body as we are capable of,

“ must be very limited.”—“ After having, for example, divided an inch into a thousand parts, these parts are so small as to escape our senses, and a farther division would to us, no doubt, be impossible.” *Euler’s Letters*. Vol. II. Let. xi. & viii.

§ 62. The first question, thus, falls to be answered in the negative. In really dividing any particle of matter, we are unable to go on with the process past a certain stage.

§ 63. But though there is a limit beyond which we cannot perceive any division, can we not, at all events, conceive of divisions and subdivisions without end? We shall make *Mr Hume’s* words answer this interrogatory for us.

§ 64. “ The imagination \* \* may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the images which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to exceed them.† \* \* \* Whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable \* \* into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different

† We may have distinct enough, or it may be confused enough, ideas of any two or more *numbers*, or sets of numbers, and of their relative *proportions*; say, of ten, as standing for the parts of an inch, and of the 1,000,000th, and 1,000,000,000,000th parts of the 10th of an inch. And is not the mistaking these ideas for the ideas of something pertaining to an actual inch, a wide cause of the vain supposition, that we can frame images of real things as minute as the millionth and billionth part of the tenth of an inch?

“ ideas.”—“ ’Tis therefore certain, that the imagination “ reaches a *minimum*.” Treatise of Human Nature. B. I. Part ii. Sect. 1.‡

§ 65. ’Tis true, that there are equally strong assertions on the other side of the question. And were the assertions simply given, were a direct appeal made to consciousness for the truth, we should be obliged to admit, there were no alternative for it but to let each one declare himself for that side of the question he beforehand was inclined to adopt. Even, however, in the case contemplated, one view only of the matter (be this remembered) could be just. But there is this difference between the opposing assertions. Whatever *Mr Hume* may have done in other places, whatever inconsistency he may be guilty of in the affair; the words we have but now cited from the “ Treatise,” and we in making them the vehi-

‡ In quoting from the “ Treatise of Human Nature,” a few remarks are necessary. That work was the first of *Hume’s* publications. In the Advertisement prefixed to the “ Inquiry concerning Human Understanding,” the Sceptic says: “ Most of the principles and reasonings contained in this volume were published in a work in three volumes, called *A Treatise of Human Nature*. \* \* \* \* He “ (the author) cast the whole anew in the following pieces; where “ *some negligences in his former reasoning*, and more in the expression, “ are, he hopes, corrected. \* \* \* \* Henceforth the Author “ desires, that the following Pieces may *alone* be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.” *Hume* himself, thus, disowned the reasonings of the “ Treatise.” No one need condemn what is repudiated by its author. To do so, were to challenge an enemy who confesses himself already vanquished. But should I be pleased with a particular passage in the “ Treatise,” what harm can there be in citing it, to convey my sentiments? Sometimes there’s no great necessity for speaking for ourselves when words that are at our hand express exactly what we have to say. What a certain writer says of *volumes*, is much truer with regard to *sentences*. “ A writer “ often does more good by shewing the use of some of those many “ volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; though “ this be of much less advantage to his own character.” *Law’s* Preface to *King’s* Origin of Evil.

cles of what we had to convey, do simply appeal to what consciousness testifies on the subject ; and we are content to leave the matter there, without seeking to go any farther : While those who range themselves on the opposite side do not lay down their position as any thing like self-evident. They do not say, we can conceive divisions and subdivisions without end, and this fact is decisive of the point at issue. But they offer proof *why we must be able* to conceive the thing : Which is a very different matter. Could they think, that their position needed no evidence to support it, when they set out in search of proof ? And if their position needed proof, it cannot altogether be a fact testified immediately by consciousness. The plain testimony of consciousness, *as to what falls within its proper province*, is the strongest and the most direct, as well as the most easily reached evidence we can have.

§ 66. To refer to *Euler*. When he said : “ However far you may have already carried, in imagination, the division of an inch, it is always possible to carry it still farther ; and never will you be able to carry on your subdivision so far, as that the last parts shall be absolutely indivisible,” &c. *vide supra*, § 51. When he said that, was he contented with the evidence to be had *intuitively* of the proposition which he brought forward ? Not to insist on this, that he gives elsewhere, as we have seen, (*vide supra*, § 31. et 32.) a detailed argument to prove, that it must be always possible for us to carry the division forward, or on any consideration of that nature ; the author of the Letters produces you an especial reason, when he thinks the proper time is come, to shew that by the imagination “ the division of an inch ” may always be carried still farther. “ After having, for example, divided an inch into a thousand parts, \* \* \* \* “ you have only,” says he, “ to look at this thousandth part of an inch through a *good* microscope, which mag-



“ nifies, for example, a thousand times, and each particle  
“ will appear as large as an inch” [does] “ to the naked  
“ eye ; and you will be convinced of the possibility of  
“ dividing each of these particles again into a thousand  
“ parts : the same *reasoning* may always be carried for-  
“ ward, without limit and without end.” Letter viii.

§ 67. We have little or nothing to do with *Euler's* proof, that the imagination shall never be able to carry on its subdivisions so far, as that the last parts shall be absolutely indivisible. Our attention just now is engaged with something else. It is only with the fact of there being a proof that our present business lies. Nevertheless, we shall say one word upon the proof, in passing.

§ 68. The reason why the imagination can always carry still farther than it has yet done, the division of an inch, is that a microscope which magnifies a thousand times will make the thousandth part of an inch appear as large as an inch does to the naked eye. The microscope, with *Euler*, enlarges our imaginative powers. But, in reality, the microscope only enlarges the rays of light that flow from each particle. It is not the rays, it is the rays dilated, that we see by the aid of the microscope. Does the microscope make the thousandth part of an inch to be an inch ? As the microscope is, beyond contradiction, one of the most useful of curious instruments, it is not the cause of so amazing an absurdity, as the making of an inch out of the thousandth part of one. That instrument by no means enables us to perceive a less *extension* than we can see by the naked eye. It does not destroy, it does not at all affect, the minuteness of any particular extension. To spread a ray of light out to a greater extent than the ray filled according to our unassisted powers of vision ; to make a thousandth part of an inch look as if it were an inch ; is very far from making the least perceivable extension to be more extended than it was

perceived to be: The possibility of so spreading out a ray of light, is the farthest thing possible from being a *datum* by help of which any natural philosopher can make out, that we can conceive the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*. In conceiving the division of the rays of light flowing from the thousandth part of an inch, as seen through a microscope the magnifying power of which is a thousand times, we are, after all, only conceiving the division of an inch of extension.

§ 69. We shall next refer to the procedure of another author who declares himself an advocate for the doctrine of infinite divisibility. "The parts," these are *Dr Reid's* words, "become too small to be perceived by our senses; but we cannot believe that it [the body] becomes then incapable of being farther divided, or that such division would make it not to be a body."

§ 70. "We carry on the division and subdivision in our thought far beyond the reach of our senses, and we can find no end to it: Nay, I think we plainly discern, that there can be no limit beyond which the division cannot be carried."

§ 71. "For if there be any limit to this division, one of two things must necessarily happen: Either we have come by division to a body which is extended, but has no parts, and is absolutely indivisible; or this body is divisible, but as soon as it is divided, it becomes no body. Both these positions seem to me absurd, and one or the other is the necessary consequence of supposing a limit to the divisibility of matter." *Dr Reid's* Essays. Essay II. ch. xix.

§ 72. We may just notice, in our way, that the first of the two alternatives, namely, that we come to a body extended but indivisible, is no consequence whatever of the doctrine, that in dividing any body we may come to bodies extended but indivisible. This alternative is the

doctrine itself: And he who puts it, does little else than say, If there be any limit to the division of a body, there is a limit to the division of a body. As for the other alternative, namely, that by dividing a certain body, the body becomes no body, whether or not it be any *consequence* of the doctrine, that in dividing a body we may arrive at indivisible *bodies*,\* it must be granted to be quite as absurd as it appeared in *Dr Reid's* eyes. *Reid's* second alternative is just tantamount to *Euler's* first argument. *Vide supra*, § 31.

§ 73. "We carry on," says the Doctor, "the division and subdivision *in our thought* far beyond the reach of "our senses, and *we can find no end to it*." Well, if consciousness say so, should not the matter be allowed to rest there? Certainly: otherwise there would be a necessity for a proof, that the thing which consciousness testifies is, must be. But is the matter allowed to rest there, in token of consciousness saying so? By no means. "Nay," continues the Doctor, "I think we plainly discern, there *can be* no limit beyond which the division "cannot be carried." And then follows the proof. From all which, you see how ill satisfied the Doctor was with the unsupported testimony of consciousness, if consciousness said, we can find no end to the division and subdivision: Although Consciousness was, as all know, a great favourite with him, it being exalted in his system of mental philosophy to the rank and dignity of a separate and original power of the mind. So, he did not intend, any more than *Euler* did, to appeal to Consciousness for a favourable answer to the question, Can we divide and subdivide in our thoughts, without finding any end, "in "wandering mazes lost?"†

§ 74. There was, indeed, this reason for giving a proof why it is necessary that in our thoughts we find *no end*

† *Milton*.

to the division and subdivision,—that, in point of fact, in our thoughts we can find, can shortly find, AN *end* to the division and subdivision.

§ 75. And, of a truth, if it had not been for the *reason* of the absence of an end to the divisions, we should never have heard of the *absence itself* of an end. (On this account it was that we entered on the two arguments commonly employed in behalf of the dogma we have opposed.) Had it not been, we say, for the *must be*, the *is* had never reached our ears. For every one has it in his power to satisfy himself, that in conceiving the division of a particle of matter, the imagination will ultimately reach an image which cannot be lessened, which to lessen would be to annihilate.

## PART IV.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. After so extensive an incursion into the territory of the Mathematician, and that of the Natural Philosopher; to which we were invited by having had the dogma of infinite divisibility cast in our teeth; we return with good will to the words of the “ Refutation.” We introduced, and have most fully answered, *Antitheos’s* question: “ I would ask \* *how* mathematicians” (natural philosophers) “ have always regarded the smallest particle of *matter* divisible to infinity?”† It is thus *Antitheos* follows up that question: “ Do they ever contemplate “ actual separation of parts *in such cases?*” Ch. VI. par. 4. Most assuredly they do. In such a case as where Natural Philosophers are considering the division, or even but the divisibility,—whether to infinity, or to finity, is of no consequence,—of any piece of matter; to a certainty, they

† As our author seems to favour the doctrine affirming the infinite divisibility of matter, he should have stood aloof from the *smallest* particle of “ matter,” which, unfortunately for him, he has fallen in with. For what is the smallest particle of matter? That which cannot be diminished, that which cannot be divided into smaller particles. But if, with such a one as *Antitheos*, any particle of matter is so small as that it cannot be diminished, or divided into smaller particles, if, in other words, there *is* a *smallest* particle; is the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, in no danger of disgrace? Yea, it runs imminent risk of being maltreated, past remedy, by its friends, and should cry out lustily, Murder! my advocates are for putting me beyond the pale of existence.



cast an eye on actual separation, or at all events capacity of actual separation, of parts. But how does our author reply to the question, Do mathematicians, or at least natural philosophers, contemplate actual separation, or rather capability of actual separation, of parts, when they are discussing the topic whether matter be divisible *in infinitum*? "No;" says he boldly; "but parts \* \* \* "in the sense of partial consideration *only*." Now were a geometrician, or a man of natural science, who was instructing a pupil in the sublime, as well as curious, doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, proceeding to illustrate the *first approaches* to the infinity† by directing the pupil's attention to the divisibility of a *New-York* pippin into two; where is the necessity of there being halves "in the sense of partial consideration *ONLY*?" What if the philosopher, to cut the knot for our atheist, (for he would have us believe it is a real Gordian one,) were to slice the apple through the middle, and present one-half to his pupil in order to being divided again, and eat the other himself? As *Antitheos* himself has said elsewhere, (whether with entire propriety or not, is another question—*vide infra*, § 7.) "If it be of any *specifical* body we speak," a *New-York* pippin for instance, "we can, in reality, separate one part from another." (Ch. VII. par. 4.) What good reason, nay what specious reason, can be assigned why philosophers should not ever contemplate parts in any sense but the sense of partial consideration *only*, even parts in the sense of capability of actual separation, when they are regarding the *divisibility*, the infinite, or the finite, divisibility, of any piece of matter? Is the piece of matter not capable of having its parts actually separated from each other? Or are the philosophers obliged to choose to confine themselves to partial considerations which are not so much as mental

† *Vide* APPENDICEM.

divisions? If this be so, whence the obligation? Let us know its source, that we may be put into a condition to see a little farther into so strange a thing.

§ 2. In giving our author's reply to his question, several words were omitted, as the asterisks denoted. "Parts—," the passage runs in this way, "as *Mr Gillespie* himself has it—in the sense of partial consideration only." When *Mr Gillespie* speaks of parts in the sense of partial consideration only, he has something in his view very different from the parts of matter, which all, so far as not already divided, are divisible, or may be conceived as divisible, from each other, which, therefore, are parts in another sense than by partial consideration only; he has in his view the parts of the extension which is of infinity, which parts, both really and mentally, are necessarily indivisible, and, so, are parts *only* in the sense of partial considerations or apprehensions. Of this no one who has perused the "Argument" can be presumed ignorant, and therefore our antitheist must be supposed to have known of it well when he penned the words upon which we are animadverting. What judgment, then, are we to pass on *Antitheos's* mode of speaking? Is it calculated to convey a correct representation of matters? In giving a misrepresentation of the case, can our atheist be reckoned perfectly honest?

§ 3. After replying to his own question, in his own way, *Antitheos* puts another interrogatory. "When they," the antecedent is, mathematicians, "When they," asks he, "speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either by the plane of the equator, or that passing from the meridian of *Greenwich* to the 180th degree of longitude,—are they necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly?" By no means, answer we. But nevertheless, if mathematicians, geographers rather, speak of hemispheres of the earth, of hemispheres *divided* by an *imaginary* plane

which they denominate the *equator*, or by a plane passing through the first meridian and the 180th degree of longitude, a plane every square foot of which is as *ideal* as any foot in the plane of the equator; if, in other words, geographers employ the term *divided* in one, and that perhaps not the best, of its *second intentions*;† they can as readily, and quite as rationally, speak of their being able to conceive the earth as divided into two by a real process, of the earth as being divisible in the sense of actual separability of parts. Geographers speak, we grant, of halves and divisions of the earth when they mean no more than considerations of so much of it to the exclusion of the rest, for the time. And geographers have a sufficient right to use, when they please, any word in a technical sense, in a sense of their own, *if* they but use the same word always in the same sense. This qualification is necessary for a good reason: To be consistent with regard to the language we employ, as it is a great, so it is an indispensable step towards being completely intelligible. Geographers, we repeat, talk of divisions, when they do not mean divisions strictly speaking; but then they can also talk, to good purpose it may be, of divisions in the *proper* sense of the term.

§ 4. To render the distinction between geographical divisions and true and real divisions yet plainer, by a familiar illustration. Let a plane, called, if you choose, a geographical plane, about six feet long and some two feet deep, and *of no breadth*, be passed through the middle of a living human body. And indeed—if this consideration

† We would recommend to *Antitheos's* attention, first and last, (and our recommendation he may turn, if he likes, to some advantage, for the future,) a caution given by a very eminent Logician. "The *utmost care* is requisite," in these words the present Archbishop of *Dublin* warns us, "to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or the different second intentions with each other." See *Whately's Elements of Logic*. Book III. § 10. (Ed. 6th.)

will enable one to transmit the plane more easily—anatomists and physiologists are accustomed to treat of the halves of the human frame, when they tell us that as a whole it is symmetrical, the one-half forming in the main a counterpart to the other. What if we were to designate the transmission a *dividing*? Would he who was subjected to the act eat his next meal at all the worse for it? Would he breathe less, or walk less, or sleep less? Would any function be destroyed, or impaired in the smallest? That gives us as an idea of the geographical mode of dividing. But were one to turn to *division* of the right sort, and threaten in good earnest to divide in a real manner a living man into halves; the well-founded and salutary laws of the land would be apt to interfere, and shew how wide they regard the difference to be between a merely geographical method of dividing any oblong solid, and a mode of dividing, at least somewhat similar to that which, *so far down*, was practised by numbers of our heavy-handed dragoons when they were last in the *Netherlands*.

§ 5. Proper divisions, in short, are *toto cælo* different from geographical ones. Geographical divisions are indeed partial considerations. But the grand distinction (let us not by any means lose sight of it) between geographical partial considerations and our partial considerations of infinite extension, lies in this, that whereas we can make the ordinary subjects of the former kind of considerations undergo divisions in our thoughts after another sort than that effected by bare partial apprehension; it is quite out of our power to subject the parts of that extension which is of infinity to any other divisions by the mind than such as we denote by *partial apprehensions or considerations*. It is with no propriety, as I have frequently observed, that we bestow the name of *division* upon a mere partial apprehension.



§ 6. If geographers are not guilty of speaking unintelligibly when they say, that the equator divides the globe into the northern and southern hemispheres, &c., “ How is it,” demands our atheist, “ that *extension* is necessarily indivisible ?” I really do not know. I never pretended to be able to tell why extension is necessarily indivisible. I never said even so much as that it was so. The “ Argument” says no more than that “ *Infinity of Extension* is necessarily indivisible.” And really one would think, that any extension, unless it compose part of the extension which is infinite, is divisible to all intents and purposes, so far from being necessarily indivisible. If the author of the “ Refutation” should incline to urge, that by “ extension” he meant *infinity of extension*, when he asked how it is that extension is necessarily indivisible, then we would refer him, for an answer to his question, to Part II. § 27., and to his own comment on the proof there occurring, as the said comment is to be met in the 37th section of the same Part. *Ad hæc, infra* § 15. *et seq.* Nay, demonstration apart, is it not a truth *immediately self-evident*, that infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible ? Let *Antitheos* answer this question. “ I grant,” admits he, “ that we *may conceive* of “ an absolute separation,” and *therefore* separability, “ of “ substance generally, *which we cannot do* in the case of “ extension.” Ch. VII. par. 4. Here by “ extension” he means infinity of extension, or space. Else, where the sense of the antithesis between “ substance” and “ extension ?” Not to say that the context binds “ extension” to that meaning. We might have allowed *Mr Locke* to reply to that question ; who, whenever he has informed us what division implies, lays it down as a truth *intuitively perceivable*, not by deduction necessary, that pure space is indivisible even so much as in thought. Pure space, with him, is the extension distinct from the extension of



matter, is the extension which is of infinity. *Vide Part. II. § 29. et § 41.*

§ 7. *Antitheos* proceeds: "It may be said, perhaps, "that although matter is, *mentally*, easy enough to divide"—Doubtless one would think it is easy enough to divide matter mentally. But by the bye, we must not forget, that 'tis easy enough to divide much that falls under the description of matter otherwise than only by the mind. Our atheist has observed (as we noticed before :) "If it be of *any* specific body we speak, we can, *in reality*, "separate" or divide "one part from another." Now this is going even further than we feel disposed to go. Is the Dog-star a specific body? It will probably be allowed by *Antitheos* that it is so, as no present object is to be attained by a denial,—at least, no object at all worth the cost of a shamefully obvious falsehood. *Can we* separate or divide one part of the Dog-star from another, *in reality*? Ah, no. *Sirius* is too distant, and too big, *for us* to split it into pieces. To sum up what we have advanced: If it be of any specific body we speak, we can in reality, or, if not in reality, at least in imagination, divide the parts from each other.—But possibly, or probably, *Antitheos*, by "*any* specific body," meant any specific body *upon this earth*? If so,—let him take out a patent for his discovery, that men "*can, in reality,*" or by manual instrumentality, "separate one part from another."

§ 8. Our author has often reasons for his forms of expressions. And he happens to have an excellent reason for declaring, that it is easy enough to divide matter *mentally*. The reason makes its appearance in a subsequent chapter. We may gather what it is from the following assertion. "That matter is divisible, (*on a certain and "special construction of terms,*) no one will deny; but that "it is absolutely so, is not true." Ch. VII. Par. 4. What

that certain and special construction of the term *divisible* is, when we say with truth, matter is divisible, we may learn from words occurring in the same paragraph. "We can divide substance," *Antitheos* informs us, "by abstraction;" that is, I humbly apprehend, by a partial consideration, which happens to be no true division at all. But we can do more than divide substance by abstraction. For again: "We may conceive of an absolute separation," and, *a fortiori*, separability or divisibility, "of substance generally"—(*supra* § 6.) Words which richly deserve to be weighed most attentively. With our antitheist, *substance* and *matter* mutually exhaust each other, that not being admitted, by him, into the rank of substance which is not material. What that certain and special construction is, we may learn also, may we not? from the words which, in our regular progress, we are examining—"Matter is, *mentally*, easy enough to divide." According to our atheist, then, the reason why it is easy enough to divide matter *mentally* is, that it is difficult enough, indeed altogether impossible—not for us only, but—for any power, or (if *Antitheos* would prefer another word) for any chance or accident, *absolutely* to divide matter, at least matter "generally." And, in truth, it must be confessed, that the position, Matter "generally" is divisible *only mentally*, is a good consequence from the position, Matter "generally" is divisible, but is *not* divisible *absolutely*: a good consequence, at all events, on the supposition, (the only one possible, if we would preserve *Antitheos's* character for never being without a meaning,) that "*absolutely*" as contradistinguished from "*mentally*," means *not mentally*. If matter generally is divisible at all, and be not divisible *out of* the mind, it is wonderfully probable, that it is divisible *in* the mind. Our atheist's reason, in fine, may be admitted, with considerable safety, to be a good reason, if it constitute a good and a true position in

*itself*. But is it true, that matter generally, or, *as a whole*—for this, I conceive, is what *Antitheos* means when he says, "We may conceive of an absolute separation of substance" or matter "*generally*"—Is it true, that matter as a whole is not divisible absolutely, or out of the mind?

§ 9. What if absolute divisibility (we say not absolute division—far from it—) follows from the admission, fortunately so liberally furnished by our author, of mental divisibility? If we can divide all that is matter by a mental process, how can any one make it appear, it is impossible in the nature of things that all matter should be divided by a real process? Can we, in this case, infer the existence of an impossibility outwardly, from the existence of a possibility inwardly? an impossibility in things, from a possibility in our conceptions regarding the things? Nay, what criterion of possibility, and impossibility too, can we have but that which arises from our conceptions?† What we conceive to be possible, is possible. Which, indeed, is virtually saying nothing more than this, What *we* conceive to be possible, is possible *to us*. And this proposition, in its turn, may be transmuted into another, even into this most undeniable, yet important proposition, Whatever we conceive to be possible, we really do conceive to be possible. We conceive a thing to be possible in reality: We judge a thing to be possible in reality: The thing is possible in reality: What are these but different ways of setting forth the same position? The grand element in the affair, in each of the three expressions, is, the conception of real possibility. Whatever, then, we clearly conceive to be possible in reality, is possible in reality.‡ And therefore, as we do (having *Anti-*

† "We can judge," says *Archbishop King*, "of things no otherwise than from our conceptions." *Origin of Evil*. Chap. I. Sect. ii. & 2.

‡ Perhaps *Hume* never wrote a better passage than the following, whether we regard the acuteness or the cogency of the reasoning.

*theos's* leave) clearly conceive matter as a whole to be susceptible of division absolutely, or in reality, we cannot be wrong in affirming, that matter as a whole is capable of being divided absolutely, in reality, as in itself.

§. 10. So much as to that divisibility which matter is subject to. Tho' we never add another syllable, 'twill not be of great consequence: We have by this time put affairs into the proper train. But we may have occasion, some time or other, to speak again regarding the real divisibility of all matter: a topic upon which our author (in his seventh chapter, as well as in his sixth,) has gone *wrong altogether*, confounding as he does, in grand style, divisibility with division (things usually the same with *Antitheos*,†) separability with separation, the conception of a vacuum with the existence of a vacuum externally, and drawing inferences from these *indifferently*, sometimes to his own inexpressible comfort and satisfaction, and sometimes, and as frequently, at the expense of landing himself, and us, were we not sufficiently reluctant to let him

"Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea, necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any arguments derived from the clear idea, in reality asserts that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, 'tis impossible it could ever be conceived." *Treatise of Human Nature*. B. I. Part ii. Sect. 4. *Vide notam* (†) *apud* § 64. *partis iii.* It will be observed, that the author of the *Treatise* goes further than we have gone. We aver, Whatever we conceive to be possible, is possible: He avers, Whatever we conceive, is possible. But perhaps the latter maxim differs very slightly at bottom from the other. The learned *Cudworth* says: "Whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable \* \* ; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility." *True Intellectual System of the Universe*. Book I. ch. v. *Birch's* Edit. Page 647.—As *Hume's* is the *greater*, ours the *less*, if his maxim be true, ours must *therefore* be so too.

† *Vide Part II.* § 32.



be our conductor whithersoever he would, amidst the turnings and windings of a worse than Cretan labyrinth.

§ 11. At length we shall permit our atheist to terminate the sentence in the middle of which we broke in, hoping as we do that for what of rudeness there may have been in the interruption, the weightiness of that which we had to deliver will be accepted as an apology. "It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply the same process to *extension*." Par. 5. For my part, I see no impossibility in the case ; unless by "extension" be meant the extension, or part of the extension, which is infinite. And indeed we may opine with much probability, that such extension was that which was in *Antitheos's* view ; for the very next sentence uses "*space*" to stand for the "*extension*" of its predecessor. "But is not the *space* occupied by the earth,—or say, its useful little representation, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe,—as easily conceived to be divisible" or perhaps divided "by a mathematical plane, as the globe itself, which is not really but only mentally divided?" In answer to which question :—1. Why is the globe, the little globe, or

The great globe itself,

"not really \* \* divided?" Not because it is not really divisible. For that it is really or in the nature of things divisible, is sufficiently proved by our being able to conceive the thing possible. *Vide supra*, § 9.—2. As to whether the space occupied by

The great globe itself,

Yea all which it inherit,

or by a representation of it twelve inches, or it may be twenty inches, in diameter, (it is right to be exact with an admeasurement ;) I say, as to whether *that* space can be conceived divided, or even, if you please, but divisible.



by a mathematical plane : let us ask, What is a mathematical plane ? Our author informs us correctly ; though he has encumbered his information with a good deal of inanity. "A mathematical point," he advances to the information thus, "has no dimensions"—Why discard *magnitude*, the usual word ?—"A mathematical point has "no dimensions, *because* whatever possesses dimensions "must possess figure, and that which has figure cannot "be a point." That which has figure cannot be a point. But why ? The "Refutation" supplies not the reason. So that, as to why a point has no figure or dimensions, we are left within a little of where we began. Our author had spoken better, if he had simply said, A mathematical point has no dimensions, because that which has no dimensions is the *definition* given by mathematicians of a point. "In like manner," he goes on, "a plane cannot "have thickness, since whatever is of the smallest thickness is not a plane but a solid." Par. 5. Could he not just have said, A plane is *defined* to be a surface having length and breadth but no thickness : as that which has the three dimensions is *defined* to be a solid ?—"A plane," then, "cannot have thickness : "whatever is of the smallest" or *of any* "thickness is not a plane." How, then, can we conceive the space *Antitheos* speaks of, or indeed any space whatever, divided, or divisible, by a mathematical plane ? A division by a mathematical plane is no division at all. That which divides matter, or space, or any thing our atheist likes, must have some thickness, tho' the thickness should be "of the smallest." But as touching this, an ample sufficiency has been already set before the reader. *Vide Part. II. § 26. notamq; et § 29. Partemque III. § 12. &c.*—In fine, the space filled by the earth, or its "little representation," is not as easily conceived to be divided, or divisible, as the great globe, or

any small one, can be conceived to be divided, or divisible. For that space cannot be conceived to be divided or divisible at all.

§ 12. "In dividing space by abstraction," or by a partial consideration, "therefore, there is no *necessity*, as "our author would have us believe, of falling into the *absurdity* of space divided by actual separation of the "parts, leaving no space between them." Par 5. As our author would have us believe, says *Antitheos*. Now the author alluded to would have no one believe any thing by the sixtieth part of a degree so absurd. How could, and where did, the author of the "Argument," in treating of partial considerations of infinite extension, expansion, space, which he, after the example of *Mr Locke*, allows to be quite possible; how could he, and where did he, in granting that we may for a time consider so much space to the exclusion, as it were, of the rest, fall into the "absurdity" (word well chosen) of supposing space divided by actual separation of parts, *when the very thing which, with all his might, he DEMONSTRATES TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, is this very thing, to-wit, that the parts of infinite extension, or space, are susceptible of actual separation?*

§ 13. Our atheist concludes what he has to urge in opposition to Proposition II. in this way. "If *Mr Gillespie's* "indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his "proposition is not true; if, in reference to actual experiment, he may be applauded for having recourse to inductive instead of *a priori* reasoning, [but†] he need "not so soon have neglected the principles upon which "he started, without intimating some ground for the

† This word is supplied from a copy of the "Refutation," presented by its author to a *Jew* (according to the flesh)—Who, with true Jewish foresight and discretion, wrote on the title-page: "The fool hath said "in this book, There is no God." The *but* is *Antitheos's* autograph. The copy in question composes one of the volumes in the *Philalethean Society's* Library.

"change." Par. 6. After what has been so fully advanced in Part II. the reader needs no guide to lead him through this maze. *Mr Gillespie* recognises but one kind of proper divisibility, (and who ever heard of any other?) and has demonstrated, that infinity of extension is not divisible, in the proper sense of the word. Therefore, "his proposition is \* true."

§ 14. And that we have great authority to vouch for the validity of *Mr Gillespie's* demonstration, EVEN THE AUTHORITY OF OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF, shall now be evinced *past the possibility of room for doubt*.

§ 15. In the discussion of his second proposition," says *Antitheos*, as before we heard, (*vide part. ii. § 37 et § 42.*) "the author makes manifest the absurdity of supposing "space really divisible, since that would be to suppose "the parts separated without having any space between "them." We agree with *Antitheos*, that the author of the "Argument" makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space, or rather "infinity of extension," which is all one with infinity of space, (*vide part. iii. § 17.*) to be really divisible; but we can never grant, that it is absurd to suppose space is really divisible for the reason which *Antitheos* assigns. The reason given by this gentleman why there is absurdity in supposing space really divisible is this, to suppose space really *divisible* would be to suppose the parts *separated* without having any space between them. Now, to say that to suppose space really divisible is to suppose the parts thereof separated, or divided, is to confound two things which are entirely different, divisibility and division. We have seen that our atheist charges *Mr Gillespie* with confounding these two distinct things, (*vide part. ii. § 32. et § 34.*) and here *Antitheos* exposes why he was so ready to charge such a procedure on another: *Antitheos* confounds the two things himself. The cloven foot has made its appearance.

§ 16. Our author has quite reversed matters. He who supposes, if any one can suppose, (as it is certain no one can,) that the parts of space are separated, or divided, *presupposes* the separability, or divisibility, of the parts. But he who supposes (and the person who supposes must just be nobody at all,) the divisibility of space, by no means thereby supposes, either first or last, the division of space.

§ 17. In a word, we agree with our atheist as to the fact, we differ from him as to the reason of the fact, that under the second Proposition of the "Argument" is made manifest the absurdity of supposing† infinite extension, or space, to be divisible. Had *Antitheos* said that Proposition II. manifests the absurdity of supposing space really divisible, since to suppose it really divisible is to suppose its parts separable, we should have agreed with him as to the reason of the fact too: so far at least as the absurdity of the supposition, that the parts of space are separable, is a reason of the absurdity of the supposition, that space is really divisible: for, in truth, the suppositions look as if they were no more than barely tantamount to each other.

§ 18. We shall turn our antitheist's admission on all sides, and make every conceivable supposition, to shew that viewing the admission in what light one pleases, it is all that our hearts could wish. Should the author of

† We use the words *supposing* or *suppose*, here and elsewhere, in the same sense as that in which Mathematicians speak, when, in a proper *reductio PER IMPOSSIBILE ad absurdum*, they ask us to draw an absurd consequence from a supposition which is to be set aside. The supposition in one sense, and that one the best of senses, is really impossible. We cannot clearly conceive the truth of it to be a possible thing, and this even before the contrary to it is *established* in due geometrical style. But the case is argued *as if* the impossible supposition *were conceived* to be true. We may deduce an inference from a supposition which we can make only *relatively*, as we may say.



the "Refutation" be inclined to allege, that by "divisible" he meant *divided*, never intending to admit more than that the "Argument" had manifested the absurdity of supposing that space is really divided; then, as we shall leave him no door to creep out by, away from us, we have these two considerations to urge. They will be found adamantine impediments to an escape. 1. The first consideration will have respect to the *good faith* in which an *allegation* of that description could be offered. *Antitheos* is speaking in relation to the "second proposition," and the second Proposition, as it occurs in the "*Argument*," runs thus: "Infinity of Extension," (which is the same as space,) "is necessarily *indivisible*." It does not run this way: Infinity of Extension is really *undivided*. But to pass over the faith in which such an allegation would need to be made, as a circumstance of *trifling moment*, we have to say, that the thing alleged, were it alleged, to be meant by our antitheist, would be altogether as acceptable as the sign of his meaning. For 2. If *Mr Gillespie* manifested no more than, or rather so much as, the *absurdity* of supposing that space is really divided, if, in other words, he *demonstrated* that space is really not divided, how could he have done so but by demonstrating that space *cannot be* really divided? We *demonstrate* that a thing is not, only by proving that it cannot be. And if *Mr Gillespie* demonstrated that space cannot be really divided, he must have demonstrated that space is really indivisible. For to say, that space cannot be divided, and to say, that it is indivisible, are one and the same. So that if *Mr Gillespie* demonstrated that space is really not divided, he has demonstrated that space is really indivisible. And therefore even if "*divisible*," in the passage in question, be to stand for *divided*, and our atheist be to be held as admitting nothing more than that Proposition II. manifests the absurdity of supposing that space is



really divided ; we have, contained virtually in an admission to that effect, his authority for it that *Mr Gillespie* has demonstrated the real indivisibility of space.

§ 19. To conclude this part of the subject, let the admission of our antitheist be regarded in any sense one likes, to a certainty we have, as we affirmed, his authority to vouch for the validity of the demonstration, that infinity of extension, or space, is indivisible.

§ 20. And since the author of the "Refutation" has passed his word in sincerity for the truth of Proposition II., let us rest contented, without bearing him any grudge for what besides may have fallen from his pen. What matters it, though he cried out, at the first glimpse of the affair, "unqualified assent \* cannot be accorded to "proposition the second," if, on second thoughts, (second thoughts are the best,) he saw a sufficient reason for declaring, that his opponent "makes manifest the absurdity "of supposing space really divisible," his opponent's *highest aim* being to demonstrate that space, infinite space, is really indivisible ? Whatever difficulties *Antitheos* asserted to be in the way ;—if ultimately he proclaims that the road is thoroughly clear, we may know he was only making as if he would cause us a little, a very unnecessary, affrightment. However it comes about that the second Proposition is true, it suffices that it is so.

§ 21. We can now proceed to judge in a certain affair, with capital authority at our elbow for the decision we shall pronounce. At the beginning of Chapter VII. of his work, *Antitheos* says : "The *fourth* proposition \* \* "is founded upon *the baseless fabric* of extension" (he should have said, "infinity of extension") "being indivisible," &c. ; and in the fifth paragraph of Chapter VI. he had more than merely hinted, that Proposition II. constitutes a *gratuitous fallacy*. Whether the necessary indivisibility of infinite extension be a baseless fabric,

whether the declaration that "infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible," be a gratuitous fallacy, admits not now of the possibility of a doubt. We have had our atheist's word for it, that the "Argument" has demonstrated, infinity of extension is really indivisible, and what more could be necessary to shew that the indivisibility of infinite extension is no "baseless fabric"? that the position which affirms infinity of extension to be necessarily indivisible, is never to be reckoned in the number of "gratuitous fallacies?"

§ 22. So far, then, as we have gone yet, all is well. "It would be absurd in the extreme to deny" Proposition I. And, in spite of himself, *Antitheos* has accorded "the same unqualified assent" to Proposition II.†

§ 23. The words which next occur in the "Refutation" bring us to a new subject. "A corollary is here introduced, asserting the immoveability of *extension*." Ch. VI. par. 7. There happens to be no corollary of the kind in the "Argument." A Corollary there is indeed. But it is in the following terms. "COROLLARY *from Proposition II. Infinity of extension is necessarily immoveable.*" A

† *In spite of himself*, in his book,—but only there. For in a letter addressed to Mr Gillespie, so lately as the 15th of January, last, "*Antitheos*," in the contemplation of a *second edition* of the "Refutation," admits that he "would have to alter" his reasoning "with respect to the 'indivisibility of extension.'" "*No one I presume*," writes "*Antitheos*," "*ever thought of denying the applicability of infinitude, either to SPACE or duration, OR OF IMAGINING THE SEPARABILITY OF THEIR PARTS.*" So that *out of* (though *only out of*) his book, the first edition of it at any rate, *Antitheos* has, *spontaneously*, "accorded to proposition the second" "the same unqualified assent" which was accorded to Proposition the first. Now, let us remember that "a *great part* of the reasoning in 'the 'Argument' is built upon the second Proposition," and that "to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce 'no small portion of the work referred to'—(*vide part. ii. § 19.*) let us, I say, but keep this in mind, and we shall be at no loss to perceive that the letter by "*Antitheos*" constitutes a very precious document to the lovers of the "Argument, *a priori*."

matter this, widely different from what *Antitheos* represents it to be. "It is true," proceeds he, "that either finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed capable of motion." Bare finity of extension is not capable of motion; but then every thing of finity, of finity only, in extension, is so. "Space cannot," continues our atheist, "be carried out of itself." Very true. That is equivalent, so far as it goes, to what the Corollary declares. "Nor," adds he, by way of illustration, "can those parts of it occupied by Mont *Blanc*, for example, and the Peak of *Teneriffe*, ever be imagined to change places." Precisely so. But the Mountain and the Peak, themselves, may be imagined to change places. And the distinction well deserves observation. "To the truth of what is here maintained, therefore," concludes he, "we must give unreserved assent, independent of its nominal connection with the false doctrine immediately going before." *Ibid.* The "false doctrine" is that which sets forth that "Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible." That false doctrine we have witnessed the author of the "Refutation" transforming into a perfectly true one. *Vide supra*, § 15, *et seq.* The "connection," which is called a "nominal" connection, (for what reason it is easier to search than to find,) is established, under the "Corollary," in the following manner. "Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable. That is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves. For, motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never be expected to see that because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal to A. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily incapable of separation, is, therefore, necessarily immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves."

§ 24. The connection we speak of is set forth by *Mr Locke* in these words. "The parts of pure space are *immoveable, which follows from their inseparability*; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are *inseparable*; which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another." Essay B. II. ch. xiii. § 14.

§ 25. We were finding some fault in our author's conclusion, but since, according to it, "unreserved assent" "must" be given to the truth maintained in the Corollary, we need, after all, have no quarrel with any thing that accompanies the unconditional admission.

## PART V.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. “ But we now come,” such are the words which follow those last quoted from the “ Refutation,” “ But we now come to a proposition which may be said to carry with it *all the strength*, if it has any, as well as *the weakness*, of Mr Gillespie’s ‘ Argument.’ ” Ch. VI. par. 8. ’Tis well that *Antitheos* attaches some importance to the Proposition he has now in his eye; for the preceding one was treated as if it were “ of no great consequence.” The Proposition which, as our author will have it, has *all the strength*, or the weakness, of the “ Argument,” “ is,” that gentleman correctly remarks, “ the third in number, and announces that ‘ There is necessarily A BEING of Infinity of Extension.’ ” *Ibid.*

§ 2. “ If we had not *already seen*,” continues *Antitheos*, “ that the author’s reasoning leads us to conclude that “ his Being is to be regarded as something substantial ”—Where did we see what, in his own sense of it, *Antitheos* says we have seen? Nowhere else but in the fourth paragraph of Chapter V., where we saw it stated (the statement being according to truth) that Mr Gillespie’s ‘ SUBSEQUENT reasoning’ ‘ makes intelligence, &c. part of his argument;’ and where we saw our atheist lay down a determination to hold Mr Gillespie as making intelligence, &c. part of his argument *ab ovo usque ad mala*—‘ UNI-



FORMLY.' *Vide Part. II. § 4.* We promised to run to the rescue whenever *Antitheos* was detected turning matters upside down, and this is the first opportunity we have had of making good our promise. We should not regret if we never had a second. But things do not always fall out according to one's wishes. And our wishes in this respect, run a great chance of being disappointed: *Antitheos* threatened us with *uniformity* as touching the affair of *putting things topsy-turvy*.

§ 3. So much as to where *Antitheos* and his reader had seen that *Mr Gillespie's* reasoning leads to the conclusion, that his Being is *substantial*, in our antitheist's sense of "substantial," as it occurs in the passage we are criticising. As it occurs in that passage, we say; For our author is not always consistent in his procedure, he being accustomed to use *substantial*, and its cognate, *substance*, in more senses than one. *Ex. gr.* At one time, "*substance*," with him, is that only which "possesses attraction," which "is observed under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c." which is capable of being "weighed," and "analyzed," and of having "its elements reduced to gas." (*Vide Part. XII. §§ 1, 4.*) While, in the case before us, "*something substantial*," with our atheist, stands for *nothing more* than "an agent of any kind" — "something possessing power—something that acts"—something that has "intelligence, and power, and freedom of agency." (Compare Chap. VI. par. 9. with Chap. V. par. 4.) *Nothing more*: For there is no mention of attraction, figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c. weight, gaseousness, &c. as among the essential acts, properties, or capacities, of that which is *substantial*.

§ 4. No doubt, *Antitheos* would say, were the question put to him, that every thing which has "intelligence, and

"power, and freedom of agency," can attract and be attracted, has figure, density, would have colour if exposed to the rays of the sun, moves, may be supposed to have a certain taste, and a certain smell, may be set on fire, may be crystallized, and weighed, and analyzed, and reduced to elementary gases. Such, however, is not the matter for consideration here. That composes the question respecting *local conjunction*, the question as to what qualities are inseparably associated in the same subject. It may be, or it may not be true, that intelligence, and power, and freeness, are never to be found but in a subject having figure, and density, and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, &c. &c.; but whether that be true, or whether it be false, concerns us not at present. On the contrary, the following are the questions which arise out of our atheist's procedure, as we have noticed it. Is that which possesses attraction, &c. &c. a substance; a substance *because* it has the capacity of attracting, and of being attracted? And again: Is that which has intelligence, &c. to be pronounced a substance; to be pronounced a substance *just because* it has the property of intelligence? Is that which is of intelligence, *therefore* to be denominated a substance; without our waiting to determine the point as to how many properties or qualities must keep company with intelligence as mutual occupiers of the subject of inhesion? Which *Antitheos* decides in the affirmative. *Vide § præced.*

§ 5. When I observed, our author would hold, that every thing having intelligence, &c. can attract, and has figure, density, &c. &c. &c. I bore in mind what he in one place says: "It (extension) is also conceivable as one of the properties, if not the *only indispensable* property of matter." Ch. VIII. par. 3. By which if the unwary reader should understand that *Antitheos* means to make even "a very clever approach" (to employ our author's

racy language†) to the Cartesian doctrine, that extension is the essence, itself, of matter,‡ the reader would be much mistaken indeed. What our atheist means, *in spite of his own words*, amounts only to this: that whereas a particular piece of matter may be without *some one* quality which some other piece has; *ex. gr.* the book called "Refutation" may well be supposed to be without that *weight* which even one *solid* Argument would impart to it; that whereas, in fine, *each* of the other properties ever found in matter may be absent, *one after another*, from a thing, and matter yet remain behind: we cannot take away all extension, without taking away all matter too. The sentence itself from which those words are taken, commences thus: "Although extension may be conceived of *as a* "*pure abstraction*:" that is, I fancy, as existing separately, or by itself; as in the case of pure space. From which clause we see how very far *Antitheos* was from going into the doctrine of *Des Cartes*.—After all, it must perhaps be granted, that it is *no easy task* to reconcile the beginning and end of this sentence: "Although extension may be "conceived of as a *pure abstraction*, it is also conceivable as "one of the properties, *if not the only indispensable property* of matter." If extension can exist by itself, and our antitheist says it can, without thereby being matter, how can extension make any approach, unless a stupid one, to being the *only indispensable property* of matter? In short, there is "a very clever approach" to a contradiction. The end of the sentence and the beginning can never exist together in perfect harmony; the sooner, therefore, they separate for ever, the better.—We have only farther to remark, that tho' in this passage *Antitheos* speaks of extension as perhaps being the only indispensable property of matter, yet the whole scope of his book,

† Last Chapter, ninth paragraph.

‡ *Vide Part. III. § 36.*

where it at all bears on the topic of what matter is, runs counter to that sentiment. The exception to the general strain is a solitary one.

§ 6. But not only have we "already seen" in the "Refutation," that *Mr Gillespie's* reasoning leads to the conclusion that his Being is "something *substantial*," but, the author of that production throws out, we may see the same thing in a different quarter altogether. "If," says he, "we refer to the third Division of his Introduction, we find him contending that the necessary Being must be of the character now ascribed to that subject. At the twenty-third section"—&c. &c. Ch. VI. par. 9. Now what is this that we have here? The "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD," "professes to demonstrate that matter by the *most rigid* *rationation*." (*Vide Præfationem.*) To be complete in itself, is one of the necessary prerequisites of a demonstration. The work alluded to, accordingly, never refers to the "Introduction"—Which is so distinct from the "Argument" that this might have received—and may yet receive, (for the special benefit of refutation-makers, now that *Antitheos* has put into my head the propriety of letting it receive,—) publication separately, and be, notwithstanding, a finished treatise, wanting nothing necessary in order to the presence of the most perfect unity of execution. The "Introduction," in a word, is in no respect any part of that which the Society of Atheists which fixed on our author as its champion, was challenged to answer and refute. Doubtless, I might have challenged that Society, had I liked, to overturn the reasonings which compose the three Divisions of the "Introduction." And it may be noticed, that no proof has been adduced to evidence that, if it had been so challenged, it could, by means of this champion, or of any champion, have successfully overturned any of those reasonings. But as the



case is, the Society was challenged to do no more—and no less—than answer and refute the reasonings contained in the "Argument, *a priori*," &c. *Vide Præfat.*

§ 7. To enable our readers, the more perfectly to understand with what grace *Antitheos* in his "Refutation" of the "Argument, *a priori*," &c., brings in quotations from the "Introduction," to find of what character the "Argument" makes the necessary Being it discourses of to be; we shall enumerate the topics of which the "Introduction" consists. "DIVISION I. An Inquiry into "the defects of mere *a posteriori* arguments, for the being "of A DEITY. Chapter I. Of the Argument from Experience. CHAPTER II. Of the Argument from Miracles." "DIVISION II. A Review of *Dr Samuel Clarke's* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of GOD." "DIVISION III. Necessary existence implies infinite "extension." The first section of which Division commences thus: "SUPPOSING, that there is a necessarily "existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things." Division III., so far from being taken up in an attempt to do aught towards proving a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things, sets out with the EXPRESS SUPPOSITION that there is such; and is wholly employed in endeavouring to deduce a certain consequence from that supposition. In fine, the contents of the Division we speak of, are truly summed up in what may be drawn from its title: *If necessary existence be supposed, then that is supposed, which implies infinite extension.* Marvellously good indeed is the grace with which our atheist, at the place where he stands, and for the purpose which he has to serve, quotes from "the third "Division" of the "Introduction."

§ 8. Well then: here we have our antitheist going "out of the record," to use a legal phrase which he has adopted. ("Preface.") We referred lately to his deter-



mination to turn matters upside down, or rather, to turn the end round upon the beginning. *Vide supra*, § 2. With regard to the case before us, we can acquit him of any charge of placing the tail where the head only should be. His conduct now is of a different character from what it was in the former instance: At present, he is seeking to introduce into the beginning, neither end nor middle, but only something entirely distinct, alike from beginning, and from middle, and from end. But we shall not copy the bad example, nor follow our atheist through those sentences, vicious as at the present stage they must be, which respect something avowed in the third "Division." Not that there is any thing contained in those sentences, nor any thing about them, except the confusion which follows in their train, that we need to fear: As might easily be shewn, were this a fit opportunity. But anxiously do we desire, we acknowledge, to keep clear of the confusion which very naturally would result from a present consideration of the sentences under notice. In short, *Antitheos* had his reasons for what he has done. And we have ours for reprobating his exceedingly unwarrantable procedure.

§ 9. "*If* we had not already seen that the author's "reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be "regarded as something substantial"—Well, what follows from such a supposition? "We should have been at a "loss what to make of the *subject* of the above *predicate*. "As a logician would say, it is not distributed." Par. 9. The non-distribution of a subject can never be any reason why one should be at a loss what to make of it. A non-distributed subject, is, "as a logician would say," a subject made to stand for a part only of its significate. And did ever any logician worthy of the name, assert that we should be at a loss what to make of a subject because it is taken in a part only of its extent? Logicians are quite

as fond of undistributed, as of distributed subjects. And as an evidence, there are in the field of logic as many *particular* propositions as there are *universal* ones: The non-distribution of the subject being that which fixes the particularity of the proposition. But our aim is not to rectify *Antitheos's* logic, except where the badness of his logic is made a prop to the goodness of his cause; and to pass over a matter which, after all, is of little moment in the present business: *Antitheos's* logic in the preceding portion of the passage, finds me totally at fault. What does he make the *subject* to be, to-wit, in the Proposition, "There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension?" The word *Being*. But how "Being" can be regarded as the subject, our atheist has not condescended to declare, neither is he at all able to declare. To me indeed it appears, that "Being" in that Proposition is *syncategorematic*, *i. e.* constitutes a part only of the complex term composing the subject: which I take to be, "A Being of Infinity of Extension:" "there is necessarily," being the predicate, or, if you will, the *copula* and the predicate together. But to settle what is the right subject, and, by consequence possibly, what is the right predicate, of the Proposition, is, as well as the other thing, but a mere trifle, not worth vexing ourselves about; as shall be perceived in the eleventh section. Though *Antitheos* has called things by their wrong names, it may turn out that the slip in logic will not afford him even a semblance of support.

§ 10. "Relative," says the author of the "Refutation," after presenting us with the sentences which respect something avowed in "Division III." of the "Introduction;" "Relative to a Being of this sort, *then*"—that is, relative to a Being of the character spoken of in that "Division," to-wit, "a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things." (*Vide supra*, § 7.)

But here we can have nothing to do with the *assumed* Being which "Division III." treats of. Our atheist himself seems to have had his misgivings as to the propriety of the "*then*," for he immediately goes on to say: "*At all events*, relative to a substantial being"—A substantial being! Why not a being (*i. e.* an existing) substance? Is not *a substance* identical with *a being*? Why distinguish them? What is an unsubstantial being? A shadow that proceeds not from any substance is not more a non-entity than an unsubstantial being. A substantial being is a substantial—substance; or a being that has—being. What nothingness has a non-being substance which an unsubstantial being has not?

§ 11. "Relative to a (substantial) being, the truth of "*the predicate*," *Antitheos* proceeds, "is what we have now to try." Par. 11. As he made "Being" to be the *subject*, so now he takes "Infinity of Extension" to be the *predicate*, in Proposition III. Our atheist would represent *Being* as something already got at, and the aim of that Proposition to be, to invest the Being with infinite extension. Quite contrary to the truth: *A Being* is not something which the "Argument," as yet, holds us in possession of. The object of the Proposition, in fact, is neither more nor less than *to arrive at a Being*; a Being, indeed of infinity of extension: but the Proposition by no means considers "Being" and "Infinity of Extension," first *separately*, afterwards proceeding to work out a *conjunction* of them. In a word, "Infinity of Extension" is *not* the predicate. "The truth of the predicate is what we have now to try," says *Antitheos*. The truth of Proposition III., *at any rate*, he is going to try. And that is sufficient comfort for us.

§ 12. We shall make it our business to examine every item and iota of the ordeal: Because, the Proposition, if successfully established, goes near to be decisive, in our

favour, of the whole controversy ; and if objected to, on sufficient grounds, the whole demonstration, the whole of the merely pretended demonstration, must go for nothing. Our atheist rightly holds the Proposition in question to be of very high importance in the affair ; whether or not it carries with it ALL the strength of the " Argument."

§ 13. " The evidence in support of the *third* proposition is stated," our author remarks, " in the form of a *dilemma*." Par. 11. And then he quotes § 1, and part of § 2,† and § 4. The words he has quoted are as follows.

§ 14. " *Either*, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which " is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a " support or substratum ; *or*, it subsists not, or we con- " ceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 15. " First, if Infinity of Extension subsist without " a substratum," [or, if it have *not* a substratum,] " then, " it is a *substance*." \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

§ 16. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not " without a Substratum," [that is, if it *have* a Substratum,] " then, it being a contradiction to deny there is " Infinity of Extension,‡ it is a contradiction to deny " there is a Substratum to it."

§ 17. " The conclusion deduced from the *latter* alter- " native," says *Antitheos*, " besides appearing *lame* and " *impotent*, is somewhat *laughable*.|| But allowing its logic " to pass, it may be worth while, if only for *amusement*, " to try the force of this, the negative horn of the di- " lemma, by ascertaining what it is made of." Par. 12. Why is *this* pronounced to be the *negative* horn ? 'Twould require more than an *Aristotle* to tell how it could pro-

† *Antitheos* does not signify, he has omitted any thing.

‡ " Prop. I." Note in " Argument." Vide Part. II. § 15.

|| Vide Part. XII. § 8.



perly be pronounced so. But though *Aristotle* could not, yet possibly *Antitheos* can inform us, why "*this*" is pronounced the *negative* horn. 'Tis perhaps probable, that *Antitheos* calls the alternative spoken of, "the *negative* "horn of the dilemma," *because* that alternative contains the word "*not*." At least, I cannot think of any better reason he could have. With regard, then, to the question, whether the word "*not*" causes the member in which it occurs to be truly negative: the word "*without*," in the alternative, appears to be a negative one, to all intents and purposes. And if so, the alternative will be affirmative, so long as two negative words, ("*not*," and "*without*,")—*which affect the same thing*—are equal to a positive. —Be "*this*" horn of what sort it may, it is a horn which *Antitheos* would, *if he but could*, get quit of.† But however negative the horn may be, 'tis a positive truth that *Antitheos* has been *fairly stuck upon it*, and can by no struggling take himself off. We shall observe, in good time, how he winces.

§ 18. But whether "*this*" be the negative horn, or not, let us witness in what manner the force of it is tried. "The *primary* signification of the word *substratum* is, a "thing lying under something else. Supposing, for instance, a bed of gravel to lie under the soil, gravel is "the substratum of that soil; if there be sandstone below "that, the sandstone is the substratum of the gravel; if "coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substratum "of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, "therefore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing "less than saying that it must have something to rest "upon; something to hold it up. That is,—Space must "have limits; and there must be something in existence "beyond its limits to keep it from falling—out of itself! "If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling over-

† *Vide Part. XI. § 21.*



"board, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke; and "the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself, "boasted of nothing that he might not *bet* reasonably *bet* "expected to perform." *Ibid.* These are capital jests. And had they but come in at a proper place, we should have "laughed consumedly." The misfortune is, they are not in season.

§ 19. "The *primary* signification of the word *substratum* is," our philologist informs us, "a thing *lying under* "something else." So it is. *Substratum* is a participle from the verb *substernor*, *Anglicè*, to be strowed or strewn under. But, alas! the *primary* signification of the word *substance* is very similar to that of the word *substratum*. The primary signification of *substance*, is, *standing under*: It being nothing but a derivation from the participle *substans*.‡ But *Antitheos* is remarkably enamoured of the word *substance*, and therefore he has a respect for *its* primary signification, never bringing this in sight. But then he bears (with ample reason too) *substratum* a terrible grudge, and thinks nothing of exposing *its* primary signification to *well-merited derision*.

§ 20. A fine affair truly here. Strange work, work "passing strange," might our atheist make of our English tongue, were he to go on at this rate. At what point in its history could any language bear to pass

† One of the *bes* is an error of the press. But to say which, would be to interfere with the *style*.

‡ From the neuter plural, *Horne Tooke* says.—It is curious, or perhaps it is not curious, that the two words in our language corresponding to *sub* and *stans*, to-wit *under* and *standing*, should, when joined in one word, constitute a term denoting what is very usually reckoned the superior portion of the mind. Our materialist would busy us about *substance* as not reaching to aught beyond *body*. So that there is some necessity for our refusing to quit the English, for the Latin preposition. And accordingly, we are resolved to stick by the *understanding*. Surely *it*, in good English, does not *so naturally* mean *body*, as *substance* may stand for *mind*.

through the primary-signification-alembic? Because the meaning of a word, considered as to its etymon, is *so*, THEREFORE it is just the *same so* now—clean contrary perhaps to the incontestable fact: Is not that a grand conclusion to come to?

§ 21. But *Antitheos* is not alone in the world, in the use of such *reasoning*. Before him, a very celebrated philologist and freethinker went very far in the primary-signification-track.

§ 22. "TRUE," says *John Horne Tooke*, "is \* a  
"past participle of the verb \* \* *To Trow*." \* \* \*

§ 23. "TRUE, as we now write it; or TREW, as it was  
"formerly written; means simply and merely—That  
"which is TROWED. And, instead of its being a rare com-  
"modity upon earth; except only in words, *there is no-*  
"*thing but TRUTH in the world.*"

§ 24. "That every man, in his communication with  
"others, should speak that which he TROWETH, is of so  
"great importance to mankind; that it ought not to sur-  
"prize us, if we find the *most extravagant and exaggerated*  
"*praises* bestowed upon TRUTH. But TRUTH supposes  
"mankind: *for whom* and *by whom* alone the word is *form-*  
"*ed*, and *to whom* alone it is applicable. If no man, no  
"TRUTH. There is THEREFORE" [Save the mark! THERE-  
FORE!] "no such thing as eternal, immutable, ever-  
"lasting TRUTH; unless mankind, *such as they are at pre-*  
"*sent*," [and, of course, unless "TRUTH," "the third  
"person singular of the Indicative TROW,"] "be also  
"eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may  
"contradict each other, and yet both speak TRUTH: for  
"the TRUTH of one person may be opposite to the TRUTH  
"of another. To speak TRUTH may be a vice as well as  
"a virtue: for there are many occasions where it ought  
"not to be spoken." "Diversions of *Purley*," Part II.  
Chap. v.

§ 25. "RIGHT is no other than RECT-*tum* (*Regitum*),  
" the past participle of the Latin verb *Regere*."

§ 26. "In the same manner our English word JUST is  
" the past participle of the verb *jubere*."

§ 27. "It (LAW) is merely the past tense and past  
" participle of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb  
" and it means (something or any thing, *Chose*  
" *Cosa, Aliquid*) *Laid down*."

§ 28. "A RIGHT and JUST action is, such a one as is  
" *ordered and commanded*."

§ 29. "It appears to me highly improper to say, that  
" GOD has a RIGHT: as it is also to say, that GOD is  
" JUST. FOR" [Mark the—*reason*!]  
" nothing is *ordered*,  
" *directed or commanded* concerning GOD."

§ 30. "I follow the LAW of GOD (what is *laid down* by  
" him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the LAWS  
" of human nature; which, without any human testimony,  
" we know must proceed from GOD: and upon these are  
" founded the RIGHTS of man, or what is *ordered* for man."  
Part II. Chap. i.

§ 31. "Those sham Deities FATE and DESTINY—*ali-*  
" *quid Fatum, quelque chose Destinée*—are merely the past  
" participles of *Fari* and *Destiner*."

§ 32. "CHANCE \* \* \* and his twin-brother AC-  
" CIDENT, are merely the participles of *Escheoir, Cheoir*,  
" and *Cadere*. \* \* To say—'It befell me by CHANCE,  
" or by ACCIDENT,'—is absurdly saying—'It fell by fall-  
" ing.'" *Ibid.* Chap. ii.

§ 33. But what need to multiply quotations? though  
" *Horne Tooke*," as one not incorrectly says, "has fur-  
" nished a *whole magazine* of such weapons for any So-  
" phist" [wise man, etymologically,] "who may need them."  
*Whately's Logic*, B. III. § 8.

§ 34. Now hear the opinion of one who was no bad  
judge in an affair like that to which he is addressing him-

self. "It is in this literal and primitive sense alone," we are citing the words of *Dugald Stewart*, "that, according to him, (*Mr Tooke*,) a philosopher is entitled to employ it, (any word,) even in the present advanced state of science; and whenever he annexes to it a meaning at all different, he imposes equally on himself and on others. To me, on the contrary, it appears, that to appeal to etymology in a philosophical argument, (excepting, perhaps, in those cases where the word itself is of philosophical origin) is altogether nugatory; and can serve, at the best, to throw an amusing light on the laws which regulate the operations of human fancy." Philosophical Essays. Essay V. ch. ii.

§ 35. We might favour our readers with a good many passages from *Stewart* which have no tendency to withdraw from the literal-and-primitive-sense-method any portion of the respect which is *due* to it. But we decline to put this philosopher upon the task of further, and in detail, as it were, *slaying the slain*. It is only necessary to state some things, to render a fuller refutation than the statements themselves contain *in gremio*, wholly a work of supererogation.

§ 36. The author of "The Diversions of *Purley*," at the end of his First Part, assures his readers: "I know for what building I am laying the foundation: and am myself well satisfied of its importance." It must on all hands be admitted, that to work in the dark as to the result of one's *edification* (to pay in coin that should pass here, if any where,) is not the most pleasant thing in the world, even though what we are building be *castles in the air*.

§ 37. Thus much as to *Horne Tooke's* extravagancies. And thus much indirectly, at the same time, as to *Anti-theos's* argument derived from the "primary signification

"of the word *substratum*." The thing is verily nothing less than "the acme of absurdity."

§ 38. But our atheist knew well enough what he was about. He understood assuredly that the "Argument," which maintains that "INFINITY of extension," or space, "is *necessarily existing*," did not afford any premiss from which it could be inferred, by any stupidity, that "Space must have *limits*;" and that "there must be some thing in existence *beyond its limits*." *Antitheos* was distinctly aware, that he could advance nothing stronger than a rush to beat down the reasoning under Proposition III.: and therefore, (like many dishonest sophists, in circumstances so far analogous,) *precisely because* he could do nothing in the way of refuting, he raises a — a — primary signification — a — man of straw, that no one could have imagined was ready for the occasion, and laughs heartily, he pretends, at the effect this appearance has on him, calling on his readers to laugh too.

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?

*Ars Poetica.*



## PART VI.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We shall suppose that the merriment, whoever joined in it, has subsided. And truly with *Antitheos* it lasted not long. The words which we next come to in the “ Refutation ” are far from laughing themselves, whatever the very gravity of some of them may force us to. The words alluded to, whenever we enter upon them, expose the fact, that, so little satisfied was *Antitheos* with the argument from “ the primary signification of the word “ *substratum*,” the ground he had taken is deserted as utterly untenable.

§ 2. “ Should it be contended that the *term* ought to “ be understood in its *secondary* acceptation,”—the only acceptation, we may mention once for all, the author of the “ Argument ” ever thought of putting upon it, as *Antitheos* must have been thoroughly assured,—“ and that “ the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists with- “ in itself, as any material body is said to be the substratum of its own extension:—I would remark, that we “ know of nothing *possessing* extension except matter,— “ nothing else that can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed as a *property* ; and that matter, “ not existing by *mathematical*,” [the word should be *metaphysical*—*vide part. i. § 47, et seq.*] “ but only by *physical necessity*, cannot be the substratum referred to.”

Ch. VI. Par. 13. Matter, says our atheist, exists by *physical* necessity, that is, it exists *because* it exists. But such necessity is no necessity at all, as might be evident even to the understandings of *asses*, as the *Epicureans* said, on a certain occasion ; and therefore, there is no real necessity that we should dwell upon the point. It perfectly suffices us, that matter does *not* exist by metaphysical necessity, to-wit, in the sense of it being a contradiction to suppose it not to exist. " We know of nothing possessing extension except matter,"—we were informed,— " nothing else that can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed as a property." " Material bodies," as the next sentence has it, (there being many of *Antitheos's* sentences that serve as a chorus,) " material bodies, comprising all that we *do* know, or *can* know of Being." All easily said. None of it so easily proved nevertheless. And whether easily proveable or not, the assertions *assume the very thing to be proved*. But has not *Antitheos* offered us evidence of his right to make the assumption, *that* we know of nothing but matter which has the property of extension, or *that* we know of no Being but a material body ? Not a jot of evidence does he even pretend to afford. Then, the thing remains a barefaced assumption of the best part of the whole matter in debate, remains, to use an expression of his own, nowhere more applicable, "an unproved extravagance." (Ch. II. par. 15.)

§ 3. "*Hence* it is evident," continues our atheist, " that, in material bodies, comprising all that we *do* know, or *can* know of Being, it is *impossible* to find any thing that will serve *Mr Gillespie's* purpose." Par. 13. *Mr Gillespie* will cheerfully admit, that because " matter \* \* " *cannot* be the substratum referred to" by him, it is *quite impossible* to find any thing that will suit his purpose in material bodies. And it is the business of a certain part of his work to *demonstrate* the *impossibility*. His *first*

Scholium being partly taken up with proving, that "the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension:" *Supposing* the material universe to exist, for the Scholium does not assume the thing, except in the case (a common—but not a universal—case†) where it is admitted; the Scholium beginning thus, "*If, then, it should be maintained*, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension"—And it cannot be maintained that the material universe is that substratum, or any substratum, or any thing, unless it be first assumed that matter exists.

§ 4. "Even this impossibility overlooked, however," *Antitheos* goes on, "what is it that next meets our view? —One substance occupying infinite extension, and another occupying part of this extension, if not also the whole of it; in other words, two things at the same time occupying the same space. Theology always entangles its advocates in inextricable absurdities." Par. 13. To the same purpose our author writes, farther on. "The real existence of matter brings along with it what he," *Mr Gillespie*, "is so much afraid of" [*when there is a good reason*] "—namely, the absurdity of two beings at the same time occupying the same space. On this ground let it be remembered that it is not requisite we should demonstrate the infinite extension of the material universe. In so far as it *does* extend, it occupies space; and, the infinitely extended substance occupying, of course, the whole of space, must occupy that of the material universe as well as any other,—if any other there be.

§ 5. "Let us suppose for a moment," our antitheist continues in the chapter from which we are now quoting,

† Few, indeed, and those few *atheists*, or, at best, but *half-theists*, contend for the existence of matter, in the sense which *Antitheos* puts upon *matter*: who, by *matter*, means something which is in no sense dependent for its existence on mind.

“ the being of a substance of infinite expansion, the intelligent agent in the production of all things—and all this is contended for in the ‘ Argument ’ ” [at the proper time and place] “—what was it to do when performing the \* \* feat of creating the universe out of nothing? Was it to annihilate so much of its own substance as would be necessary to make room for matter, in order to give it verge and scope enough?† If not, either matter could not be brought into being, or we must suffer ourselves to be driven to the conclusion already shown to be necessary in admitting the very palpable doctrine of the actual existence of matter.”

Ch. IX. par. 10, 11.

§ 6. From the work of a very celebrated atheist, cited as it is on one occasion, and borrowed from on many more, by *Antitheos*, we shall extract a sentence or two which exactly chime with the passages which we have just set before the reader. “ I shall inquire,” says the author of the famous *Système de la Nature*, “ if matter exists ; if it does not at least occupy a portion of space ? In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every other being who is not matter, from that place which the material beings occupy in space.” Vol. II. ch. ii. Again : “ Matter certainly occupies a part of space, and from that part, at least, the Divinity must be excluded.” “ Appendix ” to the “ System of Nature.” Ch. xx.‡

§ 7. In all these passages, whether those of *Mirabaud* or rather *D'Holbach*, or those of *Antitheos*, it is coolly taken for granted, that it is absurd to have (in the words of the first of the passages from the “ Refutation ”) “ two things at the same time occupying the same space.” But this which is so conveniently assumed, happens to be the very

† Give ample room and verge enough.

Gray's BARD.

‡ Vide APPENDICEM.



thing which lay—yea, and still lies,—at our atheist's door to be proved. To evince it by arguments which would place it beyond the reach of rational question, is absolutely necessary if atheism be to stand.

§ 8. We shall at once admit "the absurdity" (we quote again from *Antitheos*) "of two beings at the same time "occupying the same space," *in the same respect*. For this would be all one with *two* beings which were but *one* being: the quality and unity being *confounded*. A great enough absurdity truly.

§ 9. But that two things may occupy the same space at the same time, *in different respects*, is, I hope, very far from being absurd to suppose. But be it what it may, it is nothing less than what the "Argument" has undertaken to *demonstrate*.

§ 10. But the "Argument" does not set about demonstrating that, till it has gotten the length of the *second* Scholium under Proposition IV. And *Antitheos* himself, as we have seen (*vide part. ii. § 4.*), gives the "Argument" credit for "precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement." And therefore, if we, who are standing over against nothing farther on than Proposition III., *now* let our readers know how the work in question demonstrates that two substances may fill the same space, at the same time, but in different respects, it is not because we are under any strong necessity of doing so, but only because there is nothing to hinder us from following out a thing which our atheist has started, out of season as it happens, and in an evil hour for himself.

§ 11. The secret, indeed, has already been divulged: and of a truth it will never be easy to make a secret of that which must stare one in the face if he but opens his eyes and turns them in the proper direction. But in place of repeating the words which our reader has been presented with in Part III. § 16, we shall here cite the



*ipsissima verba* of the Scholium to which reference has just been made.

§ 12. "SCHOLIUM II. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, "being necessarily indivisible from each other" (*vide part. ii. § 27. et part. iii. § 16.*) " \* \* \* \* : and the parts "of the Material Universe being divisible from each "other \* \* \* : and it, *therefore*, following that the "Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of "Extension \* \* \* : Here are two sorts of extension. "The one sort, that which the Material Universe has : "And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. "And AS Infinity of extension is necessarily existing," (*vide part. ii. § 14. necnon § 9.*) "AND AS the extension "of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the "extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part of this, or "of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (*part*, but "in the sense of partial consideration ;"—*vide part. ii. § 27. et part. iii. § 16.*) "must PENETRATE the Material "Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, "of it."

§ 13. So, we see how it is easily and very palpably demonstrable, that two things must fill the same space at the same time, if matter exist. The two things fill the same space in different, in very different respects. They fill the same space, the one by *penetrating*, the other by *being penetrated*: this, (to discriminate nicely, and not too nicely,) by filling or occupying the space, that, by constituting it.

§ 14. When *Antitheos* lays down, that it is absurd to have in our view "two things at the same time occupying the same space," he makes no mention of the doctrine of penetration. If he *took care* to make no mention of it, he may justify his silence by pointing to an excellent reason which was in existence : all the absurdity, if

there was any, disappears whenever penetration is introduced. There cannot be complete penetration without two things filling the same space at one and the same time.

§ 15. *Antitheos*, we repeat, takes no notice of the doctrine of penetration. He did this, either advisedly, or because he could not help it.

§ 16. If he could not help what he has done, or rather what he has not done; in this particular matter, he was not so clear-sighted as was an author whose ideas are not seldom turned to good account in the "Refutation." "They (the theologians) will \* insist," remarks *D'Holbach*, "that their GOD, who is not matter, *penetrates* that which is matter." *System of Nature*. Vol. II. ch. ii.

§ 17. [Our readers may naturally, and very laudably, be desirous of being informed what objections the French atheist has to urge against the doctrine of the DEITY'S penetrating matter. It is all the more proper to supply the information, that our British atheist, so far from objecting to the doctrine, does not so much as think it right to notice it. In fine, we may with some advantage bestow a little consideration on what the foreigner had advanced in opposition to our tenet.

§ 18. *Objection*. "It must be obvious, that to penetrate matter, it is necessary to have some correspondence with matter, consequently to have extent; now to have extent, is to have one of the properties of matter."—

§ 19. *Reply*. But is it proved anywhere in the "*System of Nature*," that *because* extension is one of the properties of matter, *therefore* whatever has extension—extension, which is a true *sine quâ non* of every substance—attributed to it, is material? No indeed. Has a vacuum (and *D'Holbach* speaks of a vacuum as quite a possible, if not also a really existing thing;) has a vacuum extent? Then, according to the *leaning* of the objection, a vacuum is a plenum.

§ 20. *Objection.* "If the DIVINITY penetrates matter, " then HE is material."—

§ 21. *Reply.* Any reason given? None. Then there is none to be examined. The assertion itself may very correctly be designated, in *Antitheos's* nervous language, "an unproved extravagance." Why, if matter is perfectly penetrated by a *distinct* substance, the presumption, till something to the contrary be established, seems all to be in favour of the penetrating substance being *immaterial*.

§ 22. *Objection.* "By a necessary deduction HE is " inseparable from matter."—

§ 23. *Reply.* HE is not separated from matter, of course, so long as HE penetrates it, that is, so long as it continues in existence. But no longer. Matter has not been proved to have *necessary existence*.

§ 24. *Objection.* "Then if HE is omnipresent, HE will " be in every thing. This the theologian will not allow." "System of Nature." Vol. II. ch. ii.

§ 25. *Reply.* The theologians of *D'Holbach's* book may not allow it; but, for all that, every consistent theologian, and, what is more, every rational man, will allow the necessity of the *consequent*.

§ 26. And thus we have gone over, and, on his own ground, replied to all that the French atheist has objected to the DEITY'S penetration of matter. No mighty things verily those objections. But since they are all that so ingenious and so zealous an objector could bring forward, we may depend on't they constitute the full strength of his bad cause.

§ 27. I am led to make a reflection, which seems to arise, not altogether so unnaturally, out of the consideration with which we have just been occupied. What indeed, but a *passion* for atheism, should incite certain to inveigh so mightily against the doctrine of penetration in general! And as we are upon the subject, it may not be amiss to

observe, that it can but ill become modern natural philosophers to incline determinately to look with an unfavourable eye on the doctrine of the penetration of one substance by another, even though this latter should be, if any thing, *immaterial*: Modern Natural Philosophers, none of whom has yet proved, while many of them are confident, it is not proveable, that *light* itself is material: Modern Natural Philosophers, whose experiments and investigations have led them to a full belief, that the *electric fluid* is a substance *most intimately pervading every material substance*. Let *Antitheos*, in the character of a natural philosopher, represent the whole body of the philosophers spoken of. Hear him discourse of the electric fluid.

§ 28. "Should it be demanded—as it is always commendable to do on such occasions—what *the substance* is which we deem to be present in what is usually denominated a vacuum,—we may reply—*the electric fluid*. *No substance is capable of excluding it*. As water seeks its level, the fluid in question presses every where, that it may be every where present; and with this tendency, IT PENETRATES, *in a manner the most irresistible*, every thing that can be opposed to its course." Ch. VII. par. 6.

§ 29. The substance recognised by the name of *the electric fluid* penetrates every material substance. Does not this lead the way to help us somewhat to conceive how, as it were, it may be that a part of the infinite extension, OR of its immaterial substratum, penetrates every substance, *light* and *the electric fluid* with the rest, which can in any manner fall under the cognizance of sense?]

§ 30. Whether or not *Antitheos* saw, 'tis nothing very wonderful that he speaks—he *does* speak—as if he saw not, how it is that two things may, without any absurdity, be held to occupy the same space at the same time.



The demonstration of the penetration of matter, where matter exists, is the very Hercules of his Lernæan Hydra. Not to see that demonstration in the "Argument," or altogether to forget its being there, though the demonstration figures in a scholium of its own ; either of these is bad enough.

§ 31. And there is something else which is as bad ; very likely, worse : *The doctrine of the PENETRATION of matter, is deducible, by UNDENIABLE CONSEQUENCE, FROM OUR ATHEIST'S TENETS*, as they are given by himself. Unfortunate *Antitheos* ! though one door was somehow shut, (at least *Antitheos* does not say, he saw it open,) to have the enemy enter by another, which is not to be closed so easily.

§ 32. We shall produce our antitheist's tenets, and afterwards address ourselves to the necessary consequence of them as associated.

§ 33. In the *first* place, then, as specimens of one class of tenets, take the following. "Infinity of extension is "NECESSARILY existing,—it would be *absurd* in the extreme to deny." *Etc. &c. Vide Part. I. § 34.* Again : "Take away matter, and you effect the taking off of "every thing of which we can form the slightest idea. "*All is annihilated except space and duration.*"† Ch. II.

† This passage *leads* me to quote a sentence from a Review of the "Argument, *a priori*," &c. which made its appearance in a No. of "The United Secession Magazine." "Were our minds," says the Reviewer, "to make the most extravagant of all possible suppositions, and compass the idea of all the material universe, and even " (*let it be said with deep reverence*) God himself being annihilated ; ‡ "still we know it is certain that 'infinity of extension and infinity " 'of duration' would continue to exist." "Both these are, in their "very nature, independent of all being, even of God himself." The author of which may write "ATHEIST" on his forehead, as soon as he can, without running any risk of writing a lie. If we can conceive God Himself—to speak with *sense*, for *reverence* is altogether out of

‡ Behold another Reviewer harping on the same string in Part I. § 14.



par. 26. Again: "Matter may be regarded as eternal  
 "and space infinite. WE MUST, *it is true*, award both  
 "attributes to the latter." Ch. III. par. 8. To the  
 like effect: "We have \* a something \* \* \* \*  
 "WHOSE NON-EXISTENCE, \* \* \* and so forth, CAN-  
 "NOT BE CONCEIVED: a something, in short, that an-  
 "swers to our notions of *space*." *Ibid.* par. 12. To the  
 same purpose: "It is not necessary—not absolutely neces-  
 "sary—that even extension, or *space*, should have any  
 "substratum or support to its existence whatever." Ch. IX. par. 2. Also: "To make sure of the *necessity* so  
 "much desired, *Mr Gillespie* lays hold of the only two  
 "things to which it can at all be made applicable—dura-  
 "tion and *space*." Ch. XIII. par. 4. Finally, take this:  
 "The NECESSARY existence of *infinite space* and duration:  
 "none of which propositions were" [or was] "ever dis-  
 "puted." *Vide Part. I* § 35.† Thus, infinity of ex-  
 tension, infinite space, is plenarily admitted by our author  
 to have necessary existence.

§ 34. We shall, in the *second* place, bring forward a set

the question—to be *annihilated*; if, in other words, it infer *no contra-*  
*dition* to say, HE exists not; and if there be any one thing which  
 exists quite *independently* of God; what is there in Theology worth  
 caring about? Theology itself becomes a phantasm.

As another suitable opportunity of noticing that criticism may never  
 fall in my way, and as assuredly 'tis worth nobody's while to search  
 for one, I shall not quit this disagreeable subject till I deliver some-  
 thing of my mind concerning the performance generally.

Two remarks could not miss occurring to every sensible reader of  
 that deplorable Article. The first is, that the Reviewer sticks at no  
 dishonesty, however gross. The most shameful *misquotations* are  
 never boggled at; even though the want of all good faith should shine  
 clearly through. The other is, that the writer has no head (any more  
 than a heart) equal to such discussions. Every one who has a capa-  
 city for topics of that nature, will make the discovery, ere any two  
 sentences be read, that, whoever has, the wretched critic has not.

† See, also, "Refutation," Chap. X. par. 7.

of passages that speak a very different language. Accept first : " A being existing by *necessity* is sought for ; that " is \* \* \* one whose non-existence it is not in the " power of man to imagine \* \* \* \* To seek " *in nature* for such a being ; to ransack the *whole universe* " for it WERE VAIN. Among real and known existences " it was NO WHERE TO BE FOUND." Ch. I. par. 6. Next take : " If such a condition as *necessary* or *self-existence* " really exists, \* \* Why can it *not* be made appli- " cable to the material universe" ? Ch. II. par. 21. To a similar effect : " Matter does *not* exist by that necessity " which alone is admitted in the argument *a priori*." Ch. V. par. 5. And this : " We may as well go into the " HYPOTHESIS of a *vacuum* at once \* \* \* What, " then, is a vacuum ? It is space, I presume, without any " matter being present at all." Ch. VII. par. 5. Once more : " It is *as easy* to conceive of the non-existence of " the thing supposed," (to-wit by *Dr Clarke*,) " *as to* " conceive of the non-existence of that of which we are " ourselves made up, together with the world we inhabit, " and the countless suns and systems occupying space in " all directions." Ch. XIII. par. 3. Again : " Gods " and devils, angels and spirits, heaven and hell,—sup- " posing them all to exist—could have no claim to ne- " cessary existence, since it *implies no contradiction to* " *imagine them not to exist*." Ch. II. par. 20. And in fine : " WE CAN CONCEIVE MATTER NOT TO EXIST."† *Ibid*. Thus, matter is by our atheist completely deprived of true necessary existence.

§ 35. To collect into a focus the very dissimilar, yet congruous rays, emitted by that body of light, the " Re-  
" futation," which sends forth no clearer beams than are here : In the one set of positions, we have an extension

† Consider, likewise, Chap. II. par. 24, and Chap. IX. par. 10.

which is *necessary*; in the other set, an extension *not necessary*.

§ 36. We hasten to the consequence resulting from the conjunction of the two kinds of positions. We have an extension which is NECESSARY, and we have an extension which is NOT NECESSARY. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, TWO EXTENSIONS WHICH CANNOT BE THE SAME. TWO EXTENSIONS THE ONE WHEREOF CANNOT BE ANY PART OF THE OTHER. But a non-necessary extension cannot by its presence annihilate any portion of a necessary extension. And THEREFORE; matter—which has the non-necessary extension—existing along with, if not *contained in*, the extension which is of infinity—the necessary extension; the infinite extension, or space, must PENE-TRATE; matter must BE PENETRATED, *tota, et totalitèr*.

§ 37. Such, then, is the conclusion to which we are compelled to come by *Antitheos's* express tenets. And wherein does that conclusion differ from the conclusion of "Scholium II.?" Not in any point at all.

§ 38. Let the reader give his utmost attention to what we have here been urging. For, the doctrine of penetration demonstrated, *atheism falls down, dead as a stone*. And *Antitheos* knows this, else he knows but little of any moment in the affair. And the best of all, is—never let us forget it—the doctrine of penetration necessarily follows from his own principles.

§ 39. So that, to speak in allusion to our atheist's words, as they occur in the first of the passages on which we have been animadverting, Theology has not entangled its advocate in an inextricable absurdity. There is no absurdity in the case, but one; which is this, that our author should stand up for the *atheistical* hypothesis, and hold principles from which the first grand principle which conducts to *Theism*, and to nothing else, follows by complete necessity.

§ 40. After the words referred to in the preceding section, *Antitheos* goes on thus: "A religious friend who has corresponded with me upon this point, alleges that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is *not material*"—Ch. VI. par. 14. To be religious according to our atheist's mode of reckoning, nothing more is requisite than to be a theist. On this understanding, I can easily help him to another religious friend (a friend in the very best sense) who alleges the same thing, namely, that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is immaterial. And this friend is no other than the Author of the "Argument" himself, *who*, though, to speak truth, he has not alleged that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is not material, has, if he be not sadly mistaken, done *much more than merely allege* that which implies the immateriality of the substance of the substratum in question; and *who* will persist in thinking he has done so, till some one shall evince, by truly valid arguments, that the thought is erroneous. As for the "Refutation," of arguments, except those which are "a very clever approach" to shockingly bad ones, it contains none. The Author of this production, himself, shall witness for us, that the "Argument" has undertaken to demonstrate what involves the immateriality of the substratum of infinity of extension, or expansion. "Admitting his (*Mr Gillespie's*) substratum of space \* \* \*

"No reason can be assigned why infinity of expansion \* \* \* should have *an immaterial* something to keep it in existence, that would not prove"—&c. &c. Ch. VII. par. 13. Here it is tacitly assumed, that the "Argument" seeks to reach an immaterial substratum of infinity of expansion. So that the "religious friend" introduces *Antitheos* to the front of what may be held, in a certain and a good sense, and to his opprobrium, alas! as the very *asses' bridge* of the demonstration. Observe,



then, *Antitheos's* "footing" and bearing, as he prepares to make the leap, and pass the bridge. Get clear of it he must ; or else it will roll over on him, and crush his atheism into powder. Observe, I repeat, how the passage is to be effected. Behold, he springs aloft—"But this "is mere *babble*." Immediately I hear all my readers loudly accuse me of having omitted something. But I assure you, not one word has been missed. Then surely something follows. True ; but what is to come you will not think mends the matter.—"This is mere *babble* ; "something he has been taught to repeat,—not the dictate of his sounder judgment."—And why so ?—"Substance and matter are the same. The words are synonymous and convertible"—in the sense of the words mutually exhausting each other, *Antitheos* means. Yes, the words *are* convertible in that sense, IF the barely assuming the thing our atheist had to prove, the mere uttering of an "unproved extravagance," be all that is necessary to be done in the affair. *Vide supra*, § 2. "When," our antitheist proceeds, "used otherwise" (than, to-wit, as merely convertible words) "they become *unintelligible* ; *inasmuch as* we might then talk of an unsubstantial substance and immaterial matter." Par. 14. Un-substantial substance ; namely, substance that is *not* substance ! Im-material matter ; to-wit, matter which is *not* matter ! Unintelligible indeed. And as such we hand them over to our materialist's tender mercies.

§ 41. (One word in relation to the latter unintelligibility. There is no opinion, however extravagant, but has had its advocates in the world, no assertion so wild as not to have been made by some *philosopher*.† *Antitheos* holds, and who is he who will think, *Antitheos* does not rightly hold ? that to talk of *im-material matter* is to talk unintelligibly. But attend. A very celebrated main-

† *Nihil est tam absurdum quod non aliquis e Philosophis asserat.*—Tully.



tainer of the *materiality of mind*, had also been an advocate for the *immateriality of matter*. Dr Priestley, in his "History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours," declares for the "*scheme of THE IMMATERIALITY OF MATTER, as it may be called.*" And we shall not take upon us to say, that he so declares himself with less reason on his side than he has when he appears, and he appears throughout his "Disquisitions on Matter AND *Spirit*," as a sworn friend to the *materiality of mind*. From *matter*, this Doctor says, in the latter work, (vol. i. p. 144, 2d edit.) he has "wiped off the *reproach*" [a long standing one] "of being \* \* absolutely incapable of intelligence." Which *perhaps* he had accomplished all the more easily, if matter be immaterial.)

## PART VII.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. The next paragraph in the “ Refutation” commences thus: “ But, to refer to the *first* Proposition,—“ has it not been demonstrated that infinity of extension “ exists necessarily?—that it exists, *per se*, by the most “ abstract and *metaphysical* necessity?” Ch. VI. par. 15. By the way, here we have the *right* word, *i. e.* “ metaphysical”: Though no farther back than the thirteenth paragraph, we had “ mathematical,” the *wrong* one. *Vide Part. VI. § 2.* *Antitheos* in a certain place speaks of a “ magic rod” possessed by “ the reasoners for the being “ of a GOD according to the argument *a priori* ;” who are said to “ work miracles with” “ *necessity*,” which is the name of the rod. (See last Chapter, sixth paragraph.) A *magic* rod it must be: and no mistake. But I am of opinion, that our author’s magical powers, whether they are centred in a rod or no, should be presumed, notwithstanding his confirmed distaste to the supernatural, to be nowise inferior to those resident in the rod of the *a priori* reasoners noticed. To turn, when one likes, what is *metaphysical* necessity into “ mathematical,” and the *mathematical* back again into “ metaphysical necessity”; implies, methinks, a stretch of power equal, and indeed superior, to the virtue ascribed by him to our magic rod.

We, he says, "work *miracles*." Whereas, he works an *impossibility*, and that's more than a miracle.

§ 2. It *has* been demonstrated, that infinity of extension exists necessarily. So the first question is answered. It *has not* been, and what is more, it never will be, demonstrated that infinity of extension exists *per se*. So *Antitheos* has his second question replied to, but not affirmatively. "The *first Proposition*" maintains the necessary existence of infinite extension; but determines nothing concerning the topic whether that extension exists by itself or not. In the language of the note upon Proposition I: "The proposition affirms that there is Infinity of Extension, *but affirms nothing more*." See "Appendix" to the "Argument."†

§ 3. After putting the two interrogatories which we have answered in so satisfactory a manner, our atheist asks: "In what sort of predicament, *then*, must that reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and universally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable position?" The reasoning that does so must appear, and, which is more, must really be, in an ill predicament indeed. This much may be held as settled. But the "then;" the significant particle which insinuates that "that reasoning" is *Mr Gillespie's*;—"there's the rub." But we come to the proof of the justness of the insinuation. "*Mr Gillespie's* dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum to support it—infinite extension, which is itself necessary!" Yea: *Mr Gillespie's* dilemma, or disjunctive proposition, does recognise such a possibility; and, what is a longer journey in the same direction, the first Proposition of Part III. is, *inter alia*, taken up in demonstrating that "Infinity of Expansion" or Extension "*cannot exist by itself*," that, on the contrary, "Infinity

† *Put a Part. X. § 88. not. †.*

"of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or "Being." *Mr Gillespie*, then, in his dilemma, and out of it too, fully "recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension," "which is itself necessary," "requiring a substratum"—We shall not say a "substratum to support it," that is, a substratum to be a substratum. Infinite extension is itself necessary. But then, it is not necessary that infinite extension exist *per se*: At least, this has not been shewn to follow from the other position; or, moreover, from any thing else. The positions, Infinity of extension exists necessarily, and, Infinity of extension exists *per se*; though it has pleased *Antitheos* to treat them as if they expressed much about the same thing, are positions of a widely different character. The latter one is no more necessarily true because the former is so, than it is necessary, that *because* there are such things as vain assertions cemented together so as to form weak arguing, *therefore* the vain assertions should exist *per se*. Only conceive vain assertions that never proceeded from any idle tongue, or unfortunate pen! that never existed, consequently, but by themselves! hanging in the pure *per se* state—wherever you please! without even a *Refutation* to reside in! The

Words congeal'd in northern air,†

are not so badly off, though they must submit to be heard at the thaw, as those assertions must be. Words frozen in the atmosphere must first have been uttered. And yet, though there cannot be vain assertions that never were made, it is perfectly true there is an abundance of the commodity in the world—to try our patience. Some very vain assertions are not so far to seek either; although we mention no place.

§ 4. "*Mr Gillespie's* dilemma recognises, at least, the

† *Hudibras*. Part I. Canto i.

“ possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum  
 “ to support it—infinite extension, which is itself neces-  
 “ sary! How is this?” I think, we have told him. And,  
 for his comfort, he shall be told yet farther.

§ 5. “ Was it found,” demands our antitheist in continuation, “ that although *space* possessed a few of the  
 “ Divine attributes, *it* did not possess all, nor any thing  
 “ like all that were deemed needful to constitute a  
 “ respectable deity? Notwithstanding appearances, I  
 “ should hope not. But, at any rate, we are again landed  
 “ in a quagmire of absurdity—the absurdity of supposing  
 “ a thing to be dependent and independent at the same  
 “ time. If *space* must be conceived *a priori* necessary, to  
 “ talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense  
 “ of the word is nonsense.” Par. 15. What does *Anti-*  
*theos* here understand by the word “ space?” Without  
 an accompanying word, or phrase, to determine the exact  
 sense it is to bear, *space* always is rather an ambiguous  
 term. Different schools of philosophy have employed  
 it to stand for very different things.

§ 6. And it will be of singular use in clearing matters,  
 if we present an enumeration of the different things under-  
 stood by philosophers when they are treating of *space*.  
 —In explaining the various ideas which have been enter-  
 tained, one thing shall be carefully attended to: We shall  
 take pains not to represent those opinions from which we  
 dissent through the medium of our own belief on the sub-  
 ject. The inquiry is to be, What do philosophers mean  
 by *space*? And should we presuppose, at least should  
 our exposition assume, that *space* stands for some parti-  
 cular thing exclusively, the representation of the senti-  
 ments of certain could hardly be given with fairness. In  
 fine, though we have a fixed bias in this matter, we shall  
 endeavour, while we deliver what others think, to proceed  
 as if we had no preconceived notions at all.



§ 7. A few remarks, also, shall be thrown out, intended to shew that of the various opinions some approach nearer to the truth than do others. Where notions are most completely opposed, the object viewed by the minds in possession of them cannot possibly be the same, or if there be not more objects than one, the sentiments cannot possibly all be correct. 'Tis certain enough, that the reports brought us, as to what space is, disagree in the most fundamental points.—With regard to the *exposition*, we shall not take *space* to stand for any one thing more than for any other. But when we pass to the *animadversions*, we shall, on the contrary, by all means assume that space is space; that space is nothing more than space, and nothing less. An assumption which, doubtless, we are well entitled to make: And one that will be found to carry a great deal with it—A thing you may naturally incline to consider as remarkable. But true it is, that so simple an act as holding so many of the conceits concerning space up to the light of the axiom, space is space, is to lay bare their extreme emptiness.—The digression as a whole, in short, will be useful, inasmuch as it will go to determine whether there be in nature space without matter, and, if there be, what space without respect to body is. And besides the general purpose it is designed to serve, parts of the digression (we seek not to conceal it) will be attended with no inconsiderable collateral advantage to our cause.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING  
SPACE.—M. DES CARTES, MRS. COCKBURN, ETC.

§ 8.—I. Some philosophers have considered Space to be *a substance*. These may be divided into two classes. *First*; those who hold Matter and Space to be the same. *Second*; those who contend that Space is a substance, and is distinct from matter.

§ 9.—1. *Des Cartes* having defined extension to be the essence of matter, and thus made extension and matter to be the same, could admit of no space void of body, could not admit, in other words, of there being space which is not material. A consequence of the definition is, that the material universe is infinitely extended: The idea of the infinity of extension no man who reflects on the subject can get quit of; and, therefore, if extension be matter, matter is without bounds. “*Puto*,” says *Cartesius*, “*implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus*.” [“I take it to involve a *contradiction* to say, the material “universe is finite,” *i. e.* in extent.] *Epist. 69. Partis primæ*. And to reduce the position, Matter is finitely extended, to a contradiction, this ingenious theist had nothing but his own vain definition, namely, Matter is extension, and extension is matter. What else under the sun, or above, could he have?

§ 10. We shall introduce a passage from a rather ingenious author. “Some (I mean *Des Cartes* and his followers) confounding the ideas of *extension* and *body* have “by this \* \* been led to assert the absolute infinity “even of the material universe; tho’ they could not but

“ at the same time be sensible that their hypothesis in  
 “ some sense rendered matter or body a necessary being,  
 “ by depriving the DEITY both of the power of creating  
 “ a finite whole at the first, and of afterwards annihilating  
 “ any part.” “ An Impartial Enquiry into the Existence  
 “ and Nature of GOD,” &c. By *S. C. (S. Colliber.)*  
 B. II. Part ii. ch. 2.—I add, that if extension, or space,  
 and matter are to be confounded, matter must have been,  
 as well as must be, eternal, and is also necessary in the  
 sense of it inferring a contradiction to say, it does not  
 exist; unless we will have it, that all extension began  
 sometime to be, and can be imagined not to be at all.  
 There can be space without matter, or body: else, body  
 is eternal, nay necessarily existing, that is, cannot be sup-  
 posed non-existent.

§ 11.—2. The opinion has been entertained by some,  
 that there is Space apart from matter, and that Space  
 without matter is, *itself*, a substance. Under this head,  
 we may notice, in the *first* place, their notion who tell us,  
 that Space void of body is a kind of intermediate sub-  
 stance; neither body nor mind, but a something between  
 the two. And in the *next* place, the sentiment of those  
 who are willing to be held as maintaining, that Space is  
 God.

§ 12.—(1.) The notion that Space is a peculiar sort of  
 being, a substance between body and spirit, has been  
 adopted by divers writers of no very remote period. A  
 distinguished female metaphysician expresses herself in  
 the following manner. “ I see no absurdity in supposing,  
 “ that there may be other substances, than either spirits  
 “ or bodies. \* \* \* \* \* There should  
 “ be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm be-  
 “ twixt body and spirit. \* \* \* \* \* What a gap be-  
 “ twixt *senseless material*, and *intelligent immaterial* sub-  
 “ stance, unless there is some being, which, by partaking

“ of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them,  
 “ and make the transition less violent ? And why may  
 “ not Space be such a being ? Might we not venture to  
 “ define it, an *immaterial unintelligent substance, the place*  
 “ *of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties*  
 “ *of both ?*” *Mrs Cockburn’s Works. Birch’s Edit. vol. i.*  
 p. 390–1.†

§ 13. This lady writes as if body and spirit were two distinctly different kinds of substance, and as if *intelligence* was the *peculiar* attribute of spirit. *Senseless* material substance, and *intelligent* immaterial substance ; thus she distinguishes : And alluding as she does to the violence of that transition which passes from the one substance to the other, she represents the substances as being separated by a mighty and irremoveable gulf. She, good woman, had not learned the secret (it was yet—possibly, it still is—undivulged) how to wipe off from matter the reproach of being miserably ill qualified for sustaining the heavy burden of thought. (*Vide Part. VI. § 41.*) Her distinction and representation we are disposed to commend. And as for her ignorance of the secret ;—probably she was wiser without the knowledge.

§ 14. But now to what is to us the important part in the quotation, the statement, to-wit, of her opinion, that *space is a substance, an unintelligent substance, yea an im-*

† *Mrs Catherine Cockburn* was the author of “A Defence of *Mr Locke’s Essay*,” and other acute and excellent performances. The Defence was much prized by the incomparable author defended. She was also in high favour, on account of her writings, with *Dr Thomas Burnet*, Bishop of *Salisbury*, and the giant-minded *Warburton* :—Each of these Prelates supplied a preface to a production of her pen. *Dr Thomas Sharp*, Archdeacon of *Northumberland*, carried on a controversy with *Mrs Cockburn*, as to the true foundation of morality. She surely was an honour to her sex.—The words quoted in the text, occur in her “Remarks upon some writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation.”

*material substance.* (Of a truth, that space *void of matter*—which is what she means by space—is *im-material*, none can deny.) By what arguments does *Mrs Cockburn* pretend to evince, that her opinion has foundation in the nature of things? I find only one argument in that passage, and no more than one other in all her writings.

§ 15. The argument occurring in the passage quoted, infers the truth of the hypothesis embraced, from the advantage attending it. Space, argues *Mrs Cockburn*, “by “partaking of the nature of both” “senseless (or unintelligent) material, and intelligent immaterial substance”——

§ 16. But we must break in, to remark how it comes about that Space is invested with “some of the proper-“ties of both” *spirit* and *body*. Why is Space thus invested? Because it is *immaterial* and *unintelligent*. Had it been said, that, seeing Space is not matter, and is destitute of intelligence, an attribute this of spirit, Space is not body and lacks a property of spirit; there had been nothing very objectionable. But as the lady’s words stand, the only ‘property’ bestowed on spirit is *im-materiality*—a cold negation; and the only ‘property’ thrown over to body is *un-intelligence*—a mere privation too. To return from this interruption, which, we may say, was forced upon us, and for which we humbly beg pardon of *Mrs Cockburn* :—

§ 17. She argues, we repeat, that Space, by partaking of the nature of both unintelligent material, and intelligent immaterial substance, is useful in the realm of nature, inasmuch as it serves as a connecting link, and takes off all that can be taken from the violence of the transition, between substances separated by such a “vast chasm.”—Space, in short, connects intelligence and non-intelligence, matter and not-matter. But if there be a connecting link between matter and no matter, intelli-



gence and no intelligence : why might we not extend the principle, and introduce a connecting link between existence in general, itself, and non-existence ; by way of rendering the transition from the one to the other *less violent* ? But shall we indeed be ever able to say, without violence to truth, that the great gulf betwixt non-existence and existence

Tamely endured a bridge of wondrous length ? †

§ 18. The other argument to which allusion was made, is not, indeed, intended to evidence, that Space is an un-intelligent substance : and as for immateriality, space without matter is immaterial all the world over. This second argument is intended to evidence no more than that Space is *a substance*. But then, if it really render this much apparent, it will do a great deal. The argument in question is contained in these words : “ The idea “ of space is not the idea of extension, but of *something* “ *extended*.” ‡ Remarks.

§ 19. Now if this argument be to go for any thing at all, it will obviously go for something very weighty. Thus it deserves our serious consideration.

§ 20. *Space*, the argument implies, is *not extension*, but something, that is, a substance, extended.

§ 21. But if Space be an extended substance, Duration may be, on the same ground, an enduring substance. The two things are in the same predicament. Space and Time are each a *sine quâ non* of every thing else. The non-existence of either cannot be conceived. They are both limitless. They are, in fine, on a footing of equality

† Paradise Lost. B. II.

‡ Who shall decide, when doctors disagree ?

And who shall decide, when Doctors differ from ladies ? “ If *Space* “ and *Duration* \* \* \* be not (*as 'tis plain they are not*) themselves “ *substances*”—*Dr St. Clarke's* Ans. to 5th Letter.

in every essential respect. And if bare space be a substance, it will be necessary to assign a sufficient reason why bare duration is not. It will be consequentially necessary, and absolutely impossible.

§ 22. This is an argument from *the consequence*. The next shall be an argument from *the state of the fact*.

§ 23. Space is a substance having extension: This the lady's argument involves. Now the hypothesis, that extension is an attribute of space, takes, of necessity, cognizance of two things,—the substance extended, and the extension thereof. But though the hypothesis does so, *do we?* This is an appeal to consciousness, and as the court applied to is competent to take the case in hand, so, it need scarcely be said, no other tribunal is qualified. Do we (I say) in conceiving space,—as we conceive a thing *being*, do we conceive, in addition, a thing *having*, extension? How, and wherein is space, the substratum extended, distinguishable from extension, the property of space? The plain and simple truth is, space, the substratum, and extension, the property, are not distinguishable at all. We conceive only one extension, only one space.

§ 24. So much for the argument from *the fact*. Now for an argument from *the word*.

§ 25. *Space* just means *extension* or *expansion*. “The words Space, Extension, Amplitude, and Expansion are,” says the author of the *Impartial Enquiry*, “no thing different, neither in their genuine signification nor in their original use”—“whatever distinction is wont to be assigned is merely arbitrary.” See his Discourse concerning the Nature of Space.

§ 25. *Space*, then, is merely another term for *extension*. And therefore, to say, Space is something which is extended, or which is extension, is all one with saying, Extension is something which is space. Which propositions

are indeed nothing more than the truth, in one view of matters, *viz.* that in which the propositions are beheld as *truisms* : But, according to our lady's mode of reckoning what are equivalents, are tantamount to these propositions :—Space is *something* (in the former equivalent proposition it ran, *which is*—but now it becomes) *which has*, or *possesses*, extension ; and, Extension is *something* (formerly, *which is*—at present) *which has*, or is *invested with*, space. But if simple space (in short) be not only extension, or space, but likewise a something or a substance possessing space ; then, assuredly, simple space is something *more than* simple space. And we have already arranged, that we are not to permit any person to depart from us with the impression, that space is any thing more than space. *Vide supra*, § 7.

§ 26. It may be remarked, in approaching the termination of this department of the subject, that space or extension without any matter filling it, may by all means *be connected with* a substance. But if it be, the circumstance will not make out, that mere space is, of itself, a substance. The very reverse, indeed. Space supposing a substance, is another thing, truly, from space being one.

§ 27. Space, then, so far forth as it is space only, cannot be a substance. To elevate it to the rank of substance, is to change its identity. Before the dignity attaching to the nature of *substance* will sit easy upon space, we must metamorphose that which is space into that which space resides in.

§ 28. We have, in all this, confined ourselves to one line of arguing. But the reader may consider, at this point, something which occurs in the third section, above.

§ 29.—(2.) As the notion which we have just considered regards Space as unintelligent, so the opinion next to be noticed views it as an *intelligent* substance.

§ 30. *Dr St. Clarke* has an observation on “ the weak-

“ness of such, as have presumed to imagine Infinite Space  
 “to be a *just representation* or adequate idea of the *Es-*  
 “*sence* of the Supreme Cause.”† The observation oc-  
 curs under his 4th Proposition : Which runs thus :—  
 “What the *Substance* OR *Essence*‡ of that Being,” [or Sub-  
 stance—*Vide Part. V. § 10.*] “which is Self-Existent,

† Is there no confounding here of the objective and subjective ? of space and our idea of it ? To fail in preserving the distinction between object and subject, was no uncommon thing in the Doctor’s age. The full consequences of the failure were rendered very apparent in the age which preceded ours. But though the Doctor sometimes unfortunately lost his *ideas* in *things*, and changed, in spite of nature, things into ideas, yet, set him upon it, he could condemn all confusion in regard to the external and internal. The following passage may be admired, consistently, by the most finical stickler for the metaphysics which proceed “on the principles of Common Sense.”—“The  
 “principal occasion or reason of the *confusion and inconsistencies*, which  
 “appear in what most writers have advanced concerning the nature  
 “of *Space*, seems to be this : that (unless they attend carefully,) men  
 “are very apt to neglect that necessary distinction, (without which  
 “there can be no clear reasoning,) which ought always to be made  
 “between *Abstracts* and *Concretes*, such as are *Immensitas* and *Immen-*  
 “*sum* ; and also between *IDEAS* and *THINGS*, such as are the *notion*  
 “(which is within our own mind) of Immensity, and the real Immensity  
 “actually existing without us.” Correspondence with *Leibnitz*. Note in 5th Reply.

‡ The Doctor employs these two words as perfectly synonymous, and entirely convertible. This will be very plain to him who reads what is under this 4th Proposition. In which, the Doctor, when speaking in relation to God—the Self-Existent, Necessarily-Existing—Supreme Being—Substance—Cause,—uses, no less than five times, (as we have denoted,) *substance* and *essence* as expressing exactly the same thing : To say nothing of his employing, more than once, the two words indifferently, when treating concerning other things or beings. So that we may cite, as completely applicable to the present case, a marginal note in his Preface to “The Evidences of Natural  
 “and Revealed Religion.”—“In this whole question, the word *Es-*  
 “*sence* is not to be taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word,  
 “as signifying *that by which a thing is what it is*. \* \* \* \* But *Essence*,  
 “is all along to be understood, as signifying here the same with *Sub-*  
 “*stance*.”



“ or Necessarily-Existing, is ; we have no idea, neither is “ it at all possible for us to comprehend it.” The proposition lays down, that of the substance of GOD we have no idea : The observation sets an eye on those who, contrariwise, imagined that we have an idea of such substance ;—that our idea of infinite space—not infinite space itself, as *Clarke* has it—is the idea of the substance of GOD. The great Rector of *St James’s*, then, knew of persons who laboured in trying to represent *space* to be the substance of the Divine Being.

§ 31. “ Some,” says *Leibnitz*, “ have believed it (real “ absolute space) to be GOD Himself.” Third Paper to *Clarke*, 3.

§ 32. And *Bishop Berkeley*, good *Bishop Berkeley*,† no bad judge he of the sentiments of others, and no lover of language deficient in precision, speaks of “ that dangerous *dilemma*, to which several, who have employed their “ thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced ; “ to-wit, of thinking either *that real space is GOD*, or else “ that there is something beside GOD which is eternal, “ uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable.”—“ It is certain,” continues the Bishop, “ that not a few divines, “ as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the “ difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be *Divine*,” viz. a *Divine Substance* : for, observe, his view here is directed to those who put forth, “ that real space is GOD.” “ And “ some of late have set themselves particularly to shew, “ that the *incommunicable attributes* of GOD agree to it.” *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Sect. CXVII. Thus far *Bishop Berkeley*.

§ 33. We shall seize this favourable opportunity, to vindicate the memory of a writer not so much known now

† To *Berkeley*, every virtue under heaven.

*Pope*—Epilogue to the Satires.



as once he was. Against the respectable author whom we have in our eye, has a serious accusation been brought by *Dr Isaac Watts*. A great lover of truth was the Doctor: And if he be detected making a wrong statement, we can have no difficulty in ascribing the false representation to the true source, and may rest most thoroughly contented that he knew no better himself.

§ 34. The charge which the Doctor's pen was trusted to drop flows in this manner:—" *Mr Raphson*, a great mathematician, has written a book on this theme, *De Spatio Reali*,† wherein he labours to prove *that this space is GOD Himself*, going all along upon this supposition, that space is and must be something real; and then his reason cannot find an idea for it below GOD-HEAD." Philosophical Essays. Essay I. Sect. iv.

§ 35. But this testimony is not borne out by the fact: *Mr Raphson's* book neither labours to prove, nor so much as simply affirms, a thing so very absurd as the assertion, that space is GOD. The 13th proposition in *Mr Raphson's* demonstration concerning space is: "*Spatium est attributum (viz. immensitas) Primæ Causæ.*" ["Space is an attribute (or it is the immensity) of the First Cause."] See *Cap. V*. And it is not in one place only of his book, this great mathematician maintains, that space, infinite space or immensity, is nothing more than an attribute of the Supreme Being.‡ So very far was he from giving

† Published at London, in MDCXCVII.

‡ The following words occur in the Dedication:—" *De Spatio Reali*  
 " \* \* subsequens tractatus agit \* \* \* \* \* quatenus  
 " \* *Supremi Entis infinitum sit et æternum Attributum.*" In *Cap. vi.*  
 these passages are to be found: "*Spatium reale et infinitum, seu invisibilem illam et incorpoream & Infiniti extensionem, ipsam immensitatem esse Primæ Causæ,*" &c. "*Amplitudo extensionis infinita, immensam in Prima Causa essendi diffusionem, seu infinitam illius, verèq; interminatam, essentiam, exprimit.*"

any countenance to the monstrous position with which *Dr Watts* has connected his name.†

§ 36. Before losing sight of our mathematician, and of our metaphysician, we shall note, by way of setting matters farther right, that the Reverend accuser (at least during one stage of his life—*vide part. x. § 57.*) went nearer than *Joseph Raphson* did, to making Space to be GOD. In the very same paragraph wherein the mathematician's sentiment is misrepresented, the metaphysician hath these words: "Indeed, if *space* be a real thing "existent without us, it appears to bid fair for DEITY." See also the title to the Essay. *Vide Part. X. § 10. Vide quoq; § 24. et § 34. ejusdem Part.*

§ 37.—All this trouble, a desire to do justice, and a regard to truth, compelled us to take.

§ 38. We have shewn, that Space cannot be a Substance. *Vide supra, § 21. et seq. usq; ad § 28. inclus.* If Space cannot be a Substance, it cannot be a substance in possession of intelligence. All that we shall now do, is, to add something additional, upon the topic of the impossibility of Space having intelligence, or being GOD.

§ 39. By GOD,—at the very least we must mean, if we mean any thing, an intelligent, moral Being, or a Being with the attributes of intelligence, wisdom, goodness, holiness, &c. &c. How, then, can Space be GOD? how can Ex-

† *Watts* has fallen into another mistake: and as we are in the way of rectifying blunders at any rate, we shall not leave his readers on a wrong scent as to a second notorious misconception in relation to *Raphson's* book. Wherein, affirms the Doctor, the author goes "all along upon this supposition, that space," to-wit, space distinct from matter, "is and must be something real." But what is the truth? Hear *Mr Raphson* speak for himself. The title of "*Cap. IV.*" is as follows: "*Spatium reale à materiâ distinctum in rerum naturâ dari, rationibus è naturâ mundi materialis, &c. petitis, demonstratur.*" And the Chapter commences in this manner: "*Hiscæ præmissis, ad rem ipsam (scil. spatium reale à materiâ distinctum) evincendam tandem venimus.*" § c. & c.

tension without matter, be wise and good? Space, for aught that has been proved, or that appears, to the contrary, may COEXIST with those attributes: It may be the *mode* of a Substance, of which they are *modes* too. But how can space, extension void of body, vacuum, be intelligent, and wise, and good, and holy? To say, that space is intelligent, wise, good, holy, is to say what virtually implies, that space, and intelligence, and wisdom, and goodness, and holiness, are COEXISTING things, but it is not to say what implies any thing more—if the assertion is to be supposed to have really any proper meaning. Space is NOTHING BUT Space. But Intelligence is SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT Space. *Therefore*, if space itself were intelligence, space would not be space. Though Space and Intelligence may well be allowed to be coexistences, you cannot *sink and lose* the one in the other, without absurdity. But you sink and lose them in each other, whenever you make them more than coexistences. And they are more than coexistences, if space is intelligence. And Space is Intelligence, if it be true that space is intelligent, true, in any other sense than that involved in the position, They are coexistences.

§ 40. "Space," observes *Clarke*, "is not a Being, an eternal and infinite Being, but a property, or a consequence of the existence of a Being infinite and eternal. Infinite Space, is Immensity: But Immensity is not GOD: And therefore Infinite Space, is not GOD." Third Reply to *Leibnitz*, 3. Again. "Infinite Space, is nothing else but abstract Immensity or Infinity; even as Infinite Duration is abstract Eternity. And it would be just as proper, to say that Eternity is the essence," [or substance—*vide supra not. ‡ apud* § 30.] "of the Supreme Cause; as to say, that Immensity is so." Demonstration: under Prop. IV.—These observations are deserving

of being pondered, and with the reflections to which such observations should give birth, we cannot be too familiar.

§ 41. In connection with what we have said, that, for aught which has been shewn, or appears, to the contrary, space—we shall here say, infinite space—may *co-exist* with intelligence, wisdom, &c. ; we are desirous of answering a question put forth by *Antitheos*, whom, in the mean time, we would not forget altogether. “How infinite extension,” these are *Antitheos’s* words, “or infinite duration, or a compound of both—if a compound of this nature can be imagined—”(I am sure it cannot—) “or how even a substratum of these *abstractions*†—supposing such substratum—can afford a medium for the existence of *intelligence*, power, and freedom of agency, passes all understanding.”—“Can we describe,” demands our atheist, “how it is possible *for intelligence to pervade all space*—? \* \* \* \* \*

“Mr Gillespie talks of a substance, it is true, a *being* of infinity of expansion, &c.” — . Chap. XII. par. 1 & 2. To *Antitheos’s* question, How can intelligence pervade all space? I shall respond by a counter interrogation. But first, I must set down two or three words of his own, by way of a sort of fulcrum, whereby and wherefrom to loosen the foundations of his *materialism*, or, should these remain unshaken, it will be because his *atheism totters to its base*. “Intelligence \*, speaking generally, is,” asserts *Antitheos*, in the 4th paragraph of Chapter XI. “nothing more than an accidental *property of matter*.” Now my question is this : Does matter possess extension? *No doubt*,—*Antitheos* has already in-

† The word in the “Refutation” is “attractions;” obviously a misprint. The sense (perhaps the nonsense—*vide part. i. § 8.*) requires *abstractions*.



formed us. *Vide Part. VI. § 2.* Wherefore, intelligence being a property of what has extension, intelligence pervades what has extension. For how can intelligence be a property of matter, but by pervading matter? The thing is clear enough. But what is meant by pervading matter, is, co-existing with matter.

§ 42. Then—(I see *Antitheos* tremble for his atheism, as well he may—) if intelligence can co-exist with matter, or solid extension, why, why can intelligence not pervade, or co-exist with, extension without solidity, with pure space? Certain it is, the *solidity* does indeed seem to be no furtherance, but an impediment rather, to *thought*.

§ 43. Will *Antitheos* be disposed to allege, that it is the *infiniteness* of space which presents the barrier in the way of the co-existence of Space and Intelligence? If he will, then we shall let *Leibnitz* furnish the ground-work for an unanswerable reply. “Supposing the *sensorium* (of the “soul) to be extended, \* \* \* the question returns, “Whether the soul be diffused through the whole extension, be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, “IS NOTHING TO THE PURPOSE here.” Fifth Paper, 98.—In fine, why may not intelligence *pervade all space*, as well as all a brain, or all of any portion of a brain?

§ 44. We shall finish what we have to urge in relation to the opinion, that pure space is a substance, as well as, indeed, in relation to our first head generally, by putting before our readers two passages in *Mr Locke*.† And had these passages, or such passages as these, been sufficiently *digested* (and *Bacon* himself could not point to much that

† The passages referred to (for that matter) might be quoted, and not to bad purpose either, in relation to any of our great heads,—nay, in relation to almost any part of this digression. So that, if the reader will carry the contents of the passages about in his mind, till he get to the end of what we have to say regarding space, he will do what will oblige us, and be useful to himself.



was worthier of undergoing the whole process), we should never have heard of such a fantastic hypothesis as that which maintains that space is a substance—an unintelligent substance, or an intelligent one—For neither branch of the hypothesis is one whit more ridiculous than the other. “Space, considered barely in length between any  
“two beings, without considering any thing else between  
“them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth,  
“and thickness, I think it may be called capacity; the  
“term extension is usually applied to it in what manner  
“soever considered.” Essay. B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. “Whether we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its  
“coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of these solid  
“parts, extension; or, whether considering it as lying  
“between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or  
“else considering it as lying between any two bodies, or  
“positive beings, without any consideration whether  
“there be any matter or no between, we call it distance.  
“However named or considered, IT IS ALWAYS THE SAME  
“UNIFORM SIMPLE *idea of* SPACE ——— whereof having  
“settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and  
“add them one to another, as often as we will, and consider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled  
“with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there  
“without displacing and thrusting out the body that was  
“there before; or else as void of solidity, so that a body  
“of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space, may  
“be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of  
“any thing that was there.” *Ibid.* § 27.

## PART VIII.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE.—NEWTON, CLARKE, BUTLER, PRICE, LOCKE, ADDISON, TILLOTSON, MILTON, ETC.

§ 1.—II. Other philosophers mean by Space nothing more than *a mode, property, quality, affection*, of a substratum or substance. The philosophers we now speak of may be ranged into two divisions. The *first* division may consist of those who allow of no vacuum in nature, who, in other words, hold matter to be infinitely extended. The *second* will be composed of those who maintain the existence of vacuum, or space without matter.

§ 2.—1. As to those philosophers who fall to be ranked under the first division: These, in affirming matter to be limitless, not having it to say, (they being no *Cartesians*,) that matter, because the same with extension, cannot be conceived to be finite; have one only decent pretext for their conduct. Their pretext is this,—they *please arbitrarily* to make the affirmation. Now, because they have no better reason to give, we are inclined to believe, their assertion agrees not with the nature of things. That, *in point of fact*, matter is infinitely extended,—that, in point of fact, there is no such thing as vacuum any where amidst bodies,† or beyond all matter, (there being no *beyond* in relation to all matter,‡) as to so gratuitous an assertion,

† *Vide* APPENDIC. A.

‡ *Vide infra*, §§ 11. 12.—*Etc.*

it is nowise necessary that we give it a farther consideration. Our readers shall have dwelt upon the subject long enough, by the time they have fully comprehended the elements constituting the assertion.

§ 3.—2. We, therefore, pass on to the philosophers of the second class, the philosophers who admit that there is Space distinct from matter, considering this Space to be no more than a mode or property of a substance or substratum.

§ 4. “DEUS \* \* \*,” says the great *Newton* in his celebrated Scholium, “*Non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat est adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem constituit.*” “[THE DEITY is not eternity nor infinity, but HE is eternal and infinite; HE is not duration nor *space*, but HE endures, and is *expanded*.† HE endures always, and is present every where; and by existing at all times and in all places, HE makes duration and *space*, eternity and *infinity*, to be.”‡] *Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general. sub finem.*

§ 5 Those who are acquainted with *Clarke's* Demonstration, and his Letters to *Butler*, are well aware what his sentiment is.‡ We shall select a passage from a

† “*Sir Isaac Newton*, in his famous Scholium, \* \* supposes God to be *extended*,” or expanded. *Dr Watts' Inquiry concerning Space.* Sect. v.—“*Sir Isaac Newton* thought, that the DEITY \* \* \* constitutes \* *space*.” *Dr Reid. Vide Part. IX. § 17.*

‡ § 1. “They” (“Eternity” and “Immensity”) “seem both to be but *modes* of an Essence or Substance.” Demonstration, under Prop. IV.—“*Space*, is a property, or *mode*, of the self-existent Substance.” “The self-existent Substance \* \* is itself (if I may so speak) the *Substratum* of *Space*.” Ans. to the 3d Letter.

§ 2. “Though his” [*Dr Clarke's*] “adversaries (see *Chev. Ramsay*, book i. prop. 8. Schol.) charged him with adopting the Diffusive Ubiquity, he is,” says *Henry Lord Brougham*, or *Sir Charles Bell*, or say both, “plainly not subject to this observation.” *Illustrative Note*

different quarter of his writings. "Space void of body, "is the *property* of an *incorporeal* Substance." Again : "By *void Space*, we never mean *Space void of every thing*. " \* \* In all void *Space*, GOD is *certainly* present," &c. &c. Papers which passed between *Leibnitz* and *Clarke* : *Clarke's* 4th Reply, § 8 & 9. A hundred quotations to the same effect might be made.

§ 6. "We seem," these are the words of *Butler*, "to discern intuitively, that there must and cannot but be somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea," "the idea of infinity, *i. e.* immensity and eternity," "or the archetype of it. And from hence (for *this abstract*, "as much as any other, implies a *concrete*) we conclude, "that there is and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense "eternal Being existing." Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed. Part I. chap. vi.

§ 7. "It is," says *Dr Price*, "a maxim which cannot "be disputed, that time and place are necessary to the "existence of all things. *Dr Clarke*," continues *Dr Price*, "has made use of this maxim to prove that infinite space "and duration are the *essential properties* of THE DEITY, "and I think he was right."

§ 8. If I dared to introduce the author of the "Argument" among such illustrious company, I should notice that his sentiment is the same as theirs, and that he has

on the 9th paragraph of Ch. xxiv. of *Brougham* and *Bell's Paley's* Natural Theology.

§ 3. Amazing assertion! How can *Clarke* make immensity, or boundless space,<sup>1</sup> to be a *mode* of GOD's Substance : How can *Clarke* maintain THE DEITY to be the *Substratum* of Space : Unless *Clarke* do adopt diffusive ubiquity,<sup>2</sup> and be, *very* PLAINLY too, subject to the charge brought against him by the Chevalier ?

<sup>1</sup> "To say that *immensity* does not signify *boundless space*, \* \* \* \* is "(I think) affirming that *words* have no meaning." *Clarke's* 5th Reply to *Leibnitz*.

<sup>2</sup> What is ubiquity which is not diffusive? The same thing that unextended extension is. *Vide APPENDIC. B.* § 10. 11. &c.

attempted to *demonstrate* (what, by the bye, none of the others ever thought of doing) that space, infinity or immensity, or what you will, is only *an attribute or mode*. *Vide Part. VII. § 3.*

§ 9. After these references to the opinion of *Clarke* and *Butler*, &c., we shall be able duly to appreciate the *justness* of something put forth by *Antitheos*, almost at his outset. “It could not,” this gentleman declares, in the seventh paragraph of his first chapter, “It could not escape “ observation among minds of an abstract and reflective “ turn, that *space* possesses some of the *attributes commonly “ ascribed* to DEITY, such as infinity, and, *of course*, omnipresence;† immateriality, and so forth: that duration “ cannot be supposed to have had a beginning, or to be “ within the possibility of ever coming to an end. It “ must thus have appeared to the *metaphysical* theist, “ exceedingly desirable to bring these *idle and unappro- “ priated* attributes into more useful play, and in a manner the most advantageous to the *common* faith. *Clarke* “ and *Butler*, and all their *followers*, have accordingly “ talked much of these matters, and evinced a strong “ predilection for them in selecting examples wherewithal “ to illustrate the absolute and infinite perfections of the “ Divine nature. These *metaphysicians*, in short,” [observe, it is “ metaphysicians,”] “ have made *space* and “ duration *usurp the station and dignity of a Divine Being*.”

† § 1. If we would speak with strict correctness; to be infinitely extended and to be omnipresent,—to have infinity, *viz.* of extension, and to have omnipresence,—are the same. Omnipresence is *no consequence* (*Antitheos* would have it a consequence) of infinity, or infinite extension. Omnipresence is just infinite extension, and infinite extension is just omnipresence.

§ 2. It is not very correct to say (though *Antitheos* says) that infinity, to-wit, of extension, or space, is an attribute of space: Unless a thing may be an attribute of itself. Space is infinite: and infinite space is no attribute of infinite space.



“ They have taken this empty and inanimate fabrication, “ and set it up in a newly-erected shrine of curiously “ *mathematical* construction, and fallen down to it as *the* “ *God* of their idolatry.” (The “ mathematical” shrine, —not the “ metaphysicians,”† but—our *magician* must have constructed. Newly erected is the shrine: and if suddenly erected, no wonder, since it arose by magic. *Vide Part. VII. § 1.*) With *Clarke* and *Butler*, and their followers as to this affair, infinite space and infinite duration are *no more* than *modes* or *properties* of the existence of GOD. With *Antitheos*—*Clarke* and *Butler*, and their followers, make space and duration to be GOD Himself. As arrant a piece of nonsense as could be put into their mouths. And we know *how honestly* put.

§ 10. The same sort of thing is set forth in other places too. For instance:—In Chapter VI. paragraph 15, our atheist speaks, as we have heard, as if *Mr Gillespie* had represented space to be DEITY. *Vide Part. VII. § 5.* And in Chapter XII. paragraph 2, *Antitheos* hints broadly enough, (and falsely enough,) that the same gentleman “ makes *space* into a God altogether.” Read, also, the 12th paragraph of Chapter III.

§ 11. We shall in this place take notice of *Mr Locke*, who seems undetermined—not so much what to think, as—what to say, as to whether *space* be a substance or a mode. This solid thinker believed the material universe to be finite. “ If,” he says, “ body be not supposed in “ finite, *which, I think no one will affirm,*” &c. Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 21. And the like in numerous places. And as he believed matter to be finite, so he believed, and could not but believe, space to be infinite: “ This,” he declares, “ is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, “ will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent

† *Law* notices “ the *great confusion* caused by a jumble of *Mathematics* and *Metaphysics* together.”—Notes to *King*. Note (6.)

“ of body, into the *infinity of space or expansion.*” *Ibid.* Ch. xv. § 4. To the same effect he speaks in many passages. *Locke* believed, we say, that body is finite, and space infinite: Consequently, that there is space without matter. And though he determines not, at least does not determine explicitly, whether space void of body be a *substance*, or only the *property* of one ;—(*space void of body, or beyond body, can be no third thing ; it cannot be a relation of bodies to each other ;*)—he shews a decided leaning to the sentiment, that such space is no more than a *mode*.

§ 12. This most judicious philosopher gives no obscure intimation of what was his opinion, in the following passages. “ Whatever men shall think concerning the existence of vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity, distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas ; and we can as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion, though it be never so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether” — after all he *had* said to evince, that *motion proves a vacuum* to be in the neighbourhood of bodies,† and that there is *vacuum, infinite vacuum, beyond the utmost bounds of body* ; after all he had said,‡ in a word, (and before all he had to say||) to make clear, that there is extension *independent* of matter—— “ Whether any one will take *space* to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the *most knowing King Solomon*, ‘ The heaven, and the heaven of ‘ heavens, cannot contain THEE ;’ or those *more emphatical* ones of the *inspired philosopher, St Paul*, ‘ IN HIM

† *Vide* APPENDIC. A.

‡ See B. II. ch. xiii. § 21, *Etc.*

|| See B. II. ch. xvii. § 4, *Etc. Etc.*

“ ‘ we live, and move, and have our being,’ are to be understood in a *literal sense*, I leave every one to consider;†  
 “ only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and *distinct* from that of body.” B. II. ch. xiii.  
 § 27. Again: “ It is true, we can easily, in our thoughts, come to the end of solid extension; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. *Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all*, UNLESS he will confine GOD within the limits of matter. *Solomon*, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, *seems to have other thoughts*, when he says, ‘ ‘ Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain THEE;’ and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther than GOD *exists*, or *imagine any expansion where HE IS NOT*.” *Ibid.* ch. xv. § 2. Again: “ GOD \* \* fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one should doubt that HE likewise FILLS *immensity*. His *infinite* BEING is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter, to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.” *Ib.* § 3. Again: “—The boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in *their full extent*, belong only to THE DEITY.” *Ib.* § 8. Again: “ Motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not because he is an immaterial, but because HE is an *infinite*, spirit.” B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21. Again: “ GOD IS \* \* EVERYWHERE.” *Ib.* ch. xxvii. § 2.

§ 13. See also, to the same purpose, B. II. ch. xvii. § 20. B. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 33. 34. 35. 36. *Etc. etc.*

§ 14. Why this great philosopher did not speak out still more unequivocally in this case, reasons might be assigned. That he had something in his mind as to which he did not, for certain causes, speak fully out, we may see (as from the two first citations in § 12. above, so) from certain rather mysterious words in the passages to be presently cited from the *Essay*: Words which do hint, not too darkly either, that this wonderful man had the solid foundations of the *a priori* argument from Space and Time—or Immensity and Eternity—to the existence of GOD, settled and firmly fixed in the deep recesses of his mind:—To which conclusion we shall be the more led, when we reflect, that *Locke*, in his correspondence with his friend *Limborch*, distinctly states his belief, that the Existence and Unity of DEITY are completely proveable *a priori*.

§ 15, “*Je crois,*” so writes *Locke* to that correspondent, “*que quiconque réfléchira sur soi-même, connoîtra évidemment sans en pouvoir douter le moins du monde, qu’il y a eu de toute éternité un Etre INTELLIGENT. Je crois encore qu’il est évident à tout homme qui pense, qu’il y a aussi un Etre INFINI. Or je dis qu’il ne peut y avoir QU’UN Etre infini, & que cet Etre infini doit être aussi l’Etre ETERNEL ; parce que, ce qui est infini doit avoir été infini de toute éternité, car aucuns additions faites dans le tems, ne sauroient rendre une chose infinie, si elle ne l’est pas en elle-même, & par elle-même, de toute éternité. Telle étant la nature de l’infini qu’on n’en peut rien ôter, & qu’on n’y peut rien ajouter. D’où il s’ensuit que l’infini ne sauroit être séparé en plus d’un, ni être qu’un.*”

§ 16. “*C’est-là, selon moi, UNE PREUVE A PRIORI QUE L’ETRE ETERNEL INDEPENDENT N’EST QU’UN : & si nous y joignons l’idée de toutes les perfections possibles,*



“ nous avons alors l'idée d'un DIEU éternel, infini, omnis-  
 “ cient, & tout-puissant, &c.” From *Locke's* letter to *Lim-*  
*borch* of 21st May, 1698. Consult also *Locke* to *Lim-*  
*borch* of 29th Oct. 1697, and of 2d April 1698.

§ 17. The very important passages to which we refer-  
 red so recently are the following. “ To conclude: *ex-*  
 “ *pansion* and *duration* do mutually embrace and compre-  
 “ hend each other; every part of *space* being in every  
 “ part of *duration*; and every part of *duration* in every  
 “ part of *expansion*.† *Such a combination* of two distinct  
 “ ideas, is, I suppose, *scarce to be found* in all that great  
 “ variety we do or can conceive, and *may AFFORD MAT-*  
 “ *TER TO FARTHER SPECULATION.*” B. II. ch. xv. § 12.  
 And again: “ The idea whereof,” *viz.* “ infinity of *space*  
 “ or *expansion*,” “ is distinct and separate from body,  
 “ and all other things: WHICH MAY (TO THOSE WHO  
 “ PLEASE) BE A SUBJECT OF FARTHER MEDITATION.”  
*Ib.* § 4.

§ 18. However, we shall not get leave to keep *Locke* of  
 our party, without a struggle. But as the very name of  
 the author of the “ Essay concerning Human Under-  
 “ standing” will frighten many of the timid and weak  
 philosophers over to the side he espouses; will enable not  
 a few among the irresolute philosophers to make up their  
 minds with whom to range themselves; and will be sure  
 to throw a damp over any ardour which opposing philo-  
 sophers may possess: we shall make good our right to re-  
 tain *Locke* among our numbers, by the irresistible force  
 of fair means.

19. *Reid* it is who disputes our claim to *Mr Locke's*  
 authority in the present case. “ *Locke*,” remarks the  
 Doctor, “ has reduced all things to three categories, *viz.*

† “ *Cum unaquæq; Spatii particula sit semper, & unumquodq; Dura-*  
*tionis indivisibile momentum ubique*”—Sir Isaac Newton, *Schol. Ge-*  
*nerale*.



“ substances, modes, and relations. In this division, time, “ *space*, and number, three great objects of human thought, “ are,” the Doctor declares, “ omitted.” Analysis of *Aristotle’s Logic*. Chap. II. sect. ii.

§ 20. Does *Dr Reid* put forward any thing to support the declaration? No. Then that is so far well: We have not to set out to overturn aught given as proof of his assertion; consequently, there’s nothing to prevent our proceeding straightway to the proof of our own, *viz.* that *Mr Locke* took pure space to be a mode of existence.

§ 21. *Reid* is quite correct in saying, that the profound reasoner he mentions reduces all things, all the objects of thought, to the three categories, *substances, modes, and relations*. The subject of Modes is taken up by *Mr Locke* first of all. The Chapter (it is Chapter XIII. of Book II.) in which he begins to treat of modes, is occupied with “ the simple modes of space.” A great portion of the Chapter is occupied in proving: “ *Extension and body not the same*”—(§ 11—) “ *A vacuum*,” or, as he elsewhere calls it, “ *pure space*,” “ *beyond the utmost bounds of body*”—(§ 21.) *Etc. etc. etc.* Vide *supra*, §§ 11. 12. *quoq;* *Part. II.* §§ 29. & 30. So that if the author of the *Essay* omitted to place among modes pure space, that great object of human thought at sundry times, and of *Dr Reid’s* when he set *space* betwixt *time* and *number* (as above;) it was not because *Locke* had not brought modes and pure space into the closest juxtaposition. Farther, if it had been omitted to class *pure space*, and *duration*, (or *time*, as *Reid* has it,) with modes, *Locke* could hardly fail to observe the omission, considering that 4 chapters are mostly taken up in treating of those two things; 4 chapters, not one of which is one of *Locke’s* short ones; 4 chapters, which together constitute no inconsiderable part of the whole *Essay*. And if he had noticed any omission of the kind, he would certainly (for *Locke* was

an honest man) have done something to remedy the mighty defect in the *principle* or the *application* of his classification. But if so very palpable an omission as the omission must have been, if it existed at all, were made and were not observed, it is far, far indeed, from being what one would have reasonably expected from so capacious and observing a mind.

§ 22. But not to insist solely on these considerations, convincing though they are, we shall hear *Mr Locke* speak for himself, *directly on the subject of what Space is*: for with *Space* only we have here to do.—Remember, that our controversy at this time is with *Dr Reid*: who has asserted, that *Mr Locke* neglected to put *space* under any of his three *predicaments*,—say, under either of the two predicaments, *Substance* and *Mode*. (*Vide supra*, § 19.)

§ 23. After having (in the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, & 16th sections of the thirteenth chapter of Book Second) distinguished *pure* or *simple* space from body, by and bye (§ 17) he puts this question into the mouth of an objector:—"If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether "this space, void of body, be *substance* or *accident*?" Here is a question which, of itself, furnishes an *experimentum crucis* for the determination of the point whether or not *Locke* inclined to take *space* for an *accident*, that is a *mode*. When that acute philosopher made space to have an existence *distinct from matter*, he saw, he must have seen, that the question would be raised, *What is pure space*? How then does the author of the *Essay* answer the very natural interrogatory? By saying that space is not a substance, and not a mode? BY NO MEANS. But here was an opportunity of the fairest kind he could ever have, to declare that space was *not* a mode or accident, and *not* a substance, *if he took it to be neither*. How answers he, then, the question, *Is space, void of body, substance or mode*? "I shall readily answer,"

he replies, "*I know not*"—I know not which For he does not say: I know not whether pure space be any thing at all—And indeed how could he? SINCE he *expressly* declares that space void of body is NOT nothing at all. "Nor let any one say," is his *caveat*, "that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all," &c. &c. *ut supra*, § 12. To the same purpose is the following:—"When men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body, as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas, upon consideration, carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, *imaginary space*; as if it were NOTHING, because there is no body existing in it."† B. II. ch. xv. § 4. *Etc. etc.*—But the reply has not yet been all given, and what is to come is the better portion: "I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, TILL they that ask, shew me a *clear distinct* idea of substance." Then I shall tell them, whether space void of body be a *substance*: Substance or mode *pure* space must be, as it is certainly a something.

§ 24. I know that an exception will be taken to what has just been urged, and that the two sections of the Essay which do all but immediately succeed the words last quoted, will be especially appealed to by those who may be anxious to tear *Mr Locke* from the company of those with whom pure space is a *mode*, or *accident*, of a substance. In those sections it is said:—"Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy.—" (§ 19.) "Were the Latin words, *inhærentia* and *substantia*, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called

† "The Ancients did not call *all Space* which is void of bodies, but only *extramundane Space*, by the name of *imaginary Space*. The meaning of which, is not, that such Space is *not real*; but only that we are wholly ignorant *what* kinds of things are *in that Space*." *Clarke's* 3d Reply, 2.

“ sticking on, and under-propping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.” (§ 20.) *Etc.*

§ 25. *Mr Locke* is ridiculing something here. It is granted. But what is that which he ridicules? Not *substances*.† Not *modes*, or *accidents*, if this word be preferable. For he makes all things, “ as they are *in themselves*,” (b. ii. ch. xxv. § 1.) to be either substances or modes, *i. e.* accidents.‡ *Vide supra*, § 19. *et* § 21. A good jest indeed it would be, to behold *Locke* ridiculing, here or there, substances and modes! or the ideas (for *Locke* was particularly fond of the ideas) of substances and modes! *Locke* divides all things, as in themselves, into modes and substances—and ridicules modes and substances! Incredible. Impossible.

§ 26. But of a certainty, *Mr Locke* is ridiculing something. What he ridicules, there are words within the boundaries of those two sections which will shew us. And it is well we are not left to mere inference, but have evidence of the express sort. “ They who first ran into the notion of *accidents*, as a sort of *real BEINGS*, that needed something to *inhere in*, were forced to find out the word *substance*, to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word

† This is declared by *Locke* himself, in his second Reply (or third Letter) to the Bishop of *Worcester*.

‡ “ The adequate division of *being* comprehends but these two members” *i. e.* “ *substance*” and “ *mode*.”—*Bayle*. Crit. Dict. P. 3083. “ Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself.” *Cudworth's Intellectual System*. Chap. v. *Birch's Edit.* P. 769. *Vide Part. X.* § 16. *notamq; relat.*



“ *substance*, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant; the word *substance* would have done it effectually.” (§ 19.) *Etc.*

§ 27. Here you have the key to expose what *Mr Locke* laughs at: which is, The notion of accidents as beings having a real existence, distinct from substances. The *illustration* shews this clearly: *Locke* secretly (yet manifestly) compares the Indian philosopher’s *earth* to an *accident*, and his *elephant* to a *substance*; while, again, the elephant and the tortoise being viewed in relation to each other, *elephant* is transformed into *accident*, *tortoise*, at the same time, stepping into the elephant’s shoes, and becoming *substance*. But the earth is notoriously a distinct thing from the elephant

With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear  
The weight of mightiest monarchies;

and the elephant is different from the tortoise. Therefore accident,—set forth by the earth and the metamorphosed elephant,—is an entity separable from substance,—represented by the first elephant and the tortoise. But this is absurd. And also very ridiculous. So *Mr Locke*, a tolerably grave (he was a very vivacious) gentleman in general, takes a hearty laugh at it. And we may well join him in his merriment, for the “ notion of accidents, “ as a sort of real beings,” having the same relation to substances that the earth has to the Indian philosopher’s elephant, or the elephant to the tortoise, may provoke a smile from the severest countenance.

§ 28. In accordance with what we have now said, *Watts* writes:—“ *Mr Locke* has happily refuted that unreasonable notion of substance in general, which makes “ it to be some real thing in nature, different from all the “ united qualities, the supposed properties and powers” [Why *supposed*? are they *only supposed*? are they not



true and real properties and powers ? properties and powers] “ of body or spirit, and he has exposed it to a “ just ridicule, as in Book II. chap. xiii. sect. \* 19, 20.” Once more : “ *Mr Locke* would seem to exclude and abandon any general notion of substance, as another real “ *physical distinct being*, provided to support all its real “ or supposed accidents or qualities, and seems to banter “ it by the Indian’s \* \* tortoise—which supports the “ elephant—which supports the world.”—Philosophical Essays. Essay II. sect. i.†

§ 29. Finally, I would just ask any one to lay his hand upon his *head*, and, for *Dr Reid*, to reconcile the words of *Mr Locke*, as quoted in the twelfth section, above, with any other hypothesis than that which makes endless expansion, or space, to be a mode of the existence of GOD.

† Prudence dictates that I should use the *precaution* of begging it to be borne in mind, that I am not to be held as doing more than agreeing with *Watts* upon the point as to which he is cited. *Watts* thinks that : “ *As solid extension*”—(“ *solidity and extension* considered in body, “ are but as one thing”—Essay II. sect. iv.—) “ and a power of thinking “ have this one character of substance, that they are sufficient supports for qualities, modes or accidents ; so they have the other “ property of substance also, viz. that they subsist of themselves, independent of any created being.”—(Essay II. sect. ii. And see that Essay throughout.) Now all this seems to me to be very absurd ; especially the latter part. Is *power* not a relative thing ? can a power of thinking really subsist of itself ? Ability, capacity,—power,—seem unavoidably to imply a subject of them.

“ I have never,” says *Watts*, “ seen sufficient ground to abandon all “ his (*Des Cartes’s*) scheme of sentiments of the nature of mind or “ spirit”—&c. Essay V. sect. i. See *Preface* to his Essays : especially the 5th paragraph.

“ *Nulla \**,” writes *Locke*, with his eye directed towards *Des Cartes’s* scheme as to mind, “ *Nulla \* modo mihi in animum inducere possum cogitationem per se existere, sed rem vel substantiam, cogitantem*,”—&c. Letter to *Limborch*, of 4th and 18th Oct. 1698.

In the same strain *Reid* declares : “ We take it \* as a first principle \* \* \* \* that thinking supposes a being that thinks.”—Essay I. ch. ii.

§ 30. But indeed the thing is very clear. And what could have induced the author of the “*Analysis of Aristotle’s Logic*” to trust to the world so unguarded and groundless an assertion as that which we have been weighing, it would not be easy to discover : unless it were that he really thought as he wrote, and could not help it.

§ 31. Before quitting the philosophers who consider pure space to be the property of a substance, we shall gratify our readers with a paragraph from the pages of our worthily admired *Addison*.

§ 32. “If,” says this sensible and elegant writer, in one of his Essays on the nature of the Supreme Being, “If we consider HIM (our MAKER) in his omnipresence, “his *being passes through*, actuates, and supports the whole “frame of nature. HIS creation, and every part of it, is “full of HIM. There is nothing HE has made that is “either so distant, so little, or so inconsiderable, which “HE does not *essentially inhabit*. HIS *substance* is *within* “the substance of every being, whether material or immaterial, and as intimately present to it as that being “is to itself. It would be an imperfection in HIM, *were* “HE *able* to remove out of one place into another, or *to withdraw* HIMSELF from any thing he has created, or “*from any part of that space which is diffused and spread abroad to infinity*.” Spectator, No. 565. See the remainder of that most beautiful paper.

§ 33. *Tillotson*, as a Divine, was held in warm admiration by *Addison*. But that is not the only reason why we shall bring forward a sentence from the Archbishop : who was, according to the opinion of *Dr Samuel Clarke*,—himself no mean judge in such matters,—“of far better “understanding and judgment” than the generality of the *Schoolmen*.

§ 34. “By the immensity of GOD, I mean,” *Archbishop Tillotson* tells us, “that HIS *being* hath no bounds or limits,

“ but doth EVERY WAY SPREAD AND DIFFUSE ITSELF beyond what we can imagine——The presence of another being, even of a body, which is the grossest substance, doth not exclude HIM ; the whole world doth not confine HIM ; but HE FILLS ALL THE SPACE which we can imagine beyond this visible world, and infinitely more than we can imagine.”—Sermon CLIV. : on the immensity of GOD.

§ 35. I shall finish this head with the words of *England's* immortal Epic Bard : who

Rode sublime  
Upon the seraph-wings of Extasy,  
The secrets of th' Abyss to spy.  
He pass'd the flaming bounds of Place and Time.†

The esoteric philosophical theology of the following passage in the *Paradise Lost* is not a whit behind the best in all the world.

—Thou, my Word, begotten Son, by thee  
This I perform ; speak thou, and be it done !  
My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee  
I send along ; ride forth, and bid the deep  
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth ;  
*Boundless the deep, BECAUSE I AM, who fill*  
*Infinitude ; NOR VACUOUS THE SPACE,*  
*Though I, uncircumscribed myself, retire,*  
*And put not forth my goodness.*

Book VII.

† *Gray's* Progress of Poesy.

## PART IX.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE.—ANTITHEOS, REID, GLEIG, GASSENDUS, EPISCOPIUS, LEIBNITZ, ETC.

§ 1.—III. Thus far as to those who will have Space to be a Substance, and those who take it to be only a Mode. The third grand hypothesis is that of such as lay down, that *space is space*, or what is tantamount to such proposition. The philosophers we are now come to, are inclined to allow, that there is Space, without matter, in the universe: And while they do not allege that Space is aught less than Space, they will not suffer more to be affirmed concerning it, than that it exists where body exists not. As a matter of course, therefore,—maintaining, as they do, that Space is neither a substance nor the property of one, but is, notwithstanding, a somewhat really existing,—they are for making it out to be some third thing. Though indeed, to speak truth, these philosophers do not so much assert that space belongs to some third class of entity, (*viz.* something distinct from substance, and from property,) as virtually refuse to proclaim what Space is. In short, the fair amount of their notion, so far, at least, as they let it come before the world, is contractible to this, Space is Space.

§ 2.—1. The philosopher of this class whom we shall advert to first, is *Antitheos* himself.

§ 3. This gentleman admits, in the most distinct man-

ner, and to the fullest extent, that there may be space without matter. Of this our readers are perfectly aware. According to *Antitheos*, we can conceive the non-existence of the whole material universe. *Vide Part. VI. § 34.* But though we conceive matter away, we cannot, our atheist largely, and satisfactorily, insists, conceive the non-existence of Space. *Ibid. § 33.* Pure space, or vacuum, then, is, with our antitheist, a *possible* thing.

§ 4. To advance to a second admission:—"I grant," says *Antitheos*,—and the admission has already been referred to as being of the utmost importance (*vide part. iv. § 8*)—"I grant that we may conceive of an absolute separation of substance" [by *substance* he means *matter*] "generally," or *as a whole*—(*Ibid.*) Now, as often as we conceive an absolute separation of matter, as a whole, so often do we conceive, *that* matter is finite;—separability, and, *a fortiori*, separation, implying finiteness (*vide part. ii. § 39.*—) and *that*, consequently, there is pure space in nature. Whenever, in fine, we conceive a separation of matter absolutely, we conceive what involves the existence of pure space. But we can easily conceive a separation of matter absolutely. We can *easily*, therefore, *conceive* that vacuum exists.

§ 5. But not only does *Antitheos* contend that we may conceive—and that we may easily conceive what involves—the co-existence of the absence of body and the presence of space: he is of opinion that perhaps there *has always been* a vacuum in nature. "We cannot prove," he correctly observes, "that it" ("matter") "is infinitely extended. The fact is, we cannot say whether matter be infinitely extended or not." Chap. V. par. 7. And therefore, we cannot be sure but that there now is, in point of fact, extramundane space. If the world is finitely extended, (and *Antitheos* grants, we cannot be certain that it is not,) there is empty space beyond its li-



mits. "If the material universe is \* \* finite; there  
 "cannot but be actual \* \* extramundane space."†  
 For our atheist, like a reasonable man, admits it is absurd,  
 to suppose, all extension itself to be bounded. *Vide*  
*Part. I. § 34. et § 85. Etc.* According to our atheist's  
 doctrine, then, *it may be* that vacuum is a *really existing*  
 thing.

§ 6. But what need to speak of our antitheist's mak-  
 ing vacuum to be possible, or conceivable,—nay easily  
 conceivable, or very possible—perhaps a real existence?  
 For do not his explicit principles imply all these things,  
 and amount, besides, to a great deal more? "Infinite  
 "space," (the reader will find in Part VI. § 33.) "is  
 "plenarily admitted by our author to have *necessary ex-*  
 "*istence.*" "*Matter* is," (as we have seen in § 34. of the  
 same Part,) "by our atheist completely deprived of true  
 "necessary existence." Thus according to *Antitheos's*  
 principles, "we have an extension" [*which is, and*] "which  
 "is NECESSARY, and we have an extension" [*which is,*  
 but] "which is NOT NECESSARY"—*vide part. vi. § 36.* But  
 that necessary extension is composed of vacuum, or pure  
 space. Therefore, pure or simple space has real existence,  
 yea necessary existence, in our atheist's universe: An ex-  
 istence which by this time must have given, and which  
 (irreversible Fate has decreed it) will continue to give,  
 our atheist, the sorest, and a quite unbearable, annoy-  
 ance.

§ 7. "All Atheists," said one who was well acquainted  
 with antiquity, and who knew right well how to turn his  
 skill in the false, as well as in the true, philosophy of the  
 ancients, to good account against the enemy: "All Athe-  
 "ists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no  
 "other substance besides body or matter. For as there

† *Clarke's 5th Reply. Note.*

“ was never any yet known, who asserting incorporeal  
 “ substance,” [or what implies incorporeal substance,]  
 “ did deny a DEITY ; so *neither can there be any reason,*  
 “ why he that admits the former should exclude the lat-  
 “ ter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or con-  
 “ founded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a  
 “ GOD, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal  
 “ substance” [and all that implies incorporeal substance]  
 “ also. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain  
 “ disease or madness, called *hydrophobia*, the symptom of  
 “ those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes  
 “ them have a monstrous antipathy to water ; so all  
 “ Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness,  
 “ that may be called *Pneumatophobia*, that makes them  
 “ have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spi-  
 “ rits or incorporeal substances,” [or whatever implies as  
 much,] “ they being acted also, at the same time, with  
 “ an *Hylomania*, whereby they madly doat upon matter,  
 “ and devoutly worship it as the only *Numen*.” *Cud-*  
*worth's Intellectual System.* Chap. III. and xxx. (*Birch's*  
 Edit. P. 135.)

§ 8. True, the Democritic and Epicurean atheists did indeed admit the existence of space or vacuum, as a nature really distinct from body. But not very consistently with the general spirit of—we do not say, their philosophy, but—their atheism. Accordingly, “ other Atheists “ there were,” observes *Cudworth*, “ who \* \* \* “ were sensible of the *inconvenience* of making space thus “ to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence “ it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of “ incorporeal substance.”) Chap. V. (P. 770.)

§ 9. And thus much as to the annoyance, or the inconvenience, which space hath caused, and will yet cause, our antitheist to experience.

§ 10. To repeat something we have said : In *Antitheos's*

universe, pure or simple space has real existence. Our next business must lie with the question, What does *Antitheos* make simple space to be? And we shall find, that, with him, simple space is simple space : neither more nor less.

§ 11. “ We know,” as we have heard our atheist declaring—*vide part. vi. § 2.*—“ of nothing *possessing* extension except matter,—nothing else that can stand as “ an object to which extension may be ascribed as a *pro-perty*.” With *Antitheos*, then, simple or pure space does not *possess* extension : in other words, extension is not a mode of Space.

§ 12. And as extension is not a mode of Space, so Space (*i. e.* Extension) is made by *Antitheos* to be itself no mode of a substance. Why? “ Material bodies,”† *Antitheos* is ready to answer, “ comprising all that we *do* “ know, or *can* know of Being,” that is, Substance. *Vide Part. VI. § 2.* If bodies be the only substances possessing the attribute of extension, it is very plain that pure space cannot be the attribute of any substance.

§ 13. In fine : Our Atheist’s decision being this, That simple space is not a substance, and not a mode,—and not a relation of bodies to each other, (because, with our atheist, simple space is necessary, whereas bodies are not—*vide supra*, § 6) : Simple space remains, then, simple space.‡ And that, let me tell *Antitheos*, is saying, contrary to what one might beforehand fancy, not a little but a great deal. *Vide supra*, § 6, *et seq.*

§ 14.—2. With no impropriety, but perhaps for one reason, may we bring *Dr Reid’s* opinion under this head. The Doctor says : “ We call it (space) immense, eternal, im-moveable, and indestructible. But it is only an immense, “ eternal, immoveable, and indestructible *void or empti-*

† Are there anywhere immaterial bodies ?

‡ Read the 9th par. of the concluding chap. of the “ Refutation.”

“*ness.*” Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. To say, Space is void or emptiness, that is, void or empty of every thing—but space, or what space or extension supposes, if it supposes aught : to say, we repeat, that space is void or empty of every thing—but space ; what is this essentially more than saying, Space is Space ?—*Vide Part. X. §§ 41. 47.*

§ 15. With which agrees, sufficiently, the passage in the “ Analysis” already made use of by us. *Vide Part. VIII. § 19.* If Space be not a *substance*, and be not a *mode*, and be not a *relation*, (as that passage implies,) pray, what can Space be—but Space ?

§ 16. The reason why perhaps we cannot properly reduce *Reid's* opinion to this class, shall be perceived whenever we recite a paragraph occurring in the Chapter “ Of Duration.”

§ 17. “ *Sir Isaac Newton* thought, that THE DEITY, by existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time and space, immensity and eternity. This probably suggested to his great friend *Dr Clarke* what he calls the argument *a priori* for the existence of an immense and eternal Being. Space and time, he thought, are only abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and eternity, which forces itself upon our belief. And as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal. These are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human understanding,† *I am unable to determine.*” Essay III. ch. iii.

† *Quæritur* : When my imagination, or that within me which conceives, does wander in a region whither my understanding, with the aid of that which conceives, whither, in other words, my imagination cannot wander ; whither has imagination gone ? by what instrumentality was the journey accomplished ? how does imagination employ it-



§ 18. Of course, as *Reid* is unable to determine whether or no the sentiment of *Sir Isaac Newton* and *Dr Clarke*, that immensity, or boundless space, is the attribute of an immense Being, be a solid one ; he must be supposed unable to determine, that space is not an attribute, or mode, of a substance. And space cannot be, in every sense, void or empty, if it is full of a substance.

§ 19. Upon the whole, with regard to the sentiments of the Professor of Moral Philosophy, concerning space, we may safely take the following words (they are his own) as a satisfactory compendium. " We are at a loss to " what category or class of things we ought to refer " them," *i. e. time and space*. (Chapter " Of Duration.") Well might *Reid* say so.

§ 20.—3. Under this head, we may notice, also the words of a *Bishop of Stirling*.

§ 21. In the Chapter treating of " Space and its modes," in our *Bishop's* treatise, the following is the title which serves for the exponent of several paragraphs : " Space " nothing but the possible existence of body." And in a succeeding paragraph, these words occur : " We consider pure space as a mere notion relative to the existence of corporeal substance, as in truth nothing more

self in its new quarters ? how long will imagination stay away ? and will it communicate, on its return, what it has seen in its travels ? and, if it does, will not such conduct amount to a betrayal of secrets ?

What lies beyond the sphere of human understanding is that which is destitute of a foundation in intelligibility. No subject that we can think of, properly lies beyond the sphere of our understandings ; but to utter unintelligibilities, we may easily do. There are some philosophers who do solemnly caution us to beware of going beyond the reach of our faculties : to beware of exceeding our faculties, *by our faculties*. The caution is to be wondered at, and neglected. There is no great danger in the matter ; there's only an impossibility. In the same hour in which men receive power to sink below themselves, they will (I prophesy) receive power to soar above or *beyond* themselves. At least there is a high probability.



“than the absence of body, WHERE body is possible.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 7th Edit. Art. “Metaphysics,” p. 656. Thus *Bp. Gleig*.

§ 22. Pity, if the *Bishop* did not bear in mind, that “WHERE” supposes, and perhaps presupposes, *space*.

§ 23. Pure space is “a mere notion,” says the *Bishop*. To which had he stuck, we should have been obliged to have set down his words elsewhere, even among the *Kants* and the *Broughams* of the affair. *Vide Part. X. § 69, &c. et § 63, &c.* But the second clause seems intended to be exegetical of the first, and the *Bishop* drowns (and that pretty successfully) his *notion* in the ‘boundless invariable ocean,’ as *Locke* would call it, of *absence of body*.

§ 24. Now though Space were reduced to nothing but the possibility of body, nothing more than the absence of body (IN SPACE, observe you,) *where* body is possible—[“*Lusus merus non intellectorum verborum*—”†] still, one may venture to hope, Space may turn out to be Space.

§ 25.—4. *Gassendi’s* hypothesis, likewise, has a good claim to be ranged under this third great head.

§ 26. *Gassendus*, who was the restorer of the Epicurean philosophy, or—if Epicureanism were too *soundly asleep* to be resuscitated—who at least strove to palliate the dogmas of *Epicurus*; the celebrated *Gassendus*, we say, chose to maintain, that Space is not Spirit and not Body, is not Substance and not Accident. Here is a description by negatives, with a vengeance. What Space is, seeing it is neither mind nor matter, neither substance nor property, I cannot tell. Only I fancy, Space still is Space. Shade of the learned *Gassendus*! what less, what more, what else, can Space be than Space?

§ 27. A certain *middle* nature; something perfectly

† *Gassend. Physic. lib. 1*. The words in the text are, in a good sense, quite as applicable to our *Bishop’s* notion of Space, as to the *Schoolmen’s* notion of Time.

distinct from corporeal substance, and yet not an incorporeal substance either—a somewhat between substance and accident: this is what Space is, would the shade respond, were *Gassendi's* shade to be faithful. *Space* a middle nature! a real somewhat, neither spiritual nor material, neither a substance nor a mode! Then, a—we know not what.† In short, a *nothing*. Nothing, to-wit, but *space*. In fine, Space would continue to be Space, even though Space were ascertained to be nothing more than the certain middle nature.

§ 28. *Bayle* (in *Crit. Dict.* p. 3083–4) characterized—and we cannot say, altogether without justice—*Gassendi's* procedure in the following manner: “*Gassendus* \* \* \* chose \* to plunge himself into the most hideous “abyss of conjecturing, that,” &c. &c. Whatever *Gassendi's* conjecture is, of this we are confident, that *Gassendi's* *space* seriously constitutes a *most hideous abyss*. One into which we are desirous not to *be plunged*,—now, or at any future time. To contemplate a flight into “the vast immeasurable abyss”‡ of infinite space, is always dreadful enough. But a survey of the secrets of space, the middle nature, would be, methinks, more awful still. But only—honesty compels me to confess—upon one condition, *viz.* that space, the middle thing, be any thing at all.

§ 29. To every follower of *Gassendus* we say, accommodating certain words of *Bishop Berkeley* to our use: “You may, *if so it shall seem good*, use the word” [*space*] “in the same sense that other men use *nothing*, and “so make those terms convertible in your style.” *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Section LXXX.

† “Some Accident without a Substance, \* \* or some other “*I know not what.*” *Leibnitz*, 5th Paper, 119. But an *accident* without a *substance* is in rather better plight than a somewhat neither accident nor substance, nor any thing else.

‡ *Milton*.

§ 30.—5. We shall take notice of one other hypothesis, as falling to be classed with those assemblages of letters which are tantamount to the position, *Space is space*.

§ 31. That *space* is an *external nothing*, we have, we can say, the authority of a Divine, and no less a one than *Episcopus*. “*Totum atque omne illud spatium quod EXTRA “ hunc mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure “ pute imaginarium, & PRORSUS NIHILUM.*” *Instit. Theolog. Lib. iv. cap. xiii.* The space which is said—ay, and (under *Episcopus*’s leave) which is thought—*vide part. viii.* § 11, 12.—*etc.*—to be BEYOND the material universe, is ALTOGETHER NOTHING: this *Episcopus* has given out as his serious decision. And the grounds of his judgment, we, of course, need not seek to impugn, provided we be permitted to write after it a mere iota, which must be subscribed to, though it is not adscribed. Having, then, added an element entirely inconsiderable, we would exhibit *Episcopus*’s declaration. *All and every part of that space which is said, and which is thought, to exist BEYOND this world is \* \* \* \* \** altogether nothing ——— but space. The addition is, no doubt, quite harmless, and, from the nature of the case, ’tis impossible you can take any exception to it, justly. So great a Divine, then, being judge, Space is nothing but Space. And so Space yet is Space.

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§ 32.—IV. Other opinions have been entertained, at least other forms of speech have been adopted, on the subject of Space. The opinions, or at any rate the expressions, now lying in view, are only two in number: Though the smallness of the number is the least part of the evil. But it will be perceived, after a slight examination, that each of those opinions (supposing each set of words to stand for an opinion,) falls to be resolved into

one or other of the THREE hypotheses which we have gone over.

§ 33. A fourth set, then, of words maintain, that Space is nothing but the *relation*, or rather the *relations*, of the bodies in the universe to each other, considered as existing together. The name of the learned *Leibnitz* is conspicuous among those who hold this opinion. An opinion which has become pretty common with persons who speak the language, if they do not meditate the truths, of philosophy. The doctrine may perhaps be pronounced the *fashionable* one, regarding Space. For what reasons, and by what means, it has become so prevalent among modern theologers, and certain descriptions of philosophers, is by no means perhaps so very obvious a thing.

§ 34. But at all events, common and fashionable the doctrine is. And therefore, 'tis of consequence that it be well analyzed. Without any possibility of being mistaken, we shall witness it resolving itself (with, to be sure, a special bad grace,) into the magnificent declaration, Space is space: An axiom resting on the most indisputable basis—and as true as any other truism of them all. But this is rather forestalling matters.

§ 35. We shall deliver the doctrine of the most distinguished advocate, as well as in a manner the first setter forth, of the dogma, in the words of *Dr Sam. Clarke's* translation, a translation which was “made with great exactness, to prevent any misrepresentation of *Mr Leibnitz's* sense.” See “Advertisement” prefixed to the “Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned *Mr Leibnitz* and *Dr Clarke*.”

§ 36. “As for my own opinion,” *Leibnitz* writes, “I have said more than once, that I hold *Space* to be something *merely relative*, \* that I hold it to be an *order of COEXISTENCES*—\* \* For Space denotes, in terms of possibility, *an order* of things which exist at



“ the same time, considered as existing TOGETHER ; with-  
 “ out enquiring into their manner of existing. And when  
 “ many things are seen TOGETHER, one perceives that  
 “ *order of things among themselves.*” Third Paper, 4. To  
 the same effect, see Fifth Paper, 29. &c. &c.

§ 37. Elsewhere, *Leibnitz* says : “ *Space is that order,*  
 which renders bodies capable of being situated,” &c.  
 Fourth Paper, 41. And when *Clarke*, in his answer, ob-  
 served : “ What the meaning of these words is ; *An order,*  
 “ (or situation,) *which makes bodies to be situable ;* I under-  
 “ stand not,” &c. (Fourth Reply, 41.—) *Leibnitz* re-  
 joined : “ I don’t say, that Space is an *order or situation,*  
 “ which makes things capable of being *situated :* This  
 “ would be nonsense.” And hard upon this announce-  
 ment, there follows the method by which the learned  
 German chose to get quit of the nonsense. “ I don’t say,  
 “ \* that *Space* is an *order or situation,* but an *order of*  
 “ *situations,*” &c. Fifth Paper, 104.

§ 38. Before analyzing the doctrine of those passages,  
 in order to see what it is reducible unto, it may be well  
 to take a look in the direction of *results.* To these we  
 shall pay a regard which hardly could be bestowed, were  
 we, in the first instance, to lay bare what the *Leibnitzian*  
 dogma exactly amounts to. On the other hand, if the  
 consequences inspire with horror—or with delight—the  
 analysis will be followed with the intensest attention.

§ 39. Two things necessarily follow from the supposi-  
 tion, that Space is “ something merely relative,” *i. e.* to  
 bodies, “ an order of coexistences,” *i. e.* of coexisting  
 bodies. *Bodies*, we say. For should we ask a follower of  
*Leibnitz*, Why may not Space be the order of spirits (as  
 well as of bodies) “ existing together ?” the *Leibnitzian*  
 is ready with his reply, That spirits have no extension,  
 and, by themselves, have therefore nothing at all to do



with space.† There are two things, we repeat, which follow necessarily from the supposition, that Space is merely relative to bodies, an order of coexisting bodies.

§ 40.—1st. It is thence deducible, that body or matter is infinitely extended. If matter is finite, there is *extramundane* or *bodiless* space, or extension; inasmuch as 'tis absurd to suppose bounds set to all extension. And if there be no space but what is relative to bodies, body or matter must be infinite in extent. It must be granted that space, of some kind, is infinite.

§ 41. It may be observed, that even though matter be made boundless, it would not be *therefore* completely infinite: Complete infinity including *fulness*. Although matter have no general boundaries, it may have particular interstices. To give it in *Clarke's* language: "Though *matter* had no limits, yet it might have within itself any "assignable vacuities." Dem. under Prop. VI.

† "There is nothing *simple*, in my opinion, but true *monads*, which "have neither parts nor extension." *Leibnitz's* Fifth Paper, 24. And that a spirit or soul is a true monad: "Every simple substance, soul, "or true monad." *Ib.* 91. Again: "*Thought* and *extended substance* "have no connexion with each other, and are *beings* that differ *toto* "*genere.*" *Theodicæa.* P. 172. See also, Third Paper, 12, and Fifth Paper, 48.

Spirits have no extension: nothing to do with space. Was this the chimæra that led the way to another of the wonderful births in the Leibnitzian philosophy, namely, that there can be no spirits but what are associated with bodies, however subtile; although a spirit is a simple *substance*? "There are," so says our distinguished German, "there are no created substances wholly destitute of matter. \* \* \* "Angels or Intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, have "always subtile bodies, though they themselves be incorporeal." Fifth Paper, 61. See also Third Paper, 9. And verily, if souls (to let angels alone) have no extension, they stand in some need of being *attended with matter*, in order that they may not hopelessly elude our minds' perceptions, and conceptions too. *Vide Part. III.* § 34. *et seq.* —*Vide quoq; Part. VIII. Appendic. B.* § 24.

§ 42. But if Space be the relations of bodies, matter is infinite, and infiniteness flowing from such a source *cannot be* of the complete kind. How can matter be completely infinite, if there *is* Space (and *Leibnitz* contends there is), and if Space is *different* from Matter? “I don’t say that Matter and Space are the same thing. \* \* “However, these things, though *different*, are inseparable.” Fifth Paper, 62.

§ 43.—2d. The second consequence from the supposition in question, is : that as it follows that matter is without bounds, so it follows that matter could have had no beginning, and can have no end ; in fine, that matter is necessarily existing.† For according to the supposition we go upon, the non-existence of matter would involve the non-existence of all space. And no man ever did conceive, no man shall ever be able to conceive, the non-existence of all space. *Vide Part. I. § 25. et seq.*

§ 44.—3d. We may add, that there is a third consequence resulting from the supposition, that Space is merely the order of co-existing *bodies*. The consequence is this : Were there only one body in the universe, the body would be necessarily immoveable : And, The material universe *as a whole* is necessarily immoveable. If space be no more than a relation of *bodies* ; no bodies, no space—no space, if but one body. And if there were no space, how could the *sole* body be moved ? how could the material universe be moved ?

§ 45. (The doctrine of *absolute space* infers that of the possibility of *absolute motion*. On the other hand, to deny the possibility of absolute motion, is to deny that there can be absolute space. And to deny the possibility of absolute motion, that is, to contend that *all* motion is

† The reader may consider what will be found in Part VII. § 10, as being suitable to present circumstances. The two cases are so far on one footing.

merely *relative*, is to get (by another route) at the position, that if there were but one body, it would be immoveable.

§ 46. “It doth not appear to me,” says the Bishop of *Cloyne*, “that there can be any motion other than *relative*: so that to conceive motion, there must be at least “conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position “in regard to each other is varied. *Hence*, if there was “one only body in being, it could not possibly be moved.” (Principles of Human Knowledge. § CXII.)

§ 47. Those consequences, it is not to be doubted, will stagger those theists who have embraced *Leibnitz's* notion, and have any consistency left.

§ 48. But then, the positions characterized as consequences will be greedily hailed by

the atheist crew.†

From which we may perceive how wise it was in our theologers to embrace the dogma out of which they arise. And as for the atheists, it will be time enough for them to glory in the notion, when they shall have made out the correctness of it—Which is something more than the theists who have inconsistently gloried in it have ever done. Before the atheists can push the dogma in our way, as an obstacle, they must be able to refute (and that not in the way of a mere “*Refutation*”) all—but, for their comfort, no more than all—the *first* Part of the *first* Book of the “*Argument* ;” especially the two *Scholia* therein ; as well as be in a capacity to turn aside the edge of ——— But we were going to anticipate what we have to advance.

§ 49. We are now arrived at the place where we must put down our crucible, and set our face, right earnestly, towards an analytic process. Our design is, to try whether the *Leibnitzian* thing be precious metal or no : And shall

† *Paradise Lost*, B. VI.

not our friends have good reason to congratulate us, if, immediately upon its being dropt into the vessel, it melts, and evaporates, and escapes in an unknown gas; or, at best, turns out to be one of those worthless *trifles*† with which (as we must have observed—*vide supra*, § 21. *et seq. atq;* § 31.—*aliasq;*) certain elderly children are,—to the discredit of their instructors *and others*,—but too fond of sporting themselves?

§ 50. When *Leibnitz* defines Space, “An order of co-  
“*existences*,” or “of things *which exist at the same time*,  
“considered as *existing TOGETHER* ;” what are we to under-  
stand by CO-, and TOGETHER? Nothing having re-  
spect to Time, for “time” is referred to in a clause of  
its own. What then? We must by all means under-  
stand them as having regard to Space, which they sup-  
pose, or perhaps rather presuppose. And then, the defi-  
nition becomes equivalent to this,—Space is an order of  
things \* \* \* considered as existing *together*  
IN SPACE. A description which certainly looks more like  
banter than something designed to instruct us.

§ 51. But to pass from this element in the description.  
What is Space? I ask a *Leibnitzian*. A mere *relation*  
or *order* of bodies co-existing, he replies. But tell me,  
further, I insist, what you particularly mean by “relation”  
and “order?” Take them severally.—And first as to  
*relation*. When Space is said to be “something merely  
“relative” to bodies, that, will the genuine disciple of  
*Leibnitz* rejoin, is as much as to say, Space is nothing  
but the mere *distance* of bodies. And as to *order*: “Or-  
der,” in like manner, just means *distance*. “Men ob-  
“serve in *things* a certain *order* of co-existence, accord-  
“ing to which the *relation* of one thing to another is more

† *Mr Locke* has a Chapter on “Trifling Propositions.” The “purely  
“identical propositions” receive the honour of being first noticed.  
The honour is not undeserved.



“ or less simple. This *order*, is their situation or *distance*.” *Leibnitz’s* Fifth Paper, 47. Space, then, is the distance of bodies from each other.

§ 52. Space is distance. But distance is space. And what more does either of these positions amount to than this, Space is space? “*Space*,” says *Locke*, “considered barely in *length* between any two beings, without considering any thing else *between* them, is CALLED *distance*.” B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. “But *however* NAMED or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of *space*.” *Ib.* § 27. To maintain, then, that space is distance, is virtually just to hold that space is space. And therefore, the Leibnitzian dogma is reducible to the edifying proposition which composes our THIRD *great head*.

§ 53. We shall now sum up what we have to say in reference to the passage quoted in § 36, above. “When many things are seen TOGETHER, one perceives that ORDER of things among themselves:” THIS IS THE CYPHER. When many bodies are seen together IN SPACE, one perceives that DISTANCE of bodies among themselves, which is SPACE: AND THIS IS THE KEY.

§ 54. Before leaving this department of the subject, we had better notice, that the farther explanation or emendation (or whatever it be) of *Leibnitz’s* doctrine, (*ut vide supra*, § 37.) consisting of these words, “Space is” “an order of situations,” makes things much worse, if worse be possible, than it found them. *Order*, we have seen, is tantamount to *distance*, *distance* to *space*. And *situations* obviously suppose or presuppose *space*. So that the emendation amounts to this, Space is a space of spaces.

§ 55. How long will it be ere the numerous followers of *Leibnitz* consent to learn, that they cannot deny the existence of *real absolute space* (as it has been called,) with-



out assuming *in their denial* the very thing they would deny! Men cannot speak of aught which does not involve Space, even Absolute Space. Space is a *SINE QUANON* of all else.

§ 56. In the observations which we have thus made in direct relation to the Leibnitzian doctrine, we have not (the reader is requested now to reflect) advanced one step beyond the words, or what is implied by the bare words, in which the doctrine is conveyed. But what if we were to advance beyond the words?

§ 57. Space is the relation, the order, the distance, the space, of, or between, bodies. But does not the space constituted by the distance of any two bodies from each other,—the distance, let it be, of the Sun from the Moon,—appear to the human mind to be capable of existence though those bodies were away? That is, does it not seem to us to be a false assertion, That space is *merely* a relation or order of bodies, or the distance or space between them? As touching this, however, we have merely to refer the reader to many previous portions of this work: to all those places which set forth the NECESSARY existence of *Space*, and the NON-NECESSARY existence of *Matter* or *Body*.

§ 58. It is false, then, that Space is a mere relation of bodies. Space, unlike body, exists necessarily. What Space *in itself* is,—whether it be a substance, or a mode, or—space,—forms an inquiry which has received, we trust, a most satisfactory investigation in the course of this long Digression.

§ 59. There is perhaps no doctrine which has done more to embarrass a plain matter, than this doctrine, that Space is nothing but the relation of bodies to each other. And on this account, we must have cleared away a deal of cloudiness from affairs, by shewing that *Leibnitz's* dogma naturally resolves itself into a proposition

which is so very *simple*, and so very free from *all ambiguity*.

§ 60. Before passing on to the last opinion concerning Space, we shall give a specimen of *Lord Brougham's* inanities occurring in the Section "Of the argument *a priori*." We have heard of *Leibnitz's* "distance," and submit to the temptation which seduces us to listen to a few particulars relating to *Brougham's*. The British *distance*, to the disgrace of our country, will be found to be *greater inferior* to the German.

§ 61. "Is *distance*, that is, the supposed movement† of a point in a straight line *ad infinitum*, a quality? It must be so if infinite space is. Then of what is it a quality? If infinite space is the quality of an infinite being, infinite distance must be the quality of an infinite being also. But can it be said to be the quality of the same infinite being? Observe that the mind can form just as correct an idea of infinite distance as of infinite space, or, rather, it can form a somewhat more distinct idea. But the being to be inferred from this infinite distance cannot be exactly the same in kind with that to be inferred from space infinite in all directions."

§ 62. Observe, that throughout this passage his Lordship *distinguishes*, and with no little care either, between *infinite space*, and what he is pleased to call *infinite distance*. He *distinguishes*, we say, between them: without hinting, however, at *the ground* for the distinction. *Reasons* are sometimes only difficultly got at—And in certain cases become dangerous to those who employ them (as elephants in an Indian army have been known to turn upon their own troops :) Wherefore, a degree of caution may be necessary in producing them. But what infinite distance can be, if (so far as the question, Can infinite

† Distance is *not* a supposed movement.

distance be said to be the quality of the same infinite being of whom infinite space is the quality? is concerned,) if it be not the *very same* as infinite space, passes all comprehension. "Space infinite in ALL directions" swallows up *every* "infinite distance." *Infinite distance* stands in the same relation to *space infinite in all directions*, that any other less does to the greater which contains the less.—Infinite distance "cannot be exactly the same in kind," indeed, with space infinite in all directions; but then this is because the one is *the part* of a thing, of which the other is *the whole*. Postulate space infinite in *all* directions—and you cannot avoid postulating, at the very same time, space (or distance, if you will,) infinite in *this*, or in *that* direction.

§ 63. The mind, says his Lordship, can form "a somewhat *more distinct* idea" of infinite distance than of infinite space. This is bringing matters to the very *top of their bent*. For, in truth, *infinite distance*, after all that can be said about it, is a perfect contradiction. That to constitute *distance*, at least two fixed points, or (if you prefer it another way) two points considered as fixed, are necessary; is a point which may be considered to be as fixed as either of the poles of heaven.† Infinite distance is an infinity that is finite, and a distance in which there are no distant things.

† "Considering *space* as lying between *any two* bodies, or positive 'beings, \* \* we call it *distance*,"—Locke. Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27. See also *ibid.* § 3. *Vide Part. VII.* § 44.

## PART X.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE. LAW, WATTS, BROUGHAM, KANT, BERKELEY.

§ 1.—V. We hasten to the fifth and last opinion, or rather class of opinions : And shall make our notices with becoming brevity ; except some case requiring a longer consideration present itself.

§ 2. We have seen, we have conquered, the foe in their *outposts* : the remainder resolve to defend themselves in the *citadel*. We have been upon the ground wherefrom Space, specially Space in the distance, appears an *external nothing* ; and it is our present misfortune that we approach a territory, from which, if Space does not disagreeably resemble an *internal nothing*, 'twill be because it is covered by a *conceit*, perfect in its way.

—Multo nebulæ circum Dea† fudit amictu,  
Cernere ne quis——

The *peculiarity* of this case, is, that a concealment is effected as entire as that of the ostrich, when it hides its *head* from its pursuers. Not to keep the reader too long in suspense (we can imagine, and do excuse, his anxious

† The Goddess who must be understood *here*, is, without doubt, *Dulness*, “ the mighty mother ” whom the *Dunciad* sings. Under the influence of whose yawn,—whether or not sometimes

Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense,<sup>1</sup>—

Metaphysics never call on Common-sense, but to say, How much we despise you ! and every thing as natural as you !

uncertainty ;) The *opinion* which is now to be admitted to a hearing, modestly yet distinctly and firmly whispers, that *space* is a *mere idea of the mind*.

§ 3. An idea of the mind : Then, upon my word, I think Space will turn out to be a Mode ; for an idea, as it is not a substance, so is very usually taken to be a condition or quality of one.

§ 4. But to descend to particulars, and submit to the drudgery of eyeing Space as it appears in the shape of this or that man's idea :—

§ 5.—(A.) *Bishop Law*.—The following passages are taken from the Notes to *Archbishop King's* “ Origin of “ Evil.” “ There are \* *ideas*, and *simple* ones too, which “ have nothing *ad extra* correspondent to them, *no proper “ ideatum, archetype, or objective reality*, and I don't see “ why that of *space* may not be reckon'd one of them.” Chap. I. sect. 1, Note (3.) “ —Pure extension, which “ is an *abstract idea*, form'd by the mind itself, and, as “ such, has no foundation anywhere else.” “ —Absolute “ Space, which exists only in the mind.” Note (6.) Consult also Note (7.) *etc. etc.* And as to *Law's* opinions farther, regarding Space, we beg leave to refer the curious reader to the “ Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, “ Time,” &c.—1734. or 1735. A work this, not seldom named and quoted by writers of that period, and subsequently, but now scarcely to be met with.

§ 6. According to our Annotator, then, *space* is never an external existence, never an objective reality : It exists only in the mind : It is, in short, an abstract idea.

§ 7. And what, according to *Edmund Law*, is an abstract idea ? at least, what is that abstract idea which composes, or is composed by, Space ?

§ 8. An idea : an idea, even in the most unfavourable event. And *Law* agrees with *Locke*, in making *idea* stand for “ every thing about which the mind is conversant, or



“ which can be the object of perception, thought or understanding.” Note (2.) But we shall not pretend particularly to declare here, what *Locke* took an *idea* to be. His “ *ideas*,” ’tis well known, are, upon the whole, the most perplexing words in his book: Sometimes, signifying one thing; at other times, another; and frequently, a third. But thus much we may safely remark,—and it suffices, we do remark,—that, whatever *Locke* took *idea* to be, *in rerum naturâ* he knew but of Substances, Modes, and Relations. *Idea*, therefore, must be one of these three. *Vide Part. VIII. § 19. 21. 25.*

§ 9.—(B.) *Dr Watts*.—We shall be a little particular with the Doctor, as it has been said, that he “ has with great ingenuity discussed *all* the several opinions about “ *space*.” *Mrs Cockburn’s Remarks.* (Vol. I. p. 390.) This which has been said, is generally thought.

§ 10. *Watts’ Essay on Space* is entitled, “ A fair inquiry and debate concerning *space*, whether it be something or nothing, GOD or a creature.” *Philosophical Essays—Essay I.*

§ 11. The Essay in question falls naturally to be divided into two well-defined parts: In the first of which the author shews that “ *space* cannot be merely an existence in the mind,” &c. (Sect. II.) In the other, he labours to make out “ the *nihility* of *space*” (sect. xi.); *Space* being “ nothing real, but a mere abstract idea.” (Sect. XII.)

§ 12. ’Tis altogether unnecessary that we should minutely regard all that, in propriety, appertains to the former portion. We believe, most people may easily see, that in vain does *Dr Watts* attempt, in the second portion, to invalidate what, in the first, he advances on the topic of the external existence of *space*.

§ 13. But to detail. Section I. *explains the subject in general.* “ Void *space*,” says *Watts*, “ is conceived by

“ us as scattered through all the world between bodies,  
 “ as interspersed through all the pores of bodies, and as  
 “ reaching also beyond all the worlds that GOD has made,  
 “ and extended on all sides without bounds. \* \* \*  
 “ The grand inquiry is, What is this space ?”——“ Space  
 “ is,” concludes the Doctor, “ either something or no-  
 “ thing : if something, it is either a mere idea in the mind,  
 “ or something existing without. If it exist without us,  
 “ it is a substance or a mode ; if a substance, it is created  
 “ or increated.”†

§ 14. In Section II. the author makes plain, “ that  
 “ Space cannot be a mere nothing,” but, on the contrary,  
 is a “ sort of something :” that it “ cannot be a mere  
 “ idea,” but is “ something without us.”

§ 15. In Section III. he endeavours to make it appear,  
 that *space* is a *substance*.

† § 1. With which agrees, so far, *Dr Clarke's* summary of *concep-  
 tions*. “ All the conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can be  
 “ framed concerning Space, are these which follow. That it is either  
 “ absolutely *nothing*, or a mere *idea*, or only a *relation* of one thing to  
 “ another, or that it is *body*, or some other *substance*, or else a *property*  
 “ of a substance.” Note in 5th Reply. Between the two Doctors,  
 the agreement at bottom would seem to be complete as to fundamen-  
 tals, but in one particular. The dissenting Doctor alludes not to the  
 conception, in virtue of which space is *only a relation*, &c. But he had  
 it in his power to assign a good reason for the omission. Elsewhere,  
 he maintains that the *fancy* of space being only a relation, is UNIN-  
 TELLIGIBLE. “ Some philosophers, particularly *Mr Leibnitz*, have  
 “ fancied Space,” these are our Doctor's words, “ to be a sort of rela-  
 “ tive mode, and call it the order of co-existent beings or bodies,  
 “ which order is their general situation or distance——Thus, after  
 “ a manner which is *unintelligible* to me, they go on to explain their  
 “ idea of Space.” Sect. III.

§ 2. Our own general division, and minor divisions, include (as the  
 reader is by this time aware) all the members in *Watts's* divisions, and  
 all the members in *Clarke's* division to boot. It may be to some pur-  
 pose, to present, once for all, a *table* of our division, and subdivisions,  
 of the opinions anent<sup>1</sup> Space. *Vide APPENDIC. N.*

<sup>1</sup> This word is set among *David Hume's* *Scotticisms*.

§ 16. “ If Space be something which has an existence “ without us, it must be either a substance itself, or a “ mode or property of some substance ; for it is *most evident*, that it must either subsist by itself, or it must subsist in or by some other thing which does subsist by itself. There can be no medium between subsistence in “ and by itself, and subsistence in and by another.” In all this, we think the Doctor is perfectly right. *Vide Part. V. § 14.—Atq; Part. VIII. § 25.†*

§ 17. But in what follows, we think he is perfectly wrong. Space cannot, he maintains, be a *mode* of a substance. “ That space cannot be a mode or property,” he seeks to prove, by such arguments as these :—

§ 18. (a.) “ If *space* be a mode, *where* is the substance “ in which it is,” &c. ?—*Answer*. The substance is where the mode is, to be sure.

§ 19. (b.) *Wherein does the substance differ from the mode ?*—*Answer*. In this : whereas the mode is *merely* space or extension, the substance has extension *and* duration *and* many other modes. *Vide Part. VII. § 39.—Part. VIII. § 17.—Etc.*

§ 20. (c.) That Space is not an *absolute mode*, the Doctor would fain prove, and would prove thus :—“ Space “ neither wants any subject to *inhere in*,” & “ it wants “ no other being that we can conceive to make it exist.”—*Answer*. Whether this be truly so, or no, depends on what lies under “ *Space*.” *Vide Part. VII. § 5. Et Part. XI. §§ 1. 2. 3. 5. 7.*

† “ Is this *vacuum*, or immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable extension, a substance or a mode ? It *must* be one of the two.”—*Bayle*. Crit. Dict. p. 3083. *Bayle* means a vacuum, said *by others* to exist. He means, that vacuum must be either *substance* or *mode*, if it be at all.—If “ Space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, “ it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, “ whose affection its extension is.” “ True Intellectual System of “ the Universe,” p. 769–70. In the note to the twenty-fifth section of Part VIII. hereof, *Cudworth* gives one-half of the reason.

§ 21. Other arguments, as we may say, are spoken of. But they seem far too wretched for serious notice. What, for instance, need one reply to such an argument as that which the next section shall set forth? Remember, the thing to be proved is, that *infinite* space is a substance.

§ 22. (*d.*) “*Space* wants no *created* being to support its existence.”—*Answer*. We dare say, not.

§ 23. The Section closes with these words: “All the arguments that ever I read to disprove *space* to be a substance, carry no force at all with them, and seem to be mere assertions, not only without reason, but contrary to it.” On which subject, see Part VII. § 21, and the following sections, to § 28, inclusive.

§ 24. Section IV. It having been proved—in the manner which we have witnessed, but to the Doctor’s satisfaction—that Space is a substance, he shews that “surely it cannot be a created substance.” If so, no doubt “it appears to be GOD Himself.”

§ 25. Section V. evinces that “Space cannot be GOD.” And in this we entirely concur with *Isaac Watts*. *Vide Part. VII.* § 38. 39. 40. 44.—*etc.* But we’re not sure, that he and we would agree, as to the arguments by which the mutually received proposition should be established.

§ 26. The Doctor’s arguments are such as the following:—

§ 27. (*α.*) “If Space be GOD Himself, then all bodies are situated in GOD, as in their proper place—” *κ.τ.λ.* One might answer: This cannot properly be an objection to the doctrine: ’tis the doctrine itself.

§ 28. (*β.*) “If Space were GOD, then the Divine Being, though in its whole it be unmeasurable,”—[Mark that—] “yet hath millions of parts of itself, really distinct from each other, measurable—” *κ.τ.λ.* If one bear in mind, that Space hath no separable parts (what *Watts* proceeds



to glance at,) and that finite can bear *no proportion* to infinite, he might well admit the strength of the position in the objection. For this position, also, is the doctrine itself.

§ 29. (γ.) A third “consequence of supposing Space “to be GOD, is this: Then every part of this divine space “will contain Divine Perfections in it complete, or only “some part of each of them.”—*κ.τ.λ.* For a reply to which, we shall turn to a place in *Dr St. Clarke's Answer* to a sixth Letter. “The individual Consciousness of the “One Immense Being, is as truly *one*; as the present “moment of time is *individually one*, in all places at once. “And the one can no more properly be said to be an *ell* “or a *mile* of Consciousness, (which is the sum of” [*Dr Watts*] “objection,) than the other can be said to be an “*ell* or a *mile* of *Time*. This suggestion seems to de- “serve *particular* consideration.” We are confident, that this constitutes a basis for a triumphant reply.

§ 30. (δ.) If infinite space were GOD, GOD is infinitely extended. But GOD “is the most perfect spirit.” And “a spirit is not extended.” In reference to the *first* of which propositions, consider Part VII. §§ 38. 39. 40. 44. *etc.*—And in reference to the *third*, consider Part III. § 34. with the following sections—*Alc.*, of Part VIII. Appendix B. § 24.—And Part IX. Note (†) to § 39.

§ 31. The Section concludes thus: “The strongest “arguments seem to evince this, that *space* must be GOD, “or it must be *nothing*.” The strongest arguments seem to evince, as you, good Doctor, saw yourself in your second Section, that Space cannot be *nothing*. And if any arguments evince, or even seem to evince, that Space must be GOD, they are (we may depend on't) removed from the strongest arguments by *the whole diameter of being*.

§ 32. One reason why we deemed it to be expedient to go over those four arguments intended to shew, that Space



cannot be GOD, the reader may gather, if he ponders the words instantly to be quoted. They occur in the same Section. The remark contained in them appears to be in all respects just. "Most of the inferences which I  
"drew from the supposition of Space being GOD, are just  
"and natural, if Space be GOD'S immensity," &c.

§ 33. In Section VI. the Doctor gives "a review and  
"recollection of the argument."

§ 34. Well was he entitled to proclaim: "We enter  
"into the abyss of space, infinite and eternal space, and  
"our thoughts are lost and drowned in it." What he thus declared, reviewing as he was the first half of the way, he might *as truly* have cried out at any subsequent stage of his journey. At the very beginning of this Essay, the author had said: "Would any one imagine, that so  
"familiar an idea as that which we have of *space*, should  
"be so abstruse and mysterious, so difficult and unaccountable a thing, as that it should be doubtful and  
"undetermined to this day, among the philosophers even  
"of this knowing age, what *space* is; whether it be a  
"substance or mode, GOD or a creature, something or  
"nothing." And in the *Preface* he had written to this effect: "It is strange that philosophers, even in this enlightened age, this age of juster reasoning, should run  
"into such wide extremes in their opinions concerning  
"space; that while some depress it below all real being,  
"and suppose it to be mere nothing; others exalt it to  
"the nature and dignity of GODHEAD." *Dr Watts*, we say, had so written; and, of a truth, even by the time he had gotten the length of Section VI., well was he entitled to demand: "After all our *philosophy*" [Something like half the word would have done.] "and toil of *reasoning*," [Such as it is, even with *toil* thrown into the scale, to make *heavy weight*.] "shall it be said that we know not

“ whether *space* be a mere *nothing*, or whether it be the true and eternal GOD ?”—“ Are the eternal GOD and a mere *empty nothing*, so near akin to one another, that we cannot see the difference between them—that we are not able to tell whether *space* be GOD, or whether *space* be *nothing* ?” Indeed, Reverend Doctor, appearances look threatening : And the very worst may be dreaded, *unless* some third road is before us (if we will but look for it,) by which we may escape from paths so fraught with *deceit* and *danger*. Meanwhile, we heartily join in your prayer, that the shadows of your *thick darkness* may be scattered, and that you may be led out of the labyrinth of *gross ignorance and mistake*, and helped to make your way through the *abyss of night*—and so on.

§ 35. There appears to be, in the 7th Section, *nothing* worth our notice ; if one *nothing* be excepted. Space, 'tis now darkly surmised, may ultimately turn out to be “ a mere non-entity or nothing.” The Proteus, after going through all his shapes, may “ fix at last,” and submit to exist without any shape at all, ay without even the shadow of a shape. And hereabouts lies the *mystery*.

§ 36. The 8th Section compares Space to *shadow or darkness*. “ Is not *darkness* extended beyond the utmost bounds of the material creation ?”—“ We can no more assign the *limits* of *darkness*, than we can the limits of *space*. Again, as *darkness* hath a seeming *im-mensity* belonging to it, has it not an eternity also ?” Suppose that *darkness* is extended, infinitely extended, and is eternal : What can be inferred ? That extension or space is mere non-entity or nothing ? Nay, nay.

§ 37. But has darkness, in reality, extension and duration ? No : Darkness by itself is not long, nor broad, nor deep ; and as *extent* is not an attribute of darkness, so neither is *time*. The *thing* which is dark may have, or

rather must have, these attributes or conditions. If you suppose darkness and absence of body to coexist, then you have *dark space*. (*Vide Part. IX. § 24.*)

§ 38. In Section IX. the Doctor tries to *take courage from the hint*, that *space*—or bodiless extension—may be nothing but the absence of body—or bodiless extension,—that is, that extension without body may be extension without body; as shade—or the absence of light—is the absence of light: and to *raise some efforts of reasoning*, “to prove *space* to be nothing real.”† Space is *inactive and impassive*: Therefore, argues this Logician, it cannot be GOD nor a creature. Space cannot be GOD nor a creature: And therefore, Space must be “non-entity or nothing.” Such is *Watts’* reasoning. We answer: We are not at all disposed to dispute either the premiss or the conclusion of the first enthymeme. But with regard to the second, while we go in with the premiss, we must cast out the conclusion, as well as (therefore) that premiss which the conclusion subsumes, *viz.* That what is not GOD Himself, nor a creature, is non-entity or nothing.

§ 39. Section X. is “a re-examination whether Space “has any real properties.”

§ 40. The *first* consideration advanced here may be said to be, that space is “*emptiness*, or *absence* of body or matter”—*x.τ.λ.* And as touching this, see Part IX. § 14. and § 24.

§ 41. The *second* consideration says, in reference to Space’s *supposed* “*capacity* to receive bodies into it,” “that *space* is no otherwise *capable* of receiving body into it “than as the *emptiness* of a vessel makes it *capable* of receiving liquor”—*x.τ.λ.* Which is cordially granted. Emptiness is either space without matter, or space with

† “Or no real *being*,” adds the Doctor. But I hope, that there is a medium between *no real Being*, and *nothing real*; as I would not wish my *thoughts* to be nothing real—which yet, are not real Beings.

*thin and subtile matter.* Verily, Space is no otherwise capable of receiving body into it than as the space within an empty vessel (vacuum, for all practical purposes,) makes the vessel capable of receiving any sort of substance which is no larger than the space. Space, in fine, is no otherwise capable of receiving body, than as space is capable of receiving body.

§ 42. The *third* consideration consists of this : “ Space can never *penetrate* matter \* \* \* wheresoever matter is, there Space is not.”—“ Space is no more, and is entirely lost, when body is placed in the room of *emptiness.*” Relatively to the topic of *penetration*, consult Part VI. § 12. and down to the end of § 36.

§ 43. The *fourth* consideration may be said to be : The infinity of *space* is not an infinity of *fulness.* As to which, weigh what occurs in Part IX. § 57. *Etc.*

§ 44. *Fifth* consideration : Infinite space is really *divisible*, and indeed *divided*, by the bodies situated in it. This is the same sort of consideration as the preceding. Space is *not full*, because there are bodies in it : Space is *divided*, because there are bodies in it. The considerations resting on the same bottom ; to remove the bottom from the one, is to remove the bottom from the other.

§ 45. *Sixth* Consideration. “ The true reason why *space* appears to want no cause, is not that it has such a real and substantial essence as is *too big* to be produced by any cause, but that it is such a *subtile, tenuous, unessential*, or *imaginary* thing, that has *not essence, nor existence, nor reality* enough to want a cause, or to be produced, or caused.” We are happy at leaving this exactly as we found it.

§ 46. *Seventh* Consideration. Space has not *necessary* existence : it can be annihilated. The reader has had too much on this subject in the course of our work, to leave it anywise necessary to add aught in this place.



§ 47. The rest of the Section is taken up in *illustrating a parallel* between *space* and *emptiness*. And as emptiness involves space, we can have no objections to offer to the institution of the comparison.—There may also be *as much analogy* between space and shade, that is, dark space, as ever the Doctor likes.

§ 48. In the 11th Section is answered an objection against the *nihility* of space.

§ 49. The objection amounts to this: “20 miles of ‘space between’ any ‘two bodies’—or, if you please, 20 nonillions of miles of space between any two points—‘cannot be mere nothing.’” For if the miles of space be nothing, the bodies,—or points,—are “close together, or touch one another.” Rather a shrewd objection indeed, and ’tis not so easy to see how it is to be got decently over.

§ 50. The reply consists of “a round denial” of the truth of the *consequence* in the proposition, If there be *nothing* between the bodies, or points, then they are close together: Were the miles nothing, the bodies, or points, would not therefore touch. Emptiness would be between. Emptiness, that is Space. But Space is nothing.—Nothing would be *between*. But what would the BETWEEN be? Nothing. Therefore, *between* the bodies, or points, there would be a nothing which was a nothing.

§ 51. Alas! we have nothing to bring against the *round denial*, unless it were something not very unlike the square or the cube of the miles of space. But the calamity to which we are subjected is, that space, or emptiness, is of no use in such a case: Except to keep bodies from dashing against each other, when a better preventive of collision is not to be had.

§ 52. The *nihility* of Space having been so satisfactorily established, the 12th and last Section evidences (in the best possible way,) that *space* is “nothing real.” Well:



This tallies with its *nihility*. But the rubric immediately goes on to do more than merely insinuate, that Space is “a mere abstract idea.” Indeed! And is a mere abstract idea, an abstract idea, an idea, nothing real? *nihility*?

§ 53. But not to be in too great a hurry. “After all “these debates, wherein we,” such are the first words of the Section, “have been endeavouring to prove *space* to “be nothing real without us, yet perhaps we may allow “it to be an *abstracted idea* of the mind.”† Nothing real *without us*: This, then, was what we had to understand by non-entity, or nothing, or *nihility*. Space is a non-entity, or nothing, or *nihility*, as far as *without us* is concerned. But as far as *within us* is concerned, Space is “an abstracted idea of the mind.” Well for us, if after so much tossing by winds from all the quarters of the compass, we are now wafted into secure anchorage.

§ 54. *Dr Isaac Watts* presently repeats and answers the arguments which, in the beginning of the Essay, he had used to disprove Space to be a mere idea.

§ 55. The *first* argument, as now noticed, is: Space is without bounds, and therefore is not a mere idea in *our* minds. A capital argument, in sooth! And the answer? 'Tis this: “We can form an idea of infinite space of the “*ever-growing kind*, and it *may be* a mere idea still. Our “idea, indeed, is not actually infinite”—Good: very good. For an answer, it were capital; *were it not*, that, however true the matter of the answer is, it is (by ill luck) nothing to the point. That we can form an idea of Space, does not—surely—prove, that Space is an idea, or that our idea is Space. Who but such dreamers as the worthy Doctor ever dreamt that our ideas of Space might run riot when they had *lost and drowned* themselves in the abyss,—enlarging and contracting themselves as Space *grew* from less to more, and *shrank* from more to less?

† See Essay II. Sect. iv. par. 9. Essay V. Sect. i. par 4. *Et alibi*.

§ 56. The *second* argument now mentioned, as proving that Space cannot be a mere idea, is as follows: Space “seems to have a *necesssary* and obstinate *existence*.”† The answer being to this effect: Space has hardly so much external existence as certain mathematical truths, which the Doctor, who has a worthy object in view, calls *EXTERNAL truths*; and, asks he in fine consistency, Have these *external* truths, which are nothing besides ideas, any real existence *extraneous* to the minds that conceive them? After all that we have written, we may safely leave it to the reader, to place himself between the argument and the answer, and judge which of them has the better cause by the hand.

§ 57. “To conclude,” says *Dr Isaac Watts*, in the last paragraph of his Essay, “after the *laborious* searches of “thought, reasoning and reading in *SEVERAL stages* of “my life past, these are the best conceptions and sentiments that I can frame of space.”—The conceptions and sentiments bear *very evident* marks of having been *framed*, not only in several stages of his life, but in several, and totally opposite, states of his mind.—He proceeds: “I “grant there may be some *difficulties* yet remaining, and “some *darknesses* which yet may hang over the subject. “Learned men have laboured hard to scatter them in former ages, and in the present too, without full success; “yet, perhaps, in future time there may be a way found “out for adjusting all these difficulties to the more complete satisfaction of some following age.”—I must, of course, leave it to my readers to decide, whether I have not *adjusted all the difficulties* touching *space*; but certain, at all events, I am of this, that there must be a way, to those who can find it, whereby to set right every thing that is wrong.

§ 58. If the Doctor, by “difficulties” and “darkness-

† *Vide* APPENDIC. 1.

es," means, in the most distant manner, *difficulties* and *darknesses* of an *incomprehensible* cast, we have unquestionably a remark to offer. 'Tis the height of absurdity to fancy, that the human mind can conjure up difficulties of the incomprehensible kind, which the human mind cannot solve. How could the mind know the incomprehensibilities *to be incomprehensibilities*, unless it had comfortable glimpses of that higher region, wherefrom the incomprehensible things appear indeed to be things incomprehensible? To comprehend that certain things are of an incomprehensible character, is *at least* to comprehend the things which are *afterwards* found to be incomprehensible. And comprehending the things—is not that incompatible with the things being not of a comprehensible character? *Put a Part. IV. Appendic. § 7.—quoq; Part. IX. § 17. Not. †.*

§ 59. With *Dr Watts*, thus, space is "an abstracted idea of the mind."

§ 60. And that he counts all abstracted ideas of the mind, and all ideas whatever, to be *modes* of a substance, the reader of his second Essay will perceive, by abundance of evidence. Referring to each of the four sections of that Essay, in particular, and to passages scattered through his volume of Essays, in general—we shall content ourselves with citing these four words: "*Abstracted ideas* "OR MODES." (Essay II. Sect. ii.)

§ 61. Space is an abstracted idea of the mind. An abstracted idea of the mind is the *mode* of a substance. Therefore Space is a Mode. Thus *Dr Isaac Watts*. And therefore we are under the painful necessity of sending him over to those who will have Space to be a Mode, and nothing more, and nothing less. The Doctor will agree with his company, so far as *antimodists* are concerned. But the moment an investigation takes place with regard to the nature of the *modality*, *Dr Watts*, and those of his

way of speaking, must retire within themselves, the rest of the company being all the while at liberty to expiate over the whole field of nature, and even to wander beyond the solar walk or milky way.†

§ 62.—(r). *Lord Brougham*.—In the “ Preliminary Discourse,” and in the Section already referred to, (*vide part. ix.* § 60.) the following words are to be found. “ To argue from the existence of *space* and *time* to the existence of any thing else, is assuming that those two things have a real being *independent of our conceptions of them* : for the existence of *certain ideas* in our minds cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that any thing *external* to our minds exists. To infer that *space* and *time* are qualities of an *infinite* and *eternal* being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved, if a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning at all which predicates *space* and *time as qualities* of any thing. What, for example, is *time* but the *succession of ideas*, and the *consciousness* and the *recollection* which we have of that succession” ?—*z. 5. 2.*

§ 63. In this passage it is not obscurely hinted, that his Lordship takes Space and Time to be *conceptions* or *ideas* in our minds. And of course, Space and Time cannot be “ qualities of any thing,” *i. e.* “ any thing external to our minds,” if Space and Time be no more than conceptions or ideas—namely, conceptions or ideas of Space and Time. On *Lord Brougham’s* hypothesis, which (forget not) makes Space and Time conceptions or ideas, that is, *internal* affections,—it is verily vain to speak of Space and Time as being *qualities* (or any thing else) of any object *external* to our minds. Our conceptions, in one word, cannot be external to us.

† *Pope*—*Essay on Man*. Ep. 1.



§ 64. We have little to do with his Lordship's imaginings about Time, but as "time" is introduced, we shall throw out a hint, which may have some claim to a brief consideration.

§ 65. *Time*, says his Lordship, is the SUCCESSION of ideas. But is not *Time* (*Dr Price* led the way, long ago, to the remark) *presupposed* by, or in, *Succession*?† What were a succession that occupied no time, that had no duration? A succession which will never succeed—in gaining any wise man's good opinion. The position, Time is a Succession, is, so far as this question is concerned, exactly the same as the position, Time is Time. And that, by the bye, is as true as the position, Space is Space.

§ 66. But Time not only is the succession of ideas, it is the *consciousness* and *recollection* of the succession. Time is Time, and not only so, for Time is the recollection of Time. Perhaps our readers may be more able than we are, to help out his Lordship at a *dead lift*.

§ 67. It may be noticed, in connection with what is stated in the words under our examination, that they are *amazingly inconsistent* with what is conveyed at the conclusion of the Section wherein they occur. Remember, that space and time, and, by consequence, infinite space and infinite time (or duration), that is, *immensity* and *eternity*, are ideas and conceptions "in our minds," and, therefore, are *not* any things "*independent* of our conceptions:" and "cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that any thing *external* to our minds exists:" And then weigh the following *particular*

† "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet; but the notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured." *Dr Reid*. Essay III. ch. v. Writes he not well?



“*eminent use*” of “the argument *a priori*” :—“The fact of those ideas of *immensity* and *eternity*, forcing themselves, as *Mr Stewart* expresses it, upon our belief, seems to furnish an additional *argument* for the existence of” — A mind in which “those *ideas*,” or, as the other passage calls them, “conceptions,” are? That is not said. But (and pray mark it —) “an *Immense* and *Eternal Being*.” *Etc.*

§ 68. Space with *Lord Brougham* is a conception or an idea. And gives he out aught as to what the conception or idea is? The conception Space is *not* “independent of our conceptions.” The idea Space is an idea “in our minds.” So would his Lordship reply. And perhaps there might be good reasons why we should not press the subject farther.

§ 69.—(Δ.) *Kant*.—The Father of *Critical Philosophy* makes Space, pure Space, to be a *form* of *our sensibility*—the *original use* of *understanding* itself—one of the *rules* of the *transcendental aesthetic*—only the *original synthesis* of the *homogeneous*, &c. [For the benefit of those among our readers who may not be familiar with the Kantian terminology—as well as with what it stands for (when it stands for any thing;) and who, therefore, have never gone as far, or

as high

As metaphysic wit can fly;

I have to say, that the words put into *italics* are *not errors of the press*—A thing which these readers, but for this assurance, might have been, well and wisely, ready to imagine.] *That* space, says the Professor of *Königsberg*, in which all motion must be, (which itself is therefore absolutely immoveable,) is named *pure* or *absolute* space. Again :—We conceive an *absolute* immoveable, intransposable *space*, to which we in thought refer, at last, all

motion.—The conception of an absolute immoveable space has itself *no object*. Absolute space, in fine, is BUT AN IDEA.† *Etc. etc. etc.*

§ 70. Yet we must not neglect to notice, that though *Kant* thus takes Space to be nought except an idea or a conception, he can turn a new leaf, and write in a quite different strain.

§ 71. I ('tis *Emmanuel Kant* who speaks) by all means have a conception of Space and Time. Space and Time themselves are however *not conceptions*, though I have conceptions of them. Again:—I have a conception of *wood*: so have I too conceptions of *space* and *time*. But as *wood* itself is no conception, Space and Time are likewise *no conceptions*. *Etc. etc. etc.*

§ 72. In the first place, then, Space *is* a conception. But, in the second place, Space *is not* a conception—It is an external existence: *wood* exists externally.

§ 73. After all this, it is almost a pity to be under the necessity of bringing a third philosopheme of *Kant's* before the reader's eyes. A pity, I say—For the philosopheme next to be introduced, if it does not succeed in swallowing up the other two things,—'twill not be on account of any lack of good intentions—The attempt at any rate will be made.

§ 74. Our Professor has several kinds of *nonentities* or *nothings*. One of them, is the Nonentity or Nothing which has not the original use of understanding, *reality*, for a foundation—(*nihil privativum*.) Such is the conception of empty or pure space.‡

† Does absolute Space, IN WHICH all motion is said, by *Kant*, to be, contain the material universe? If matter be contained in an idea, is not matter too an idea?—How will *Kant's* followers answer?

‡ I am not sure, but what *Kant* rather makes pure space *ens imaginarium*, i. e. an empty intuition without an object. See his "Prolegomena."

§ 75. How these three *very apparent contradictions* are to be reconciled, we cannot stay to inquire. Perhaps they cannot be reconciled at all.

§ 76.—(E.) *Bishop Berkeley*.—But we come, in the last place, to a writer who had fully as much reason as any of them to make Space an *idea*.

§ 77. “All extension,” says the good Bishop, “exists ‘only in the mind.’” *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Sect. LXVII. “That it (*absolute space*) cannot exist ‘without the mind, is *clear* upon the same principles, ‘that demonstrate,’ &c. *Ibid*. Sect. CXVI. But to multiply quotations to the same purpose, would be, in all conscience, altogether a work of supererogation.†

§ 78. Space exists in the mind. Space, extension, is in the mind “*only by way of idea*.” *Principles*. Sect. XLIX. And elsewhere the same. Therefore Space, with *Berkeley*, is an idea.

§ 79. And what does the Bishop of *Cloyne* take the idea to be? A mode. But no; not a mode, though certainly something very like it.

§ 80. The following passages might lead us to suppose *ideas* were modes or properties. “The former (*spirits*) ‘are active indivisible, substances: the latter (*ideas*) are ‘inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which *subsist not by themselves*, but are *supported* by, or exist in, minds or

† “It is this circumstance that will be found, on examination, to be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which distinguishes it from that of the *Hindoos*, and from all others commonly classed along with it by metaphysicians; that it involves the annihilation of *space* as an external existence; thereby unhinging completely the natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which, OF ALL WITHIN THE REACH OF OUR FACULTIES, we seem to be the MOST COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED; and which, accordingly was selected by *Newton* and *Clarke*, as the ground-work of their argument for the necessary existence of GOD.” *Dugald Stewart's Philosophical Essays*. Essay II. chap. ii. sect. 2.

“ spiritual substances.” Principles. Sect. LXXXIX.  
 “ A spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or  
 “ *support*, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can  
 “ exist.” *Ibid.* Sect. CXXXV. “ I know what I mean,  
 “ when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or  
 “ *support* of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and per-  
 “ ceives ideas.” Third Dialogue. “ That there is no  
 “ substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit, is to me  
 “ evident.” *Ibid.* Many are the similar passages.

§ 81. Now what is a support but a substratum or substance? And what is a thing supported but a property or mode?

§ 82. But yet though Space is made an idea, and an idea is seen to be a thing supported, and Space, thus, is represented as *very similar* to a property; Space is rather in danger of being taken for a property or mode, than of being in reality a mode or attribute.

§ 83. “ Those qualities (extension and figure) are in  
 “ the mind only as they are perceived by it; that is, *not*  
 “ *by way of mode or attribute*,” &c. Principles. Sect.  
 XLIX. “ Look you, *Hylas*, when I speak of objects as  
 “ existing in the mind \* \* \* \* My meaning is  
 “ *only*, that the mind comprehends or perceives them;  
 “ and that it is affected from WITHOUT,† or by some being  
 “ DISTINCT† from itself.” Third Dialogue. And the  
 same sort of thing in other places.

§ 84. Thus have we treated of every distinct opinion which can be entertained regarding Space. If any person can righteously add a member to our General Division, or can with the least propriety subdivide farther our subdivisions, he will cause it to be clearly understood, that we have not gone over all the various opinions. We have no objection to oppose, should any one desire to put

† No assumption of *Space* here?

upon trial what we have written, and subject it, in every possible respect, to the severest examination.

§ 85. Before losing sight of our very long Digression, and turning once more towards the “Refutation,” we shall improve the present opportunity, and remark one or two things which could not perhaps be more conveniently noticed elsewhere.

§ 86. *Space* being made by philosophers to stand for so many different things, the word being, therefore, of so ambiguous a description, the “Argument” never employs it,—but in one place, which is the “Appendix.” The passage is as follows.

§ 87. “‘Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.’” Proposition.—

§ 88. “Let the extension be of space *merely*, or of ‘matter *merely*, or of space and matter *together*.’” *Etc.*—*vide Part. VII. § 2.†*

§ 89. Then—I hear an inquirer demand—if the term be so very ambiguous, how comes it to be used, so freely used, in the *first* Part hereof? The brief, the sufficient,

† § 1. It did not suit our purpose, *to take for granted* (even so little, or—if you please—so much, as) the separate existence of pure space, *i. e.* space without matter. The “Argument” sets out from the thing denoted by the unambiguous word *extension*, infinite extension; not caring of what nature the extension is. That there is expansion, *viz.* pure space, infinite expansion, or pure space, *distinct* from the extension of matter; it is the business of the second Scholium under Prop. IV. Part I. to demonstrate.

§ 2. In fact, had the first Proposition in the demonstration (in place of being, “Infinity of EXTENSION is necessarily existing,”) been in these terms—*Infinity of SPACE is necessarily existing*;—it might have been objected: That it was—unwarrantably, for without proof—assumed, that in nature there is space where there is no matter—A position, without doubt, of vast consequence, as against atheism (*vide part. ix. § 6. 7. 8.*): and by no means to be laid hold of, before a right to possession be established.



reply is, that *space*, in that Part, is employed in no technical sense whatever—At least, if it ever occur in a truly technical sense, any other sense would, all things being considered, answer to the full as well. Let a man affix what idea to *space* he pleases, the grand purport and object of what is advanced in the Part we speak of, will not, in truth and reality, be at all affected thereby. We challenge our inquirer to make the experiment.

§ 90. Nay, substitute for “space,” on every occasion, (and the same observation applies to “magnitude,” and “immensity,”) the word *extension*—the sense may require it to be, infinite *extension*—a word attended by no particular ambiguity; and the meaning and force of the passage, properly understood, will remain untouched.

§ 91. In fine, all that Part I. requires at bottom to be admitted, is, that something is necessarily existing, be the something space, or magnitude, or immensity, or simply extension.

§ 92. But I hear another inquirer address me. In the 27th section of the same Part (so is the second inquiry prefaced) *Dr Isaac Watts* is brought in, saying, that we cannot conceive Space non-existent, &c. But subsequently, he denied the necessary existence of Space. *Vide supra*, § 46. atq; § 56.—etc. etc. In these circumstances, was it fair and altogether right, to apply the Doctor to that use which we find him forced to be of in that 27th section?—My answer is quite at hand. 'Tis two-fold.

§ 93. I ran upon *Dr Watts* the FIRST; and with *Dr Watts* the SECOND, we had there nothing whatever to do. *Vide supra*, §§ 11. 12. 57. We have had indeed a good many things to say to *Dr Watts* the Second, (*vide supra*, § 35. usq; ad § 57.) but certainly the occasion had not arrived when we were no farther on than Part I. § 27. Perhaps a deal of remarkable attention has atoned for any

delay which may have taken place in paying our respects to the last-mentioned Doctor, to-wit, the Doctor in his last-alluded-to character.

§ 94. But, *again*, tho' it be true, *Dr Isaac Watts*, at a later stage of his life, denied that *space* has necessary existence—meaning, by *space*, an external something, distinct in every respect from matter ;—still he does not, so far as I remember, exactly deny any where the necessary existence of extension of some kind. He no where affirms of all extension whatsoever, that we can conceive it to be entirely blotted out of existence. And in the 27th section of Part first, *extension*—all extension—would have done as well as “ space.” *Ut vide supra*, § 90.

## PART XI.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We must now request our reader to retrace his steps, and consider a second time the words quoted from *Antitheos* in the *fifth* section of our *seventh* Part. Taking for granted that the reader has reverted to those words, we repeat our interrogation, What does *Antitheos* understand by the word *space*, as it occurs in that passage?

§ 2. We have seen, that Space is Space, and neither more nor less, with our atheist. *Vide Part. IX. § 10. et seq.* Is the “ space” with which at present we are concerned, to be held as denoting *merely bare space or extension*? If so, “ to talk of a substratum being necessary,” even “ *a priori* necessary,” to *space*, is, I should hope, very far from being nonsense. Nay, that there is a Substratum to infinite space or expansion, is, as we observed, demonstrated in “ Part III.” of the “ Argument.” (*Vide Part. VII. § 3.*)

§ 3. If, contrariwise, by “ space” *Antitheos* means the substance which *space* supposes, if it supposes such ; it is indeed nonsense to talk of a substratum to *space* being necessary *a priori*, or in any other sense of the word *necessary* : For, in the case contemplated, it is nonsense to talk of a substratum at all. 'Tis assuredly nonsense to talk of the substance to the substance, or of the sub-

stratum to the substratum, of Space. . If *space* stands for substance, it stands for substratum.

§ 4. Our atheist does not inform us, in so many words, in which sense he uses the term. But from the circumstance of his making "*space*" take the place which "infinite *extension*" occupied, we are entitled to conclude, he employed the term in the former of the two senses. The *connection*, in short, may be held to determine, that "*space*" stands for *bare space*.

§ 5. Besides, is not as much as this indicated by the words which follow in the "Refutation?" "On the other hand," says our author, "if it (space) stands in need of a substratum, the foundation-stone of this great *argument* must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve as a substratum to any thing." As to which: If Space stands in need of a *substratum*, this must be because Space is a *property*. And if Space is a property—to give it a substratum (of which it will stand in need,) will indeed cause the foundation-stone of an argument to crumble into dust, but the argument will be, not the "Argument \* \* for the Being \* \* of GOD," but *the argument for the being of a Refutation*. (*Vide Part. XII. § 7. cum not. AA. et § 8.*) A word in *Antitheos's* ear, as to the foundation-stone of the *great argument* (by whomever handled) from Space, to the existence of DEITY;—The pillars of the world may shake, and fall too—(no contradiction is involved in supposing that—) but, though the pillars of the world fall, and the universe of matter be as if it had never been,—the foundation-stone of that great argument *standeth sure*.

§ 6. A remark of somewhat the same nature as the remarks which our antitheist has in the 15th paragraph of Chapter VI., (all of which paragraph we have now gone over,) we meet towards the end of his volume. In his "retrospective and concluding remarks," he concentrates

"into one view the chief features, the shortcomings, and "anomalies of" *Mr Gillespie's* "extraordinary attempt to "prop up, upon rational principles, what has nothing to do "with such principles, but which must for ever remain a "mere matter of faith." Chap. XIII. par. 1.†—Ponder this ere proceeding farther,—'tis our antitheist's assurance we have for it, that *Mr Gillespie's* attempt to call in rational principles to his aid, has failed.

§ 7. In *Mr Gillespie's* case, "there is," says *Antitheos*, now about the work of *concentration*, "there is an odd "forgetfulness of first principles." (Par. 4.)—Wherein consists the oddness?—"Infinite extension and infinite duration are either necessary OF THEMSELVES—absolutely "so, or they are not."—Hitherto the ground is firm. Nothing can be more solid.—"If necessary OF THEMSELVES, then is the introduction of *Mr Gillespie's* substance or substratum gratuitous and absurd."—All firm footing as yet.—OF THEMSELVES is pretty much the same, is it not? as if we should say PER SE (in the plural.) If infinite extension and infinite duration necessarily exist PER SE—that is, without substrata—then we cannot, without absurdity, introduce substrata, or even a substratum. All is well, then, up to this point. To go on with *Antitheos's* words:—"If not necessary,—"—But where is the OF THEMSELVES now? Oh! it was not convenient to carry about the PER SE any longer. Not for you, *Antitheos*! who have to conjure up *short comings* and *anomalies* in *Mr Gillespie*. But for me, who have to do nothing of the kind, who have to execute no greater a task than to exhibit such short comings and anomalies as the "Refutation" abounds with—of which the present anomaly

† Lo! the Atheist licks up the spittle of the Sceptic:—*Antitheos's* sneer is couched under language which forbids our not remembering *Hume's*—"Our most holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on reason."—*Essay on Miracles*. Part ii.



and short coming (of two small Latin words, or the corresponding ones in English,) is a very fair specimen :— For me, I say, it is quite convenient to keep the OF THEMSELVES in mind. I must have consistency in the matter of the PER SE. Well then :—" If not necessary,—" OF THEMSELVES—" the primary propositions in the *argument* are false and groundless." (Par. 4.) What *argument*? It cannot be the "Argument, *a priori*," &c., because, in it, the primary propositions do not concern themselves at all with the affair of PER SE. *Vide Part. II. § 13. et seq. Part. VII. § 2. 3. Part. X. § 88. not.†* But take the passage in the way *Antitheos* has it, (reading, simply, "If not necessary,") and nothing can be more indisputable than that "the primary propositions in the" "Argument, *a priori*," "are false and groundless." But infinite extension or space, and infinite duration, are far from *being* NOT *necessary*: They ARE *necessary*. And what settles the point is, that we have *Antitheos*'s authority for it. *Vide Part. I. § 35.* But let us ever bear in mind, that though infinite space and infinite duration are necessary, it is not necessary that they exist PER SE. The farthest from it imaginable.—And this finishes our business, at this time, with the Chapter entitled "Retrospective and Concluding Remarks."

§ 8. The 16th paragraph of Chapter VI. commences thus :—"But if we are dissatisfied with the author's substratum,"—[And *Antitheos*, unless so dissatisfied, could be no atheist—] "we are not much better situated with the alternative left us; for according to the *dilemma* he has imposed upon us, we are obliged to conclude that "infinity of *extension*† is itself a substance." Yea: And a DILEMMA to *Antitheos* it will remain. If infinite extension *stand in need* of no substratum, why then it can

† The word in the "Refutation" is "existence"—evidently an error of the press.

stand by itself. And if it can stand by itself, why then—however horrified *Antitheos* may be—it *is* a substance. But in reference, further, to this, see below § 21. and the subsequent sections, to the end of the *Part*.

§ 9. We shall at all times be ready to grant, that *infinity of extension* makes but an awkward substance—a very prodigy among monsters. But at *whose* door would the folly of creating such a substance lie, if it lay at any body's? Not at *Mr Gillespie's*, for the “Argument” only says, “IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a ‘substratum, THEN, it is a *substance*’—(*vide part. v. § 15.—et infra, § 15.—*) never saying, that Infinity of Extension subsists without a substratum, saying as it does the very reverse. (*Vide supra, § 2.*) But the folly of making a substance out of infinity of extension, lies, (as is, indeed, evident enough, and as will be farther evinced below—*vide infra, § 21. et seq.—*) lies, we repeat, at *his* door with whom infinite extension subsists without any substratum, quite by itself in nature—only, *nature* repudiates such a subsistence——And therefore, that piece of folly will likely be found near *Antitheos's* threshold, since he is so “dissatisfied” with the substratum of infinite extension.

§ 10.—In reflecting on “the dilemma” which is “imposed,” do not forget how sad a one it is for antitheists.

§ 11. “I had thought,” continues our atheist, “infinity ‘a mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the circumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its extent—’” Here he makes infinity an *adjunct*, a mere nominal adjunct, to space. Elsewhere, he says infinity is an *attribute* thereof. We noticed, how incorrect this latter saying is. *Vide § 2. notæ † apud § 9. Part. VIII.* And probably the former one is still more objectionable. But it is not worth our while to write another syllable on the subject. I had thought so, quoth he,—“but the theist,

"it seems, thinks otherwise. Infinity, with him, must be "a substance."—Only, IF infinity exist *per se*.—"On the "same ground,"—*Antitheos* goes on,—"we might contend "that finity is a substance too."—To be sure. If infinity can exist *per se*, why may not finity, likewise, exist *per se*? If bare infinity be a substance,—on precisely the same ground, bare finity may be a substance too. In this, between the theist and the anti-theist there is, for once, a happy unanimity—and indeed the thing seems quite incontrovertible. "Supposing, however," proceeds *Antitheos*, "that space infinitely extended is what he "means,"—by what? by *infinity*, I take it—"all that we "can say is, that if it" ("space infinitely extended") "be a substance it is no longer space, or extension, or "any thing else than,—just a substance;—unless it may "be both extension and substance at the same moment. "But these are profane thoughts."—They are, at all events, very empty words. As for *thought*,—whatever of this commodity is in them, is hardly equal to the task of *rising* to the profane. "If it," *i. e.* "space infinitely extended," "be a substance it is no longer space"—Good. And, in like manner, if *Antitheos*, finitely extended, be a substance, he is no longer *Antitheos*. *This* every one at a glance sees to be—just nonsense. Again: "If it," *i. e.* "space infinitely extended," "be a substance it is no "longer \* \* \* \* any thing else than,—just a sub- "stance."—So, if the finite thing called a "*Refutation*" be a substance, it is no longer any thing else than—just a substance. *This*, however, is anything but nonsense, for it is sense, and good sense, and—just a truism;—"unless" (indeed) the "*Refutation*" "may" [not] "be both" a "*Refutation*" "and substance at the same moment."—Certainly, Space cannot be "both extension "and substance at the same moment," if *extension* means extension and nothing more, and if *substance* means some-

thing more than  $\sqrt{\text{extension and nothing more.}}$  But, this can with difficulty be accounted a discovery.

§ 12. “Perhaps”—our atheist prosecutes the matter thus—“according to the new school of theology, not only  
“ may a book be a substance, but its extension may also  
“ be a substance, its weight another, its colour a third,  
“ and so forth.” *Surely*,—IF the extension can exist *per se*, IF the weight can exist *per se*, IF the colour can exist *per se*. And this, not only according to the new school of theology, but according to the old school of logic.

§ 13. “Let us hear, however,” (these are *Antitheos*’s next words) “how the divine theory of infinity of extension being a substance is to be sustained.—Mark with  
“ what boldness of reasoning it is brought out. The infidel must look well to his *footing* and points of defence,  
“ lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force.” Par. 16. Then *Antitheos* proceeds to quote from “Proposition III.” The quotation we shall give, but we shall give, at the same time, what immediately precedes in the “Argument,” that our reader may the better understand whereabouts he is. Part of the passage he has had before†—but no matter.

§ 14. “*Either*, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which  
“ is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a  
“ support or substratum: *or*, it subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 15. “First, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without  
“ a substratum, THEN, it is a *substance*. And” [now comes the portion cited by *Antitheos*] “‘ IF any one  
“ ‘ should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting ;’  
“ (that is, without a support or substratum,‡) ‘ to prove,

† *Viz. in Part. V. § 14. 15. æq; ac supra, § 9.*

‡ Observe the parenthesis is *Antitheos*’s.



" 'beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy him to shew, WHY *Infinity of Extension is not a substance*, SO FAR FORTH AS IT CAN 'SUBSIST BY ITSELF, OR WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM.' "†

§ 16. This, then, is what our atheist points to as *boldness of reasoning*. It must chagrin him, that he cannot find the weak side of the *reasoning*;—though certainly none can hinder him from being highly offended at its *boldness*. The boldness, and the reasoning to the bargain, he would sneer down. But the reasoning, whatever becomes of its boldness, will never hang its head.

§ 17. It is thus *Antitheos* follows at the heels of the passage cited by him:—"A new era has thus dawned upon logic. A grand discovery is on the eve of rendering her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer necessary for us to prove an affirmative: *assert what we may*,

† § 1. The following paragraph is the one which follows, in the "Argument."

§ 2. "As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Extension exists,<sup>1</sup> so there is, *on the supposition* of its being able to subsist without a substratum, a substance or BEING of Infinity of Extension necessarily existing: Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being of Infinity of Extension, are *not different*, as standing to each other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but are identical."

§ 3. If now my readers will turn to Part II. and § 4. they shall find our antitheist insinuating, that his opponent never told what he meant by the word *being*. (Look, also, at the 2d paragraph of Chapter XII. of the "Refutation.") In the passage just cited, that opponent (this being the first occasion of the "Argument's" using *being*), makes BEING to be the same as *substance*, and a *substance* to be *what subsists without a substratum*. Is not this telling what is meant? We have yet to learn that *Antitheos* could tell any thing better on the subject. Be this as it may, he has done the very thing *Mr Gillespie* has done,—he has given *existing by itself* as a good enough explanation of *substance*. (*Vide infra*, § 43.) But *present ends*, you see, must be answered. If an inconsistency turns out to have been committed—why, in the circumstances of the case, it could not very well have been avoided.

<sup>1</sup> "Prop. I."—Note in "Argument." *Vide Part. II.* § 15.



"no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have only to put *a brave face* on it, and throw a defiance *in the teeth* of our opponent to prove the negative." (Par. 18.) And in the Chapter wherein are concentrated "into one view the chief features" of *Mr Gillespie's* "extraordinary attempt,"† our atheist, writing in a similar strain, hath this sentence:—"He (*Mr Gillespie*) can only insist *dogmatically* upon duration and extension being recognized as substances, and in self-satisfied proof, *challenges* any one, in the most braggart and imperious tone, to show why they are not to be regarded as substances!" Par. 5.

§ 18. *Mr Gillespie* maintained, (and he yet maintains) that, to prove the utter absurdity of a *certain* denial, we have but to defy the denier to point to any sufficient reason for his denial. What is there that has not been denied by some one?‡ Should the correctness of this algebraic expression be denied  $(a+a) : 2a :: (2a-a) : a$ , what better could be done than *challenging* the denier, (not in a braggart imperious tone, but in a gentlemanly manner,) to produce a valid reason for his assertion, and thereby go far to shew us, that, like *Hudibras*,

For every why he had a wherefore ?

*Mr Gillespie*, of a truth, had thought, *that* if all men had

† *Vide supra*, § 6.

‡ We have atheistical authority for it. "*Hobbes* says, that if men found their interest in it, they would doubt" [no—but they would say they doubt] "the truth of *Euclid's Elements*." This composes one of *Diderot's* notes to *D'Holbach*: The note being commendatory. *Vide* § 1. *Appendic. Part. VI.* And if *Hobbes* ever spoke as *Diderot* makes him speak, we have two atheists testifying at once. And we readily admit the atheistical *authority* to be high, in the present instance. It's extremely likely the pair have spoken the truth. None better fitted to know what lengths *certain* men will go to, when they think their interests are at stake—

—Men may *mistake* their true interests.

agreed on giving a certain name to each of the objects or things in which were fulfilled certain conditions ; no person could reasonably refuse to suffer the appellation to be bestowed on any one of the objects : and *that* if a man was found so exceedingly singular as to recede entirely from common language, and universally received notions, the *onus probandi* (to take a phrase from the law) lay on him, to make good the new and unheard of position. That all men were at one as to the propriety of calling that a *substance* which exists without a substratum, *Mr Gillespie* had verily esteemed a circumstance sufficiently entitling him to call upon him who should decline to permit the term to be applied to that which does so exist, to call upon him (I say) to assign some ground for his refusal. No ! exclaims our atheist, such a circumstance is not sufficient to entitle *Mr Gillespie* to " throw a defiance," (" dogmatically," of course,) at the refuser, to shew why a thing existing without a substratum is not to be designated a substance. No, indeed ! exclaims our atheist, for that would be (here lies his mistake) to usher in the day of a grand discovery—the dawn of a new era—in logic. And there's no room for any grand discovery in logic : A new era would come too late. No ! no ! exclaims our atheist. But *why* does he so ? After the chiding we have got, we dare never so much as think of defying him, but we politely ask him, *Why* ? He should be able, and willing too, on every occasion, to *give a reason* for the principle on which he acts.

§ 19. *Mr Gillespie* contended, that we have only to defy any one (an atheist, for example,—and let the atheist be such an one as *Antitheos*, if this gentleman likes—) to point to some good ground for denying the proposition, " IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, " THEN, it is a *substance*" ; in order to make manifest the absurdity of a denial. And from this particular case,

*Antitheos* has drawn, as a specimen of *Mr Gillespie's* logic, (which is the *unrighteous* part of the affair,) the universal proposition, To prove *any* affirmation, we have no more to do than, with "a brave face", to "throw a defiance "in the teeth" of all opponents to prove a negative: Hurl your defiance at a negative, and, lo! the affirmative is proven. The author of the "Argument" speaks of a *special instance*, and the author of the "Refutation," by a *skilful* manœuvre, *forces* his opponent to speak as if he inclined to hold the special instance as the representative of any case whatsoever: as if he inclined to employ that procedure on *every* occasion, which he used on *one only* occasion, because no better could be done. This is the height of disingenuousness. This is wretched sophistry. But it is fortunate, that the sophistry is as obvious as it is miserable. There is no mistaking it.

§ 20. But after all: To lay down a thing, and defy all and sundry to shew a good cause for asserting the contrary,—though it may not be a commendable method, must at least be granted to be an allowable method, of starting towards the determination of any controversy whatever. Every thing which begins to be must have a sufficient reason for its existence. Every affirmation, and every negation that ever was, began sometime to be. And if a person deny a position, without being able to assign a proper cause, we may be assured that the denial is improper, if not absurd. It must always be admitted, that the mere hurling of a defiance at an opponent, is not *by itself* sufficient to establish a doctrine: It is sufficient *only when conjoined with* the opponent's *inability* to furnish any *just evidence* for the truth of a contrary proposition.

§ 21. But, all this while, we have been *assuming*, that men universally have consented to denominate that a *substance* which has been decreed to subsist by itself,

without a substratum, or subject of inhesion : Men universally, with the exception of *certain* of the "atheistick gang,"† who perceive themselves to be under the necessity of *either* contending that infinite extension, or space, exists barely by itself, without any substratum, or granting that infinite extension exists only by reason of the existence of something else *quite irreconcilable with their atheism*. And 'tis high time that we present our readers with the evidence of our *title* to make the *assumption*.

§ 22. Our *authorities* shall be selected from the list of those who are, among us, the best known and received as writers on such topics. Our authors, in short, must be in common and good repute.

§ 23. The first authority we shall adduce is *Mr Locke*, and as he is the first, so he will be the greatest.‡

§ 24. "The ideas of *substances* are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things *subsisting by themselves*."—B. II. ch. xii. § 6.

§ 25. *Mode*, on the other hand, he defines thus :  
 "Modes \* \* \* \* contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of, substances."—*Ibid.* § 4.

§ 26. In the 23d Chapter (same Book,) which expressly treats of our "ideas of substances," he hath these words :  
 "The idea then we have, to which we give the general name *substance*, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of *those qualities* we find existing,

† These are *Cudworth's* words.

‡ "In intellectual philosophy, *Locke's* celebrated work \* \* \* \* leave[s] ALL competitors behind by the *common consent* of mankind." So says *Lord Brougham*, an excellent judge of the amount of fame which authors have,—in one of his valuable and very splendid "Dissertations." Vol. II. p. 113-4. Much in this 2nd vol.—how unlike much in the 1st!



"which, we imagine, cannot exist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, "without something to support them, we call that support *substantial*"—§ 2.

§ 27. And in his Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, he owns that his account of *substance* is on the same footing with that of *Burgersdicius*, *Sanderson*, "and the whole "tribe of logicians," who, he informs us, define a *substance* to be, "*ens, or res per se subsistens.*"

§ 28. But indeed we could accumulate so much from *Locke* on this subject, that we must be content with the specimen given, and with referring the reader to a great part of the Chapter on "Substances," and to his *Letter* and second *Reply* to *Dr Stillingfleet*. *Etc.*

§ 29. We do not feel ourselves under any necessity of adducing a host of *Aristotelians*, in the shape of *Peripatetics* and *Schoolmen*,† of whose song the constant burden is, *Substantia est ens per se subsistens, & non inhærens in alio*, Substance is that which subsists by itself, and has itself no subject: Because we believe that *Mr Locke* was an honest man, and an able; and because (luckily for our readers' patience) he has spoken for "the WHOLE tribe "of logicians."

§ 30. Our next authority in this matter shall be the celebrated author of the *True Intellectual System of the Universe*: of which *Lord Brougham* declares, "The profound learning of this unfinished work, and its satisfactory exposition of the ancient philosophers, are above "all praise." Note in Section IV. (Vol. I.) The words which we are about to adduce, we have made use of already, but the occasion was different. (*Vide Part. VIII. § 25. not.‡*)

§ 31. "Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind "of entity, doth either *subsist by itself*, or else is an at-

† *Antitheos* cannot reject their testimony: At any rate he speaks of "the truly estimable wisdom of the schools"—Chap. IV. par. 9.



"tribute, affection, or *mode of something*, that doth subsist by itself?" Here he opposes a Mode to that which subsists by itself, that is, to a Substance. From the whole context of the passage, it is indisputably evident that he uses 'to subsist by itself,' and 'to be a Substance,' as completely convertible. See also, of the same great work, Chapter II. & vii. viii.

§ 32. *Dr Isaac Watts* is an author who, in one shape or other, has passed through most people's hands, and whose authority in matters of logical and ontological science used to be none of the most inconsiderable. Be his authority, in metaphysical subjects, exactly what it may, *now*, we may very safely take his opinion upon the question before us. We need not require, and did we require, we might fail in obtaining, a better judge, as to the propriety of bestowing a certain name on a certain thing.

§ 33. In his "Brief Scheme of Ontology" there are these words: "Every being is considered, either as *subsisting of itself* \* \* \* and then it is called *substance* \* \* \* or it is considered as subsisting by virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which it belongs, and then it is called a mode."—Chap. XVI.

§ 34. In the second of his "Philosophical Essays," and in the third Section, the following sentence is to be seen. "If we can lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I am persuaded solid extension would appear substantial enough to be called a *substance*, since even mere empty space, or extension without solidity, hath been by some philosophers esteemed substantial enough to *subsist by itself*, and to deserve the honour of this name?"—To wit, the name of *substance*. From this passage it appears, that the Doctor reckoned that thing which *subsists by itself* to be deserving of the name of *substance*. To this extent at least, he agrees with the philosophers he al-

cludes to. Whatever difference there might be between the Doctor and the philosophers, otherwise, he evidently doubts not, for one moment, that "to subsist by itself" is "to be 'substantial enough.'" And by the bye, as he takes "mere empty space" into account, the quotation speaks to our point, to a hair. Read, likewise, of the first Section of the same Essay, the second paragraph, and it will be found to speak no ambiguous language about that which the *subsisting by itself* makes a thing to be.—*Etc. Etc.*

§ 35. In his "Logic," he says: "Every being is considered either as *subsisting in and by itself*, and then it is "called a *substance*; or it subsists in and by another, and "then it is called a mode"—Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. See also, to the same effect, the first paragraph of the following section:—*etc. etc.*

§ 36. *Vide quoque SPECIALITER Partis X. § 16.*

§ 37. We shall next produce a philosopher whose speculations savoured strongly of *common sense*, and that in more than one respect. For which reason, possibly, he is none the worse for our purpose.

§ 38. "Things which may *exist by themselves*, and do not "necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else, are "called *substances*; and with relation to the qualities or "attributes that belong to them, they are called the *subjects* of such qualities or attributes." *Dr Thomas Reid's Essays.* Essay I. chap. ii.—The chapter, this, in which the author *points out* "some of those things" which he is to "take for granted, as first principles," principles "common to Philosophers and to the vulgar," "common "principles, which are the foundation of all reasoning, "and of all science," principles which "are such as all "men of common understanding know; or such, at least, "as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are proposed and understood."

§ 39. But the truth is, there would be no end to the quoting of authorities, on this subject, were we not to cut the matter short:—which here we do, as far as authors of one species are concerned.†

§ 40. But no farther.—For as we have had our theistical kind of authorities, so we shall let the reader have a taste of a-theistical authority too,—in relation to the very important point which is before us—A point in the decision regarding which, so very much is involved.

§ 41. What says *Spinoza* on the subject? for we naturally turn in his direction, he having been the most celebrated (most justly celebrated) atheist of *Dr Samuel Clarke's* time,‡ and there not having arisen his equal in atheism since. "*Per Substantiam intelligo,*" ait *Spinoza*, "*id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur; hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.*" ["By Substance I understand that which we conceive to exist in and by itself; it is that the con-

† Were it lawful to quote, in an affair of this kind, a writer who had the bad fortune to get, for all time to come, an ill name, one, there is no doubt, much worse, by far, than he deserved; we might have added, to the authors in the text,—*Berkeley*: who says—"Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, to-wit, *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are \* \* substances: the latter are \* \* dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances." Principles. Sect. LXXXIX. (*Vide Part. x. § 80.*) And: "It is acknowledged on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense, are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. THUS FAR IT IS AGREED ON ALL HANDS." \*Sect. XCI. See likewise, Section LXXIII., and other places of his works, for the same sort of thing.

‡ "*Spinoza*, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our time." Demonstration.

"ception of which does not stand in need of the conception of aught else, in order to its being formed."] *Ethic. Par. I. Def. 3.*

§ 42. To all these authorities, which, there is no denying, are so entirely satisfactory, we shall add a single other one. The Author now to be ushered into notice is worth them all put together, for he sets the matter in debate *quite at rest*. 'Tis ANTITHEOS HIMSELF, I speak of. To bring *him* in, when any matter of more moment than ordinary is to be decided on, is our wont. *Vide Part. I. § 34. et 35.—Part. IV. § 14. et seq.—Part. VI. § 31. et seq. usq; ad § 37.*

§ 43. "I would ask"—these are *Antitheos's* words—"what intelligence is? Is it a *being*—a SUBSTANCE—a thing that EXISTS BY ITSELF? Or is it not, on the contrary, a characteristic property—"† (Ch. XI. par. 4.) Here, *substance* is given as another word for *being*, and existence by itself is the exegesis of *substance*. With *Antitheos*, then, a *substance* is that which *exists by itself*.

§ 44. Should it be argued, (for we must provide against every thing which can possibly be objected,) *that* all, or—if not all—so many of my authorities, when they say, What subsists by itself, is a *substance*, had——(if they had not, others, when speaking to the same effect, have had ——) *finite things* ONLY in view; and *that* it is impossible in the nature of things, that there can be an infinite substance:—Then, my reply is, that *Spinoza*, the head of atheists, shall be allowed to settle this particular department of the controversy, for us. As a matter of course, theistical evidence is to be had in abundance, but I shall be content to limit myself to the evidence of atheists themselves.

§ 45. "*Substantiam corpoream*," *his verbis utitur Spinoza*, "*quæ non NISI INFINITA concipi potest* ——" [*Corporeal*

† *Vide Part. XII. § 14.*

"*substance* \* is necessarily conceived to be INFINITE—"]  
*Ut vide* § 2. *Appendic. Part. VI.*—Again :—" *Omnis*†  
*" substantia est necessariò INFINITA.*" [" *Substance* is of  
*" necessity INFINITE.*"] *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 8.*

§ 46. Thus *Spinoza*. But I shall be more liberal than I promised to be—And to *Spinoza's authority* I shall again subjoin that of ANTITHEOS HIMSELF. "We cannot say," he observes, "whether MATTER BE INFINITELY EXTENDED OR NOT. In so far as our experience goes, and our observation can carry us, we find SUBSTANCE completely occupying every part of space." (Ch. V. par. 7.) With *Antitheos*, matter is substance, indeed all that we have for substance. And this gentleman has no difficulty to throw in the way of matter's infinity. That is, *he has no difficulty to throw in the way of INFINITE substance.*

† The word "*omnis*" goes, *here*, for nothing—A position, I cheerfully submit to the judgment of the learned. And did I dare to defy gainsayers, I should accompany what I hand over, with *something*.



## PART XII.

THE “ ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD,” AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. “ But WAIVING,”—such are the words which succeed the passage quoted, from Chapter VI. of the “ Refutation,” in § 17. of the preceding Part—“ But WAIVING, in the meantime, our plea of want of evidence for the affirmative, *a simple man* would say in relation to the case before us, that *substance* possesses attraction, which *extension* does not ; that it is observed under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c. which neither *extension* nor *infinity* ever is, or can in its nature be. He might, in his deplorable ignorance, ask if ever *infinity* was weighed, or *extension* analyzed and its elements reduced to gas ?† This would, I dare say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such a person had no idea of the very convenient *art* of applying metaphysical language to things physical ; whereby a mere *abstraction*, or at most a *property* of something else, can so easily be *charmed* into a *reality*. His shewing why *infinity of extension* is not a *substance*, therefore, would be set down as grovelling and common-place, and, by consequence, useless.” Par. 19.

† The preceding passage was had in view, when we were in the 3d section of Part V.

§ 2. *Antitheos* speaks of an *art* whereby an *abstraction*, that is, a *thought*, of the mind,—(*vide part. i. § 8.*)—can be charmed into a *reality*. Now one would have imagined that no *art*—still less, an *art* backed by a *charm*—was necessary, or even admissible, for the purpose; and this, simply because *thought* had all along been held to compose one of the classes of *realities*. Perhaps the decision was erroneous, and a discovery of Inductive Science, has, in the hands of some fortunate Modern, made it plain that our thoughts are to be dismissed, for the future, to the dismal region of *un-reality*; where, if *un-reality* has any *where*, we might expect, with the brightest and certainly the best-founded hopes, to behold sights

unutterable, and worse

Than fables yet have feign'd,†

—in short, the very same place (at least according to some)

Where entity and quiddity,

The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly.

§ 3. *Antitheos* speaks of an *art*, "whereby a mere abstraction, or at most a PROPERTY of something else, " can so easily be charmed INTO a *reality*."—"That it " should come to this!"‡ Is a *property of something* in need of an *art* possessed of a *charm* which, being used, behold! a *property* starts into a *reality*. The *property*, then, was *no reality* before. "That it should come to " this!"‡

§ 4. Our atheist waives the plea of want of evidence for the *affirmative* side in regard to the proposition, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum by itself, THEN, it IS a substance; only so far as is compatible with his bringing forward reasons for the *negative*. He insinuates, that it is *essential*|| to a *substance* to attract

† This is here only by way of accommodation. Our great EPIC POET is speaking not of curious, but of dreadful things.

‡ *Hamlet.*

|| *Vide Part. V. § 3.*

and be attracted, to have a certain figure, and density, and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, to be susceptible of combustion, crystallization, &c. and of a process whereby it should be reduced to some gas; and is not this to adduce a reason on the *negative* side?

§ 5. It is an attempt at it, at all events: likely, the best which could be made. It is to adduce something, however,—any way you take it. When our atheist, (passing over in his hurry, by the bye, the *exact nature* of the *defiance* altogether,) insinuates to that effect, he is flagrantly guilty of a *petitio principii*, of begging the question to be proved, he is to be held as having uttered, once more, "an unproved extravagance."—Observe the concluding words: "His," the simple man's, "*shewing why* infinity of extension is not a substance, *therefore*, " would be set down as grovelling and common-place, and, " by consequence, useless." *Antitheos* had been insisting, tho' secretly, that, to be a *substance*, a thing *must* possess attraction, figure, density, &c. &c. And here he pleasantly concludes *as if his simple man had actually proved* that infinite extension is not a substance, BECAUSE he had found it could not be weighed, nor reduced to gas, &c. &c. Verily, verily, *his* simple man, if he had made any such thing follow from such a cause, is no such simpleton after all, but—unless we mistake the matter much—is *more of a knave than a fool*.

§ 6. We advance to the next paragraph. "After all, " however, how does the notable proposition stand, that "there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension? " The principle of the argument brought up in support of "it—the *dilemma*, in short—gives way on every side. It "stands without a vestige of backing, except from the "vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance,"—[elsewhere called "a ridiculous bravado"†—] "the value

† Last par. of "Refutation."

"of which no one but a *fool* could be at a loss to estimate." (Par. 20.)—"I thank thee — for teaching me that word."†—By the bye, although the *dilemma* is said to have given way "on every *side*," never a word was said by *Antitheos* to shew it gave way in the *middle*. *Antitheos* has never breathed one syllable against the dilemma, as a dilemma, or disjunctive proposition. He has never questioned the *connexion* of the members composing the disjunction,—the propriety of proposing the one alternative when the other is rejected. The *dilemma*, then, is in our atheist's eyes unobjectionable. But the *members*—look at them, says he. And so we shall. The *one* is: "It (Infinity of Extension) subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum." Well, what have you to say to that, *Antitheos*?—I own myself to be "*dissatisfied*" with your substratum, *Antitheos* replies. (*Vide Part. XI. § 8.*)—The *other* member is: "Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum" What say you, *Antitheos*, to that?—As I am entirely "*dissatisfied*" with any substratum, infinite extension is left to stand by itself: and this, says *Antitheos*, I tell you seriously.‡ THEN, *Antitheos*, I tell you, (and the information—shall it increase your seriousness?—) you, and all the antitheists in the world, that infinite extension IS made to be a substance. *Vide Part. XI. § 21. et sequentes.*

§ 7. Now come we to the concluding paragraph of the Chapter before us: which paragraph opens thus: "The author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having made good the doctrine he has announced: for after having done all he could do, by the foisting in of a substratum upon *extension*"—[he should have said, *infinite extension*—] After having foisted in a substratum

† "Merchant of Venice." ‡ *Vide quoq; Part. IX. § 10. 11. 12. 13.*



upon infinite extension: Who or what did that? Not Prop. III., which foists in nothing but a dilemma, a disjunctive proposition, and a conclusion deduced from either member or alternative thereof. But to see a little farther into *Antitheos's* views:—"The foisting in of a substratum upon" [infinite] "extension to the destruction of" "its necessary existence"—He that foists in a substratum upon infinite extension, by no means destroys the necessity of this latter. Infinite extension has not been proved to be not a *mode* only, of existence,† and to give it a Substratum or Substance in which it inheres, if it is a property only, is surely not to destroy, but, were that possible, to make more indestructible, its necessary existence.||—After the author of the "Argument" had, by *Antitheos's* way of it, foisted in the substratum "—he," we are next assured, "comforts himself with the reflection, that it is of very little consequence whether men will or will not CONSENT TO CALL this *substratum* by the "name of *being* or *substance*, because"—And then *Antitheos* cites a passage from the "Argument." The passage we shall produce, but the context shall be cited likewise. The first portion whereof the reader has had before him, already. *Vide Part. V. § 16.*

§ 8. "Secondly, IF Infinity of Extension subsist not "without a Substratum, THEN, it being a contradiction "to deny there is Infinity of Extension,¶ it is a contradiction to deny there is a Substratum to it."—[The conclusion here, is the conclusion which *Antitheos* declared†† to be *lame* and *impotent*, and, as if that were not enough, *laughable*. The ground for merriment, I confess I do not see. But *Antitheos* may have a keener perception of the ludicrous. Can it be, that he laughs when he should be

† *Vide Part. VII. § 3. Etc.*

|| See Note A A.

¶ "Prop. I." Note in "Argument."

†† *Vide Part. V. § 17.*



rather weeping ?† At all events, he should not have been so close, and kept the source of the jest all to himself : Had he but revealed where the cause for the merriment lay, others might have participated in the amusement.]—

§ 9. "Whether or not men will CONSENT TO CALL this "Substratum *Substance* or *Being*, is of very little consequence. *For*," [The passage cited by *Antitheos* follows.] " 'tis certain that the word Substance or Being, has "never been employed, can never be employed, to stand "for any thing *more*, at least, than the Substratum of "Infinity of Extension."—The next sentence, in the "Argument," *Antitheos* does *not* quote. 'Tis as follows :— "But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, *being* "a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the Sub- "stratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name of *Sub- "stance* or *Being*." Prop. III. §§ 4. 5.

§ 10. It is in this way that our atheist writes after giving the quotation from the "Argument :"—"It is, of "course, of no manner of importance whether men "consent to do what they always have done and must "continue to do, or whether they will not."—Exactly so. *Antitheos* lays down a *general* rule, applicable to any case, and *Mr Gillespie* gave the *particular* instance. (*Supra*, § 9.)—"But *how far*," our atheist next proceeds to ask, "is "the *because*" [or the "*for*"] "and its certainty consist- "ent with the lurking suspicion of the honoured *name* of "Being or substance being *refused* to his unsupported sub- "stratum?"—*How far* ? *Very far* indeed. As far as any one can see. Men often both say and do very perverse things, when they *think* it is for their interest.‡ May not one see it to be, somehow, necessary, that there should be a Substratum to infinite extension, who yet, for some whimsical, or for some atheistical reason, refuses to accord to the Substratum the *name* Substance or Being ?

† See Note B B.

‡ See Note C C.

Much more wonderful phenomena may be witnessed every day. Mankind not unfrequently develope the possibility there is, that human passions, and even fancies, may suffice to bring the *tongue* over to their side, in opposition to all the sound dictates of the understanding. There are those who will not be hindered by so paltry a difficulty as the *obvious unreasonableness* of a thing, from doing the thing. To refuse to bestow a *name*, is as easy, in one respect, as to see the propriety of the bestowment. I think, that by this time the most inattentive reader must have remarked, how very *few* the *insuperable obstructions* are that lie in an atheist's path.

§ 11. *Antitheos* goes on thus: " Yet, on the very heels of this misgiving, he concludes,—' There is, *then*, NECESSARILY, a Being of Infinity of Extension.' "—Yes: Hard upon the heels of the *lurking suspicion* and *misgiving* as to whether some men may not act very unreasonably, by refusing a *name* to a thing which deserves it,—or, to deliver it more after *Antitheos's* manner, hard upon the heels of the " lurking suspicion " and " misgiving " as to whether certain men, having a certain object in view, will " consent to do what they always have done, and " must continue to do," in other, and *similar*, circumstances—*when no present interest warps their perceptions all awry*; the Author of the " Argument " thinks that by Proposition III. it is made out, for ever, There is, NECESSARILY, a Being of Infinity of Extension. And I shall venture to say, I am persuaded my reader must think so too.

§ 12. Our atheist concludes his Chapter, and what he has to say in relation to *Mr Gillespie's third Proposition*, with these words:—" The *worthy old father* of the church, " who declared his belief of a Christian dogma *because it* " *was impossible*, is not far from having a *logician* of the " *mathematical* school to keep him in countenance. *Mr*

"Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his premises *dubiously faltering on his lips*."—Mr Gillespie does indeed frame a most absolute conclusion, but that he does so with his premises dubiously faltering on his lips, is *one of those many untruths* which the reader has seen dropping from *Antitheos's* pen. And his is *no faltering* pen, on an occasion. It executes no dubious characters, when a handsome misrepresentation is necessary for the writer's cause.

§ 13. A *logician* of the *mathematical* school may be, for aught known to the contrary, a very proper person to keep company with one who has arrived at a "second childishness."† But whether worthy or unworthy, old or young, fathers or sons, of the Church, are more prone than *certain other* descriptions of persons, to believe in *proportion to the incredibility* of the creed, to act as if their maxim were, CREDIMUS, QUIA IMPOSSIBILIA SUNT; this is a matter which may admit of doubt, and is open for fair investigation.

§ 14. "Is it (intelligence) a being—a substance—a thing that exists by itself? Or is it not, on the contrary," demands *Antitheos*, "a characteristic property of a certain order of beings, dependent upon the exercise of their external senses, and, by consequence, their organization? *We cannot even conceive* how it should exist, independent of these circumstances. 'To have intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas; to have ideas, it is necessary to have senses: and to have senses, it is necessary to be material.'‡ *Intelligence*, THEREFORE, speaking generally, is *nothing more than an ACCIDENTAL property of matter*."†† Chapter XI. parag. 4.

§ 15. Now this which *Antitheos* says, that intelligence, speaking either generally or particularly, is *nothing more*

† *Shakspeare*.

‡ See Note D D.

†† See E E.

than an ACCIDENTAL property of matter : that is, that such a *thought of our minds* as is denoted by the word *accident*—or *chance*—(for is it not plain, that *accident*—or *chance*—can be no real, *separate* existence in the world of *external*, independent realities, and that “the honoured “name of *Being* or *substance*” suits no such thing as the letters c-h-a-n-c-e—or a-c-c-i-d-e-n-t—can ever denote?) I say, that such a *thought of ours* should, some time or other, have added *thinking* (*ourselves* thus adding *ourselves*†) to certain ‘collocations of matter’‡—(or was the matter not brought together previously?—) *this*, to a truly “simple man,” is—surely—as wild and monstrous a creed as any “worthy old father of the church” ever set himself down to frame, in the height of his zeal to be, *above measure* mysterious and “divinely dark.”|| THIS, THIS IS INCREDIBLE.

§ 16. And because it is so, we would have our readers consider, and evermore bear in mind, that the point now before our view touches somehow on the borders of that question to which the *whole atheistic controversy* may well be reduced:¶ To-wit, Is it more credible that Mind caused Matter, than that Matter caused Mind?—*To believe* that Matter (necessarily, or accidentally,) caused Mind to come into existence, IS IMPOSSIBLE.†† Then, ATHEISM IS INCREDIBLE.

§ 17. And as it is impossible to believe, that Matter was the sole cause of Mind, so, WITH ANTITHEOS, IT IS A CREDIBLE THING, THAT MIND WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF MATTER. Which we shall prove.

§ 18. Our medium of proof shall be this: *With Anti-theos, the Creation of Matter was a possible thing.*‡‡

† Thought thus acting before thought existed.

‡ A favourite phrase with the Rev. Dr Chalmers.

|| Pope—Dunciad. B. iv. l. 460.

¶ See Note FF.

†† See Note GG.

‡‡ See Note HH.



§ 19. *Antitheos* certainly jeers sufficiently at the doctrine of the Creation of Matter.—“Like the dogma of “all things being created out of nothing,” [or, being created at all,] “\* \* \* \* the thing seems *impossible*” —Ch. I. par. 6. “The creation or annihilation of matter,—either of which is an *impossibility*.” Ch. V. last par.—“The miraculous and incomprehensible feat of “creating the universe out of nothing.”—Ch. IX. par. 11. “—The *gross and profoundly irrational* dogma of creation. This is not precisely the place to detect and lay bare all the *absurdities* of that dogma (which could easily “be done to its inmost core)”—Ch. XII. par. 5. “He “(the theologian) takes for granted the *astounding fact* “of the material universe having been created out of nothing”—[or, created at all.] Last Chap. par. 9.

§ 20. But notwithstanding all *Antitheos's* jeers, on this *fruitful* subject, he says: “WE CAN CONCEIVE MATTER “NOT TO EXIST.” See, also, other passages, the same in effect, from our atheist, (no atheist in this,) in Part VI. § 34.

§ 21. Now—assuredly—he that can conceive Matter not to be, or not to have been, can conceive Matter to have had a beginning. Lay together these two positions: To-wit, *Matter is*, and, *Matter can be conceived not to have been*: And you have the conception of the Creation of Matter; the possibility that Matter may have begun to be.

§ 22. And as with our atheist (no atheist here,) Matter *may have begun to be*, the *Creation of Matter is*, with him, a *possible* thing.†—So that now we have, in FIRM KEEPING, our medium of proof.

§ 23. And I fancy, it will not be denied (at least with a grave face,) that if Matter, all Matter, began to be,

† See Note II.



*Mind*, or *nothing*, must have produced it : That is, If Matter began to be, Mind must have been the cause.†

§ 24. So that—putting one thing by the side of another—it appears, that, WITH ANTITHEOS, AT THE BOTTOM OF HIS HEART,‡ WE CAN BELIEVE, THAT MIND CAUSED MATTER.—And this was the thing to be proved. *Vide supra*, § 17.

§ 25. — — — — *Antitheos* should call himself "*Antitheos*"—no, not for another hour.

— — — — —

§ 26. And here must be terminated our present Examination. To advance farther now, would be improper in a high degree. We have weighed what *Antitheos* has said in reference to "Proposition I." : We have examined every atom of an argument urged against "Proposition II." : And we have gone over *word by word, and in order*, each syllable written in opposition to the evidence of "Proposition III."—*On these three hang all the rest.* If those Propositions be granted, or are fully established (whether they be granted or no,) *Antitheos* may as soon cause the heavens to depart by a frown, as he can get quit of the proof for the Being of A GOD. *If* those three positions are necessarily true, there lies close to our hands the *demonstration* of An Intelligent First Cause of all the phenomena, and of all the matter, in the universe. And that they *are* so, we have no doubt, each one of our readers is by this time most thoroughly convinced.||—In short, all the remaining positions in the "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD,"

† See Note J J.

‡ Or rather, *at the top of his head.*

|| *Whatever* certain readers may say.

are *mere deductions*—doctrines evolved from the doctrines laid down in those preliminary Propositions.†

§ 27. And on the other hand, if the truth of these Propositions have not been made luminously to appear, 'tis quite needless to proceed beyond them. The *Zetetics*‡ were challenged to point out some—some one—"specific fallacy" in my Demonstration. *Antitheos*, in the character of their avowed champion, alleges, he has detected a *specific fallacy* in the *third*, that vital, Proposition. If he be right,—at that point he should have stopped—It was mere supererogation to go over an inch of more ground—One of the two foundation-stones of this *great argument crumbles into dust*—And the whole "fabric of the Argument *a priori* comes lumbering down along with it."||

§ 28. — That *Antitheos* resolved on *sinking deeper* into the slough of his own objections, is evidence of any thing but his own contentment with the result of his preliminary operations. He enters upon new ground, and demeans himself as if the region he had passed over were not territory fully conquered.

§ 29. We shall come to a halt, then—to see whether or no "Theology must be sorely distressed for standing ground, *if THIS* be its strongest position—its fortress—"its rock—its high tower."—"Refutation": *last par.*

§ 30. To go on, we should have to subsume the unquestionable truth of a proposition to which my antagonist has fairly—I mean, openly—objected. To take for granted, against atheists, the truth of the 3d Proposition: "this will we do, if GOD permit."¶ *But not now will we.* In the mean time, *Antitheos* is afforded an opportunity of

† Of the truth of which, a slight inspection of that work, may satisfy one. *Put a Part. II. § 19.*

‡ *Vide APPENDIC. 33.*

|| "Refutation." Ch. X. last par. These words are used as *accommodations*.

¶ I am not *arguing* with an antitheist, at present.

acknowledging what, we are bold to say, all our readers must have perceived.—

——“ I PAUSE FOR A REPLY.” ——

§ 31. —I conclude, in the words of the penetrating *Dr Samuel Clarke*.—“ Infinite *Space*, is infinite *Extension*: “ and *Eternity*, is infinite *Duration*. THEY ARE THE TWO “ FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE IDEAS, THAT “ EVERY MAN HAS IN HIS MIND.”—*Ans. to Sixth Letter*.

## NOTES TO PART XII.

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### NOTE AA.

“ *Space* and *Duration* being evidently *necessary*, and yet themselves not *substances*, but *properties* or *modes*; show evidently “ that the Substance, without which these Modes could not subsist, is itself *much more* (if that were possible) *necessary*.” *Dr St. Clarke’s* 3d. Ans. “ Which (*Space*) we evidently see to be “ *necessarily-existing*; and yet which (not being itself a *substance*), “ at the same time *necessarily presupposes* a *Substance*, without “ which it could not exist; Which *substance* consequently, must be “ itself (much more, if possible,) *necessarily-existing*.” Fourth Ans.

### NOTE BB.

*Antitheos* may hold in admiration the ancient sect of *Stoics*, or perhaps he may be lineally descended of the *Danes*.—“ On receiving mortal wounds in battle, they were so far from uttering groans and lamentations, or exhibiting any marks of fear or sorrow, that they commonly began to laugh and sing.”†—*Henry’s History of Great Britain*. B. II. ch. 7.

### NOTE CC.

We have, as we noticed before, atheistical authority touching upon something hercabouts. *Vide Part. XI. § 18. not. ‡.* And as we have atheistical authority, so we shall treat ourselves to theistical, too. “ We believe that to be true, *which some have affirmed*, “ that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite “ and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, “ as of a triangle’s having three angles equal to two right, whereby “ men’s judgments might be eluded and bribed, notwithstanding “ all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least “ sceptical about them.” *Cudworth*: in Preface.

† “ *Bartholin. c. 1, 2.*”

## NOTE DD.

I do not know exactly whence *Antitheos* took this sentence." The same sentiments abound, of course, in the *Système de la Nature*,—and every atheistical work.

" This passage of a modern writer,† *We worms, cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains, is vox pecudis, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.*" *Cudworth*. P. 841.

## NOTE EE.

*Antitheos*, it thus appears, was the result of ACCIDENT. The course of atheistical atoms mentioned in our *Preface* was produced by NECESSITY. *Doctors* differ, and so, we see, do *atheists*. Both hypotheses agree in one respect. *Antitheos*, as well as that course of atoms, sprung from A WORD, or, at most, A THOUGHT—his own? or a neighbour's? (*Vide* § 15. *them.*)—Or do I see an explanation of the enigma? *Antitheos's* ultimate-particle-body was the product of NECESSITY, "physical necessity," but his *intelligence*, or *mind*, that is, his organized body, was the result of ACCIDENT: Is this what *Antitheos* would deliver? If so, *half* (and not the worse half) of him came by *accident*, but the other gentleman was, every inch of him, the result of "NECESSARY CAUSES." So still the pair differ. But is there any harm in that?

—— However, after all: "Blind *fate* and blind *chance* are at bottom *much the same thing*, and one *no more intelligible* than the other." *Berkeley's* "Siris." Section 273.

## NOTE FF.

It is not an ill observation which *Clarke* makes, that the main question between us and the atheist lies in the Proposition, (his 8th,) "The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, must be an Intelligent Being."

## NOTE GG.

*Vide Part. VIII. Appendic. B. § 24. et loc. in eâ citat.*

"*I appeal,*" exclaims *John Locke*, "*to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing?*" B. IV. ch. x. § 10. See the whole of the unanswerable passage in our APPENDIX. *Vide Appendic. §§.*

† *Hobbes.*



## NOTE HH.

The creation of Matter, but not *out of nothing* : For that, strictly, is absurd nonsense. The proper notion of Creation is—not the bringing *something* out of *nothing*, but—the making something begin to be which before was not.

Let him who can, reduce this to a *contradiction*—*i. e.* render manifest that to conceive it is impossible.

*Colliber* says : “ I confess, if any man could be found so absolutely stupid and void of understanding as to affirm that the DEITY in Creating the World had \* produc’t it out of nothing as out of a preëxistent subject \* \* \* \* such a notion of it might have some right to the character of a Contradiction. But since by Creation there can no more be meant than the causing to be what was not *before*, or the producing something where *once* was nothing, this is evidently no more a Contradiction than”—&c. “ Impartial Enquiry.” Book I. ch. ix.

And *Clarke* : “ To say that something which once was not, may since have begun to exist ; is neither directly, nor by any consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is not* ; or that That which *is*, can *not be*, while it *is*.” *Dem.* under Prop. X.

## NOTE II.

I am happy at being able to add *Mr Locke’s* authority to that of *Antitheos*, on the topic of the possibility of the Creation of Matter. “ Possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some *dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made, and begin to exist.*” Essay, B. IV. ch. x. § 18. It will be observed, *Locke* goes farther than *Antitheos*, by one step. With *Antitheos*, the Creation of Matter is possible : While *Locke* conceives, not merely that Matter began to exist, but *how*.

## NOTE JJ.

“ Man knows by an *intuitive certainty*, that *bare nothing* can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles.” “ This being of *all absurdities* the greatest, to imagine that *pure nothing*, the perfect negation and absence of all beings,

“should ever produce any real existence.” *Locke*. B. IV. ch. x. §§ 3, 8.

We hesitate not to adopt, as pertinent here, one of *Epicurus's* maxims, as it was understood by the Sect.

Nullam rem e nihilo gigni Divinitus† unquam.—*Lucret. Lib. I.*

If there was no Divinity, as they supposed there was not, why then—*nothing* could not cause anything.

We shall even go so far as to adopt the theorem as stated by another Poet.

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.—*Persii Satir. III.*

*Nothing* cannot be the cause of anything, nor reduce anything to nothing.—*Nothing* cannot be a cause at all.

——“It had long ago been received as an indisputable doctrine, “if not an axiom in philosophy, that out of *nothing*, no thing can “come; and it has never yet been shown to be essentially incor- “rect.” *Refutation*. Ch. II. par. 25. *Antitheos* is right:—The doctrine, or the axiom, is correct, *essentially*,—and *substantially* too.

† *Vide Part. VI. Appendic. § 2. not.||*

## APPENDIX.

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### APPENDIX TO PART IV.

§ 1. We are about to bid a final adieu to the infinite divisibility of matter, and to infinite divisibility of every kind. But ere we take our flight from the Cimmerian darkness of that uncomfortable region, we shall do what lies in our power to display the doctrine of infinite divisibility in those colours in which it will be seen to most advantage. And in truth, it requires to be placed in the most favourable light, if we would fit it to be brooked at all, it being but a monster at best. Many of the partisans of that doctrine have represented it as a very Gorgon. A Gorgon indeed it is : But then these gentlemen, with true Grecian mendacity, have bestowed upon it more snakes and tusks than it was obliged to carry on

The very *head* and *front* of [its] offending.

In short, our statement shall be much to the credit of the dogma of infinite divisibility ; and if its patrons do not give us their thanks, it will be because there is no gratitude in their bosoms, not because we have not done any of them a service.

§ 2. Matter, that is, every part of matter, is divisible *in infinitum* : What are we to understand by that ?

§ 3.—1. We shall, in the first place, lay down what that doctrine does not mean. It cannot mean that any portion of matter contains an infinite number of parts.

§ 4. It must, we confess, be admitted, that not a few of those who have treated of the subject, not a few friends as well as foes, have represented the position, Matter is divisible infinitely, as convertible with the position, Matter contains, or consists of, an infinite number of parts. There is no necessity for our producing the willing testimony of friends, and the invective of enemies, to bear out what we affirm. What we affirm we suppose to be nothing but what is well known.—I'm not sure, that *Mr Hume*, in a passage which we have quoted, (*vide part. iii. § 2.*) may not have

intended to set out the dogma we treat of under such a representation. Certain it is, that in a note upon the place he speaks twice of *an infinite number*. In order to finding absurdities in that dogma, there is no need first to misrepresent it, or even to state it all unfavourably.

§ 5. But from the *infinite*, or, if we would be rather more correct with our word, the *eternal*, divisibility of any particle of matter, (WERE THE DIVISIBILITY POSSIBLE,) we can by no means rationally infer the existence of an infinite number of parts therein. For *an infinite number* is a contradiction in terms. The thing is very obvious. When one speaks of the possible infinity of numbers, *infinity* in this case signifies merely the power of always adding units to the sum we before had, and when any one determinate number is pronounced to be *infinite*, the word ceases to possess any meaning. What is of infinity in any respect, cannot be made greater in that respect. And were any one absolutely determinate number infinite, we could make an infinite number greater, if we could conceive a unit added to it, as it is most certain we could. To speak, then, of an infinite number is to utter a contradiction. And therefore, even were every particle of matter eternally divisible, all the matter in the universe could not be supposed to constitute an infinite number of parts.

§ 6. "The infinity of numbers," says *Mr Locke*, "to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it; but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of numbers be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number." Let a man frame in his mind an idea of any \* \* number, as great as he will; it is plain, the mind rests and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression." B. II. ch. xvii. § 8. Again: "Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long, and as much, as one will," &c. &c. *Ibid.* § 13.

§ 7. With reference to those persons who have accustomed themselves to speaking of *an infinite number* of parts, as the cause, or the consequence, or the concomitant, of the infinite divisibility of matter, and whose speculations have ever been found to be shrouded in mists sufficiently opaque to stand in the way of clear views; be-

sides what *Mr Locke* has here already conveyed, conveyed to them if they like, we would recommend the study of the following passage, provided we be allowed to make one alteration upon it. "The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning *infinity*, whether of space, duration, or *divisibility*, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities." *Ibid.* § 21. We propose, by way of an amendment, to say, that the difficulties which involve many, perhaps nearly all, discourses concerning *infinity*, in particular concerning *infinity* when *divisibility to infinity* is spoken about, have been the certain marks of a defect in many men's ideas as to what the word *infinity* means, and of the disproportion between the true meaning thereof and the confused comprehensions of the meaning by certain narrow capacities. Were this amendment suffered, *John Locke*, himself, would deal in better sense. PRAY, IF WE CAN RISE SO HIGH AS TO SEE THAT THERE ARE DEFECTS IN OUR IDEAS OF INFINITY, WHAT SHOULD HINDER US TO SOAR AWAY FROM THE DEFECTS ALTOGETHER? IF WE CAN SPRING SO FAR ALOFT AS TO DESCRY THOSE DEFECTS AS UNDER OUR SUPERINCUMBENCY, IS NOT THIS A SURE SIGN THAT THE DEFECTS ARE, IN THE BEST OF SENSES, BENEATH OUR NOTICE?

Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.†

§ 8.—2. In the next place, we shall mention distinctly what is to be understood by the dogma of the divisibility of matter to all eternity. As the capacity of every particle of matter to be divided everlastingly, (BE SUCH CAPACITY AN ODD CHIMERA, OR BE IT NOT,) does not entitle us to infer that matter contains an infinite number of parts, so, on the other hand, it forces us to draw this conclusion, that no portion of matter, *viz.* that no body, consists of any *definite* number of parts at all. He who alleges that matter is eternally divisible, must maintain, that there is no body which is made up of truly *ultimate* particles; no body which, with any propriety, can be said to contain *aliquot* parts; in fine, no body which consists of parts *component* in any other sense than *proportional*, as halves, quarters, &c. &c. What are those parts of a body which are not ultimate? which are not aliquot? but which are only proportional? But to sum up every question in one; what are those parts of a body which are of no fixed, definite number?

§ 9. These consequences, or these concomitants, are admitted, or, at least, what involves them all is allowed, by those who ought to

† *Ars Poetica*.



know something of the affair, and who would not, for the world, unnecessarily allow any thing to the prejudice of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of every portion of every body.

§ 10. “ He who maintains divisibility *in infinitum*,” says a stout defender of the divisibility he speaks of, “ *boldly* denies, therefore, “ the existence of the ultimate particles of body ;” “ it is a manifest contradiction, to suppose at once ultimate particles and divisibility *in infinitum*.”—“ *With all your might*, then, resist this “ assertion : *every compound being is made up of simple beings* ; and “ though you may not be able directly to prove the fallacy,” &c. *Euler’s Letters*. Vol. II. Let. xii. & xvi. And the same in other places.

§ 11. “ If it is admitted, that the divisibility of matter has no “ limit,” thus speaks another warm advocate of the dogma of never-ending divisibility, “ it will follow, that no” [one] “ body” [*however minute*] “ can be called one individual substance. You may *as well* “ call it two, or twenty, or two hundred” substances, or twenty times two hundred substances, or two hundred times two hundred *nonillions* of substances. See *Reid’s Essays*. Essay II. ch. xix. We thus represent a nonillion in figures :—

1,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000.

§ 12. Think of the nonillionth part of a mote in a sunbeam being as much a body as the huge luminary in whose rays the mote dances ! Yet such a part of such a thing is as much a body as the sun, according to *Dr Reid’s* principles. And verily ’tis even so, *if one small circumstance be true* : IF SUCH A PART OF SUCH A THING BE NOT A NON-ENTITY. And when you have cogitated upon that, sufficiently : Think of an extension *but* the nonillionth part of the extension of a mote in a sunbeam as really existing *in rerum naturâ*, and afterwards of the first of these extensions being divisible to all eternity ! These are the high mysteries into which those plunge who will have it, that the divisibility of matter has no limit.

§ 13. To conclude : When one says that matter is divisible *in æternum*, he must be understood as saying neither more nor less than that any particle, however small, can be divided without the possibility of ever coming to an end with the divisions. And to render his assertion a proveable one, he must be held as maintaining further, that, in point of fact, when we divide and subdivide *any* portion of a body, we find, that at no time can we give a righteous termination to the business.

## APPENDIX TO PART VI.

§ 1. The words quoted in the passage to which this Appendix has reference, are taken from the *New-York* "Free Enquirers' Family Library Edition" of the *System of Nature*. (MDCCLXXXVI.) There are notes, said to be by *Diderot*. The translation of the notes is said to be by one *H. D. Robinson*. In the *Advertisement*, we are informed, that "the *Système de la Nature* was first attributed to "*Helvetius*, and then to *Mirabeau*," (p. iv.) and that it may now be attributed, with truth, to the *Baron D'Holbach*. (Pp. v. vi. vii.)

§ 2. Of the "System of Nature" *Lord Brougham* says, in "Note IV": "It is the only work of any consideration wherein atheism "is openly avowed and preached—avowed, indeed, and preached "in terms. (See, particularly, part ii., chap. ii)." Like many assertions of *Brougham's*, this one is deficient in a certain good quality. "As to Atheists," said one who knew what he was speaking about, "these so *confident exploders of them* are both UNSKILLED "IN THE MONUMENTS OF ANTIQUITY,+ and"—&c. Will his Lordship take quietly this hint, for want of a reproof, from his favourite *Cudworth*? ‡—One of the atheistical monuments of antiquity is the "*De Rerum Natura*" of *Lucretius*, who sings:—

*Omnis, ut est, igitur, per se, Natura, duabus  
Consistit rebus; nam CORPORA sunt, et INANE—*

*Præterea nihil est, quod possis dicere ab omni  
CORPORE sejunctum, secretumque esse ab INANI  
Quod quasi tertia sit rerum natura reperta.—*

† Unskilled in the monuments of antiquity! Read *Brougham's* Notes VI. VII. VIII. and then deny, if you can, that

This, this was the unkindest cut of all.

‡ The hint occurs in the *Preface* to what *Warburton*, that colossal man, has so well called "one immortal volume." ("Preface" to the 1st Ed. of Books iv. v. vi. of the "Divine Legation of *Moses*.")

—Præter INANE, et CORPORA, *tertia per se*  
*Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui*—LIB. I.

———Natura videtur

LIBERA continuo Dominis privata superbis,  
 IPSA SUA PER SE SPONTE OMNIA DIIS AGERE EXPERS.||—LIB. II.  
 NATURAM RERUM HAUD DIVINA MENTE COORTAM.||—LIB. III.

And *Lucretius* sings not unfrequently to the same tunes.—But perhaps, my Lord, the atheists of ancient times were of *no consideration*? Or perhaps, they did not avow and preach their atheism *openly*? Or, if they did it openly, perhaps they did not do it *in terms*?—Your Lordship may be ill to please with atheism. *Ex. gr.* To affirm, with *Spinoza*, “*Substantiam corpoream, quæ non nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione Natura Divina indignam esse dici posse.*” [*I. e.* “That corporeal substance (or matter,) which is necessarily conceived to be infinite, must be allowed to be not unworthy of the Divine Nature:” Which may, very properly, be reduced to this proposition,—Matter is infinite, and there cannot be any God besides matter.] To affirm that, may not altogether satisfy your Lordship that the writer is an open, and avowed atheist, in terms. Your Lordship—I shall repeat it—may be ill to please with atheism: So very ill to please, indeed, that if such an one as your Lordship will be at the trouble to read, of the “*System of Nature*,” and of the second Part, the 9th chapter, (the title of which asks, “Do there exist Atheists?”—) he *may* come to think—not that there has been peradventure *one*, but that—there never was a truly atheistical work at all.

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|| *Epicurus*, and therefore *Lucretius*, speak, it is true, of Gods or a Divinity. But what says *Tully* of the Epicureans? *VERBIS ponunt, RE tollunt Deos.*—“As *Epicurus*, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their “vizards and disguises \* \* \* \* Yet they, that are “sagacious, *may EASILY look through* these thin veils and disguises”—*Cudworth*, Ch. II. & ii.

*Epicurus* had these reasons for *speaking* of Gods. 1. Because the Greeks of his day, Heathens though they were, were not prepared to permit such a monster as an atheist to exist in peace. 2. He took no small delight in making fools of the more unthinking common-people.—One would be apt to think that even the common-people might always have appreciated such notable irony as the following:

*Tenuis enim natura Deum, longeque remota*

*Sensibus a nostris, ANIMI VIX MENTE VIDETUR.*—*Lucretii* LIB. V.

The majority of Atheists, in all ages, have seen it fit to delude the vulgar, and afterwards to mock them.

§ 3. "There is," says *Brougham*, "no book of an atheistical description which has ever made a greater impression than the famous *Système de la Nature*." \* \* \* \*

§ 4. "It is impossible to deny the merits of the *Système de la Nature*. The work of a great writer it unquestionably is." And accordingly, his Lordship has devoted a long Note (it is Note IV.) to the performance.

§ 5. Of the merit of the "System of Nature," it is thus that *Lord Brougham* speaks:—"Its merit lies in the extraordinary eloquence of the composition, and the skill with which words substituted for ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to pass current, not only for arguments against existing beliefs, but for a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of reasoning, it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms—plausible only as long as the ear of the reader being filled with sounds, his attention is directed away from the sense. The chief resource of the writer is to take for granted the thing to be proved, and then to refer back to his assumption as a step in the demonstration, while he builds various conclusions upon it, as if it were complete. Then he declaims against a doctrine seen from one point of view only, and erects another for our assent, which, besides being liable to the very same objections, has also no foundation whatever to rest upon. The grand secret, indeed, of the author goes even further in *petitione principii* than this; for we often find, that in the very substitute which he has provided for the notions of belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea which he is combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new form, but masked under different words and phrases.

§ 6. "The truth of these statements," continues his Lordship, "we are now to examine." But into the examination we cannot follow his Lordship.

§ 7. His Lordship's volume having crossed the *Atlantic*, and fallen into the hands of the New-World atheists; the compliment to the author of the book called the *System of Nature* is repaid, with interest. "*Henry Lord Brougham* \* \* \*," say the Transatlantic infidels, "in his recent Discourse of Natural Theology, has mentioned this extraordinary treatise, but with what care does he evade entering the lists with this distinguished writer! He passes over the work with a haste and sophistry that indicates how fully conscious he was of his own weakness and his opponent's strength."—The western free-thinkers part from his Lord-



ship in this manner: "It is with a few pages" [The pages are as near to being *sixteen*, of the closer printed ones, as need be.] "of \* empty declamation that his Lordship attacks and condemns this eloquent and logical work." See "Advertisement:" mentioned in § 1. above.

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§ 8. "ALL Christian writers on Natural Theology," so write the American atheologists, "have studiously avoided even the mention of this masterly production:† knowing" [Here is the *cause*] "their utter inability to cope with its powerful reasoning," [Then follows the *effect*] "they have wisely‡ passed it by in silence." *Advertisement.* The whole assertion *says* (to employ the mild language of *Honyhnhnm*) *the thing which is not*. But whether it be an ethical lie, or merely a logical one,—a lie of malice, or only of mistake,—I shall not take up time in endeavouring to determine. The assertion *is* false, whatever be the reason of the circumstance. And did I deem it at all necessary to do so, I should set down the names of several writers on Natural Theology, the writers being Christians, who not only have not avoided mentioning the *System of Nature*, but who have examined it, rather fully. And as it is false, that the production has been passed by in silence by all Christian writers on Natural Theology; so it is not true, that these writers were in the knowledge of their utter inability to cope with the Anti-Christian writer on (what I hope is Un-Natural, as well as) A-Theology. The *effect* has no existence: Is it any wonder, that the *cause* has therefore none?

§ 9. I, for one, in place of *studiously avoiding even the mention* of the "System of Nature," have, as the reader of my sixth Part is well aware, done the very reverse, and mentioned the production, when I could have "avoided even the mention" of it, without being very studious as to *how*, and without subjecting myself to be righteously found fault with, on account of the avoidance. I have mentioned the production: Nay more, I have quoted from it, and have commented on the citations. It may be but right to notice, that the citations are made from the chapter which forms, as *Brougham* truly declares, "by far the most argumentative part" of the Frenchman's book. (Note IV.) With what success I have encountered the Goliath

† These gentlemen subsequently except *Brougham*.

‡ There were good reasons for the wisdom. *Vide infra*, § 9. *not.* ||



of Infidels,|| let the attentive reader determine. Whether or no I display an *utter inability to cope with* a man so mighty among atheists—so far as matters between us have gone—there has been at least no *wise passing him by in silence*. But though I have not passed by that author, I must certainly have passed by his “powerful reasoning,” for, to the best of my recollection, I met with none of it. But let us not despair. We may yet fall in with the *powerful reasoning* which is so rife (according to report) in “this masterly production.” In a word, we may have better fortune the next time. And the reader may take our word for it, that we shall not lose any opportunity at all suitable, should such offer, of attempting (at any rate) to cope with this paragon of Philosophers, and even—to make use of fine figure in the genuine *bathos*†—of Infidels.

|| “We have commenced the library with a translation of *Baron d'Holbach's* System of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able “expositions of theological absurdities which has ever been written.” Again: “Let those read this work who seek to come at a ‘knowledge of ‘the truth’.” But farther: “If the most profound logic, the acutest discrimination, the keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on “an author, then we may justly hail *Baron d'Holbach* as THE GREATEST “AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, and an honour to infidels.” In short: “We have “no apologies to make for republishing the System of Nature at this time; “the work will support itself, and needs no advocate; it has never been “answered, because, in truth, IT IS, INDEED, UNANSWERABLE.” *Advertisement*, already mentioned.

† To-wit, the *Anticlimax*.

## APPENDIX TO PART VIII.

## APPENDIX A.

“ *Motion proves a vacuum.*—But not to go so far as beyond the  
 “ utmost bounds of body in the universe, \* \* \* to find a va-  
 “ cuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbour-  
 “ hood, seem to me *plainly to evince it*. For I desire any one so to  
 “ divide a solid body of any dimension he pleases, as to make it  
 “ possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way  
 “ *within the bounds of that superficies*, if there be not left in it a void  
 “ space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said  
 “ solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided  
 “ is as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a  
 “ mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of  
 “ the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies ;  
 “ where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mus-  
 “ tard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big  
 “ as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed : for if it hold good in one,  
 “ it will hold in the other, and so on *in infinitum*.” [Not *in in-*  
*finitem*, or any thing like it : But *for a good while*, perhaps till our  
 minds can minish the particles no longer. *Vide Part. III. § 26. et*  
*seq.*] “ And let this void space be as little ~~as~~ it will, it destroys  
 “ the hypothesis of plentitude. For if there can be a space void of  
 “ body, equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now ex-  
 “ isting in nature, it is still space without body, and makes as great  
 “ a difference between space and body, as if it were μέγα χάσμα,  
 “ a distance as wide as any in nature. And, therefore, if we sup-  
 “ pose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least  
 “ parcel of the divided solid matter, but to  $\frac{1}{10}$  or  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of it, the  
 “ same consequence will always follow of space without matter.”  
*Locke's Essay. Book II. Chap. xiii. § 23.*

*Mr Locke* recurs to this topic in a subsequent chapter. “ Of  
 “ such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved,  
 “ as I think, *from the motion of body, its*” [CONSEQUENTIALLY, OR

HYPOTHETICALLY] “NECESSARY EXISTENCE.” “It is *impossible* for any “particle of matter to move but into an empty space.” B. II. Ch. xvii. § 4.

This demonstration by *Locke* of the existence of vacuum, will suggest, to the classical reader, *Lucretius’s* exhibition of the argument for the impossibility of motion in a perfect plenum.

———locus est intactus, INANE, vacansque.

Quod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri  
Res possent; namque, officium, quod Corporis extat,  
Obficere, atque obstare, id in omni tempore adesset  
Omnibus: haud igitur quidquam procedere posset,  
Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res.  
At nunc per maria, ac teras, sublimaque cœli,  
Multa modis multis varia ratione moveri  
Cernimus ante oculos; quæ, si non esset INANE,  
Non tam sollicito motu privata carerent;  
Quam genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent:  
Undique Materies quoniam stipata quiescet.—*Lib. Prim.*

To the English reader—

—Take it in the very words of *Creech*.†

A *Void* is *space intangible*: Thus prov’d.

For were there none, no Body could be mov’d;

Because where e’er the pressing motion goes,

It still must meet with stops,‡ \* \* \*

’Tis natural to Bodies to oppose.

So that to move would be in vain to try,

But all would stubborn,§ fixt,§ and moveless lie;

Because no yielding Body could be found

Which first should move, and give the other ground.

But every one now sees that things do move

With various turns in Earth and Heaven above;

Which, were no *Void*, not only we’d not seen,

But \* Bodies too themselves had never been:

Ne’er generated, for Matter all sides prest

With other matter would for ever rest.

Or in those of *Dr James Mason Good*.

And know this VOID IS SPACE UNTOUCHED AND PURE.¶

Were space like this vouchsaf’d not, nought could move:

Corporeal forms would still resist, and strive

With forms corporeal, nor consent to yield;

† *Pope*—Imitations of *Horace*. 6th Ep. of B. I.

‡ Four words here left out,—for sense’s sake.

§ These words here transposed,—for sound’s sake.

¶ The capitals are the translator’s.

While the great progress of creation ceas'd.  
 But what more clear in earth or heav'n sublime,  
 Or the vast ocean, than, in various modes,  
 That various matter moves? which, but for SPACE,†  
 'Twere vain t'expect: and vainer yet to look  
 For procreative power, educing still  
 Kinds from their kinds through all revolving time.‡

Our readers will perhaps pardon us, if we now present them with a demonstration of the position, that the motion of any body proves there is an immoveable space. The demonstration shall be from an old author,—a modern, however, should you mention him in the same breath with the Latin Poet.

The following axioms are laid down, at the outset.

“Primum est, *Nullius corporis superficies, quiescente corpore, moveri potest, nec, moto corpore, quiescere.*

“Secundum, *Nullum corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens proprius accedere, nec ab eo recedere, potest sine motu locali.*

“Tertium, *Nullius corporis potest fieri motus localis, nisi transeundo per aliquod Extensum.*

“Quartum & ultimum, *Omne corpus, localiter motum, movetur adæquate per illa loca, quæ motu suo acquirit.*||

“Esto jam pro *Cylindro,*

“*duas vel tres uncias alto,* P

“*& super terram immotam,*

“*ut jam supponemus, posito,* Circulus H K M H;

“*Polusq; illius Axis (circa*

“*quam movetur) superior*

“*& inferior A A. manifestum est, quod superficies*

“*Cylindri extima separat*


“*se a superficie concava*

“*ambientis aeris, per partes, puta H I a concava*

“*parte H I, pergitq; ad*

“*I K, & sic de reliquis. Unde plane apparet totam superficiem con-*

“*vexam Cylindri (& eadem ratio est de planis) moveri in orbem; ac*



† The capitals are the translator's.

‡ The last line in the quotation from *Lucretius* is not so evidently translated by *Mason Good*, as one could have wished.

|| This last axiom does not appear to be used in the demonstration. But surely its nature is such that it can do no harm, although it be left in.

“proinde quod totus *Cylindrus* in orbem movetur, per *Axioma primum*: Sed nullum corpus movetur, nisi transeundo per aliquod *Extensum*: Ergo *Cylindrus* transit per aliquod *Extensum*, per *Axioma tertium*. Sed per nullum *Extensum* transit extra ambitum *H K M H*. ERGO PER EXTENSUM INTRA ILLUM AMBITUM TRANSIT. Sed per suam ipsius *Extensionem* non transit; circumfertur enim cum ea simul. QUID IGITUR RELIQUUM EST PRÆTER INTERNUM SUUM LOCUM, SIVE SPATIUM, QUOD OCCUPAT, PER CUIUS PARTES TRANSIRE POSSIT, nempe ab *H A I* ad *I A K*, &c. Quod oportebat demonstrare.

“Rursus supponamus in eodem *Cylindro* majori *H K M H* sex foramina *Cylindracea*, *B, C, D, E, F, G*, æqualia, totidemque minores *Cylindros* eisdem foraminibus insertos, superficiebusque concavis horum foraminum æquatos et contiguos, Penatusque; aliquod corpus quiescens extra majorem *Cylindrum*, sitque corpus *P*. Moveatur jam denuo major *Cylindrus*, *H K M H* circa axem *A A* secundum ordinem literarum *H I K*, &c. Dico, tametsi minores *Cylindri* superficies suas non separent immediate nec a superficiebus foraminum suorum, nec a superficie aeris majorem *Cylindrum* ambientis, quod nihilominus moventur localiter. Nam dum major *Cylindrus* movetur ab *H* ad *I*, *Cylindrus B* recedit a corpore *P* quiescente; *Cylindrus* vero *E* proprius ad illud accedit. Nullum autem corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens proprius accedere potest, vel ab eo recedere, sine motu locali, per *Axioma secundum*: nec omnino moveri localiter, nisi transeundo aliquod *Extensum*, per *Axioma tertium*. Sed *Cylindrus B* per nullum *Extensum* extra *Cylindrum* majorem pertransit, nec penetrat ipsum corpus *C*, cum ad *C* pervenit. Igitur *Cylindrus B* succedit tantum in cylindraceum spatium *C*, & *Cylindrus C* in spatium cylindraceum *D*, et singuli *Cylindri* successive spatia cylindracea, sive locos internos præcedentium *Cylindrorum*, occupant. Quod erat demonstrandum.”

K. T. Δ. Taken from the 6th Chap. of *More's* Manual of Metaphysic.

## APPENDIX B.

§ 1. “The \* opinion \* ” that “God is present every where by an *infinite extension of his essence*,” “appears most in harmony with the Scriptures; though the term *extension*, through the inadequacy of language, conveys too material an idea.”



Theological Institutes, by *Richard Watson*. Part Second. Chap. III. Edit 2d. 1824. Such is the deliberate sentiment of this Theologian : and it will not be easy to name many works, each of them containing more talented sober theological discussion.

§ 2. "We conceive of HIM," the "intelligent, self-existent, First Cause," "as existing in all duration, and in all space. This is precisely the idea which we form of the existence of GOD; *exactly the view which the Bible gives us of HIM.*" *Rev. B. Godwin's Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy. Lect. II. (P. 53.)*

§ 3. "—— He who upholds all things by his power, may be said to be every where present.

§ 4. "This is called a *virtual presence*.† There is also what metaphysicians denominate an *essential ubiquity* : and which idea *the language of Scripture seems to favour.*" So says *Dr Paley* in Chapter XXIV. of his *Natural Theology*.

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§ 5. *Lord Brougham* has a note in reference to this passage of the Doctor's. (*Vide Part. VIII. § 5. not. ‡ § 2.*) In which his Lordship informs us : "The three doctrines are—ubiquity by *diffusion*, *virtual ubiquity*,|| or that of power only, and ubiquity of *essence.*"

§ 6. The sensible and rather shrewd *Paley* gives us *two* sorts of presence, or omnipresence;¶ without hinting there was a third. *Paley's* Annotator loses not a moment in presenting us with *three* DOCTRINES (it is out of his power to present us with *three* SPECIES) of omnipresence : the third doctrine being that of ubiquity of essence as opposed to ubiquity by diffusion, or that of ubiquity by diffusion as opposed to ubiquity of essence ; whichever way his Lordship pleases.


† "Virtue cannot be without substance.—It may be laid down as one of those truths which admit of no contradiction, that, with regard to the uncreated substance at least, virtue cannot be without substance. Speaking of this substance, *Sir Isaac Newton* hath these words : '*Omnipræsens est non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam : nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest.*' *Newton. Princip. Mathematic. Schol. general. sub finem.*" "Introduction" to the "Argument, *a priori*," &c. Div. III. § 23.

|| "'Tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere energy?" "Introduction" to "Argument." Div. I. § 11.

¶ Properly, it is of omnipresence he is treating.

§ 7. His Lordship, in entering upon his Note, forewarns us that the subject he is to touch is “confessedly abstruse.” Those that *create* the abstruseness (well, if not the obtuseness) of a subject, ought by all means to confess what the thing grew to under proper management. But it is not so right to represent their own handiwork as something they found *ready made*.

§ 8. The Author of the “Natural Theology” presents us with two divisions, as not only exhausting the subject, but being in fair antithesis. In fair antithesis the members of the division could not be, if the “essential ubiquity” were two-fold: the one species of *essential ubiquity* being “ubiquity of essence,” the other, “ubiquity by diffusion.” This matter may perhaps be rendered plainer by the following *Schema*.



Here one of the *species* is neither more nor less than the *genus* itself. And pray, what is the other *species*, in contradistinction to its fellow-member, and the *genus* of both? Tell us, and then we shall see whether the genus—essential omnipresence—can in its two-fold nature be *fairly* opposed to the other great member of the division—virtual omnipresence.

§ 9. The Author of the “Natural Theology,” in short, recognises no distinction of the kind introduced by the Noble Annotator. The Archdeacon of *Carlisle* had too much of a “natural predilection” for what by due care may be “level to all comprehensions,” to be smitten with the love of unadulterated nonsense. If our Archdeacon had no talent and no taste for metaphysical speculation even though of the genuine cast, as is noticed by his

Illustrator;† far less, had he any regard for vile bastard metaphysics.—Which it would be well to remember.

§ 10. *Lord Brougham* speaks of “the Diffusive Ubiquity.” *Vide Part. VIII. § 5. not. ‡ § 2.* What can *non-diffusive* ubiquity be? Verily, the distinction between “ubiquity by diffusion”—namely, of essence, or substance, (or, else, diffusion of what?—) and “ubiquity of essence;” is a distinction without a difference. How can there be ubiquity of essence but by every-where-diffusion of essence? What is ubiquity, if not diffusion every where? Something inexpressibly absurd. Ubiquity, then, is just ubiquity by limitless diffusion. What else can it be?

§ 11. What is ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence by diffusion without bounds? Did we pretend not to know, ’twould, after all, be a shame. The nonsense has been fully consecrated: For no inconsiderable period has it been the fashionable theology. Ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence by boundless diffusion, is,—let the reader be prepared—THE UBIQUITY OF THE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION, or INEXTENSION, as ’twas usually expressed. The ubiquity or universal extension, in question, is the universal extension which has no extension at all. The *every-where-ness* under notice, is, in plain and honest English, just *no-where-ness*.

§ 12. We shall dwell a little upon the topic of the fashionable theological whimsey.

§ 13. The Author of the “Argument” has the following passage. “The common sentiment of Theologians, that the necessary substance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of matter, *entire*, is, SO FAR AS THE OPINION IS INTELLIGIBLE AT ALL, just this third hypothesis, that the necessary substance is infinitely extended: Though, ’tis true, all extension is denied to that substance. For to say that the *same* substance is in different parts of extension, *at once*, without being extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not extended.” “Introduction.” Division III. Note to § 28.

§ 14. “*Qui autem*,” says the (undeservedly) almost-forgotten *Raphson*, “*præsentia illa, vere essentialis, & cunctis, quæ sunt, in-*

† “His,” *Paley’s*, “limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion, and the *natural predilection* for what he handled so well—a practical argument level to all comprehensions—appear not to have given him any taste for metaphysical speculations.” Note in “Section III.” of the “Preliminary Discourse.”

“*tima, per INEXTENSIONIS hypothesin sine manifesta contradictione*  
 “*(quæcunq; tandem fuerit verborum collusio) explicari possit, non-*  
 “*dum constitit, neq; unquam constare poterit : Vere enim locis,*  
 “*etiam diversis, & a se invicem distantibus, per essentiam adesse,*  
 “*exempli gratia, globo terrestri, & lunari, spatiisq; omnibus inter-*  
 “*mediis, quid aliud est, quam ipsissima ratio formalis ã extendi ?*”  
 From “*Cap. VI.*”

§ 15. We shall next hear the sentiments of *S. Colliber* : A writer once of some celebrity, and of, undoubtedly, considerable parts, and great good sense, in not a few respects.

§ 16. “This opinion,”—“the opinion of [the DEITY’S] *Inextension*,”—“being once entertained, ’tis scarce conceivable what a train of riddles and paradoxes it drew after it. For thence the *Platonists* and the rest of *Anaximander’s* Commentators first began to infer what is usually called HIS *Indistance*. For distance being only a relative conception of Space, consequently it could not, as they rightly concluded, be conceived in a being who was, as they imagined, absolutely without amplitude and dimensions.

§ 17. “Thus far they proceeded in absurdity, their next step was impiety. For since they found it impossible to conceive a being without amplitude and dimensions any otherwise than as a mere mathematical \* point; they began to speak of the DEITY in the like diminutive terms, and, in effect, imprisoned the GREAT CREATOR within the smallest dust of HIS creation.” [Less, infinitely less, so to speak, than the *smallest dust* : The smallest dust is always something : but a ‘mathematical point’ has no *magnitude*.] “But \* \* \* \* \* they quickly solved the difficulty with a mystery, and gravely concluded that it was no impossibility for \* an Infinite Being to exist ENTIRE, tho’ in a certain atomical manner, not only in one but IN EVERY individual particle of the universe AT ONCE. For this worthy discovery we are particularly indebted to *Plotinus*, one of *Plato’s* disciples, who obliged the world with two whole books to demonstrate that one and the same being may be all of it entirely in each distinguishable part of the world.

§ 18. “This Philosopher it seems had found the secret of producing more Deities out of one than the fruitful fancies of all the Poets in their Theogonics could ever make. \* \* \* \*

§ 19. “But fearing, good man ! lest this discovery of his should be thought inconsistent with the unity of God, he made bold to stretch the mystery a little farther by concluding not only that it’s the property and privilege of the absolutely Infinite Being to exist whole in every particle of the world, but that he has an



“undoubted prerogative of existing whole in the whole of it too ;  
 “so as to be *one individual innumerable universal Deity*. All which  
 “Platonical mysteries were afterwards received as articles of faith  
 “by the Schoolmen, and are comprised in that vulgar maxim of  
 “theirs, *viz., Deus est totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte mundi*,  
 “*God is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the world*, Mys-  
 “teries that require a degree of faith beyond that of miracles ; a  
 “faith which can transform contradictions into arguments with a  
 “*Credo quia impossibile est.*”

§ 20. Listen, for a moment by the way, to the “*Treatise of Human Nature*,” speaking in reference to the Schoolmen’s maxim :  
 —“That scholastic principle which, *when crudely proposed*, appears  
 “so shocking, of *totum in toto, et totum in qualibet parte*: which is  
 “much the same as if we should say, that a thing *is* in a certain  
 “place, and yet *is not* there.” Book I. Part. iv. Sect. 5.—*Vide*  
*Part. III. § 64. not. ‡.*

§ 21. We now go on with S. C.—“Though ’tis next to impos-  
 “sible to speak of such *extravagances* as these, and, at the same  
 “time, to preserve that gravity which is so necessary in discourses  
 “of this nature ; yet I conceive it may not be amiss to have obser-  
 “ved thus much, to the end it may be seen how strangely the  
 “name of Learning has been misapplied to *whimsies* of this kind,  
 “and how profanely the sacred name of God has been abused to  
 “consecrate the MOST EGREGIOUS NONSENSE.” Impartial Enquiry, &c.  
 B. II. Part. ii. ch. 4.

§ 32. Permit, ye upon whom the mantle of the *madmen amongst*  
 the Schoolmen hath fallen ! permit a word of reproof, for the past,  
 and of warning, as to the future. Has not the *egregious nonsense* al-  
 luded to by the author from whom we have this instant parted,  
 been one, and a very fruitful cause of the birth, and growth, of  
 Atheism in modern times ? has it not been one of the great nurs-  
 ing-mothers of the atheist-monster ? a nursing-mother actively at  
 work, though in some respects

remote from public view ?

§ 23. Let us call in evidence on the point.—“The partizans of  
 “spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they have them-  
 “selves accumulated, by saying, ‘The soul is entire, is whole un-  
 “der each point of its extent.’ If an absurd answer will solve  
 “difficulties, they have done it ; for after all it will be found, that this  
 “point, which is called *soul*, however insensible, however minute,  
 “must yet remain something.” Thus writes *D’Holbach. System*  
*of Nature*, Part. I. ch. vii. And the following is *Diderot’s* note on  
 that passage. It is with what is set forth in the note that our pre-



sent business most lies.—“ According to this answer an infinity of  
 “ unextended substance, or the same unextended substance re-  
 “ peated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance that has  
 “ extent, WHICH IS ABSURD ; for, according to this principle, the hu-  
 “ man soul would then be as infinite as God, since it is assumed  
 “ that God is a being without extent, who is an infinity of times whole  
 “ in each part of the universe—and the same is stated of the hu-  
 “ man soul ; from whence we must necessarily conclude that God  
 “ and the soul of man are equally infinite, unless we suppose *unex-  
 “ tended substances of different extents, or a God without extent more  
 “ extended* than the human soul. Such are, however, the rhapso-  
 “ dies which SOME of our theological metaphysicians would have  
 “ thinking beings believe !” &c. *Vide Part. VI. Appendic. § 1.*

§ 24. (A single word on a collateral topic. What has rendered the doctrine of the *immateriality of the soul* so much out of vogue now-a-days, and another name with many for a monster of absurdity ? The saying that that soul which is immaterial, is altogether destitute of extension, occupying not even a point of space. That is just the reason : *Because*, what has no extension is nothing ; or to give it in *Mr Hobbes'* words, “ Substance without dimensions “ are words which flatly contradict each other.” *De Homine.—*  
*Vide Part. III. § 34. et seq.—quoq; Part. IX. § 39. not. †. And be-  
 cause*, it is repugnant to the dictates of our unsophisticated faculties to consider gross matter (ay, or subtile matter, if you go to that,) as the only cause of all thought. *Vide Part. III. § 39. atq; § 40.—*  
*quoq; Part. VI. § 41.—et Part. XII. Appendic. §§.)*

§ 25. ——— And as the hypothesis of *inextension* is well calculated to foster atheism, so the hypothesis of *infinite extension* is admirably adapted to extinguish atheism.

§ 26. In the first place, this hypothesis distinguishes *two different sorts* of extension. And this of itself destroys the most plausible of the atheistic hypotheses : to-wit, the hypothesis of an absolute *material plenum*, and but *one substance* in nature.

§ 27. And in the second, if it be established that there is an incorporeal, or immaterial, or spiritual *expansion* which *pervades* the material universe, it is worth no atheist's while to contend against the position, that that *expansion* is a *mode* of an *Intelligent Spirit*.——

§ 28. We shall draw this Appendix to a conclusion with one other piece from the “ Impartial Enquiry.”

§ 29. “ ——— The opinion of the Nullibists.

“ 'Tis well known that *Weigeli* was the reviver of this extravagance among Christians. For one assertion of his (among divers others relishing of the height of enthusiasm and (distraction

“ was that *spiritual beings* (since conceived to be unextended or without dimensions) *are no where and yet every where*. But the chief patron of this profound mystery of Nullibism was *Des Cartes*. A philosopher that has rendered himself remarkable for these three confident assertions, *viz., That whatever thinks is immaterial; That whatever is extended, or has dimensions, is material; and That whatever is unextended, or without dimensions, is nowhere*. Which last assertion (perhaps the truest) is no other in effect than a frank confession of what the *Schools* laboured to conceal under an insignificant and arbitrary distinction between the *Locus* of a Body and the *Ubi* of a Spirit; which it seems the less metaphysical *Cartesians* find themselves unable to comprehend.” *Ibidem*.

§ 30. Unable to comprehend: no marvel. Would any amount of metaphysics—short of metaphysics run mad—enable Cartesians (to say nothing of others) to comprehend, in all its latitude, the scholastic distinction between *locus* and *ubi*? Take, upon the point, the witness of two famous men. “ If it be said by any one, that it (the soul) cannot change place, because it hath none, for spirits are not *in loco*, but *ubi*; I suppose”—witnesseth *John Locke*—“ that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by, *such UNINTELLIGIBLE ways of speaking*.” Essay. B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21.—“ The Schoolmen’s distinctions, about Spirits existing in *Ubi*, and not in *Loco*; are”—saith the second witness—“ *mere empty sounds*, without any manner of signification.” *Dr Samuel Clarke’s* Ans. to 6th Letter.

§ 31. No less a man than *Dr Watts*, the Divine, and so respectable a one as *Isaac Watts*, the Metaphysician, harped mightily, in his own way, upon this string, the distinction, to-wit, between the *locus* and *ubi* of a Spirit. Well, if he had been\*helped to go back and destroy the empty distinction, by means of an observation of his own, which partly serves to bring up the rear, composing as it does one of his concluding (they are deeply pious) reflections on “Spirits — being in a place and removing from it,” &c.—(Essay VI.) “ The best thing we can do,” observes he, “ is, to guard against those ideas of spirits which have any GROSS ABSURDITIES in them.” (“ Conclusion” to Sect. V.) Excellently said, *Dr Isaac Watts*! I assure you—And completely disregarded by yourself.

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
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The same Matter. <i>V</i> <i>Part. VII.</i> 10.	<div data-bbox="291 954 446 1054">Nothing. <i>Vide</i> <i>Part. IX.</i> § 30, 31.</div> <div data-bbox="456 936 607 1054">A relation. <i>Vide Part. IX.</i> § 33, <i>et seq.</i> <i>usq; ad</i> § 59 <i>inclus.</i></div>



# APPENDIX TO PART X.

## APPENDIX N.

TABLE OF THE DIVISION AND SUBDIVISIONS OF THE OPINIONS CONCERNING SPACE.





## APPENDIX 2.

§ 1. "Space 'seems to have a *necessary* and obstinate *existence*:'"—These words are quoted, in the place whereto this Appendix relates, as constituting an *argument* (to prove that Space cannot be a mere idea) which *Dr Isaac Watts* is to *answer*.

§ 2. The whole passage, in the Doctor's work, is as follows: "*It is said, space cannot be a mere idea, because it seems to have 'a necessary and obstinate existence, whether there were any mind or no to form an idea of it.'*" There is no questioning that *Watts*, by "any mind," meant the *mind of any man*, or, at most, of any "created being."

§ 3. That Space has necessary existence, we are firmly persuaded. And therefore, that Space would continue to exist, although every mind, that ever began to be, ceased to exist, we can easily believe. These are points we hold as settled.

§ 4. But there is a controversy which may be raised. Can any person be quite sure, that Space would be, were there NO MIND WHATSOEVER to conceive Space? *How* could one be sure of that?

§ 5. To be plain in stating our own sentiment:—We are quite convinced, that IF THERE WERE NO MIND TO FORM AN IDEA OF SPACE, there would be no Space. That is to say, the *suicidal† supposition‡* of NO SPACE, is not more self-destructive than the supposition of NO MIND.

§ 6. Space is not an idea; not a mind: But is not Space that about which ideas are employed? is not Space an object of conceptions? And is not the object of a conception inseparably related to a conception? To think of any thing—is not that to have an object of thought? Is object of thought not relative to mind? In fine, Is not Space relative to a mind cognising it?

§ 7. If so, 'tis sufficiently evident, that there could be no Space, were no Mind in existence.

§ 8. Does it any way follow *from this*, that seeing *Space* is *necessary*, *Mind* is *necessary*.

† *Putæ Part. II. § 14. &c. collat. § 1. notæ* † *apud § 88. Part. X.—Quoq; Part. III. § 16. 17.*

‡ *Putæ not. † apud § 17. Partis IV.*

## APPENDIX TO PART XII.

## APPENDIX XX.

“—It is as *impossible to conceive* that ever bare incogitative mat-  
 “ter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing  
 “should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of  
 “matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to  
 “produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of  
 “the next pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the  
 “parts firmly at rest together ; if there were no other being in the  
 “world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump ?  
 “*Is it possible to conceive* it can add motion to itself, being purely  
 “matter, or produce any thing ? Matter then, by its own strength,  
 “cannot produce in itself so much as motion : the motion it has,  
 “must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to  
 “matter by some other being more powerful than matter : matter,  
 “as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But  
 “let us suppose motion eternal too ; yet matter, incogitative mat-  
 “ter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and  
 “bulk, could never produce thought. Knowledge will still be  
 “as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as  
 “matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity to pro-  
 “duce. AND I APPEAL TO EVERY ONE’S OWN THOUGHTS, WHETHER HE  
 “CANNOT AS EASILY CONCEIVE MATTER PRODUCED BY NOTHING, AS  
 “THOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED BY PURE MATTER, WHEN BEFORE THERE  
 “WAS NO SUCH THING AS THOUGHT, OR AN INTELLIGENT BEING EXISTING ?  
 “Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt  
 “to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of  
 “it), vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please ; a  
 “globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are  
 “1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other  
 “bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot dia-  
 “meter ; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense,  
 “thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure  
 “and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the

“ very minutest, that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we suppose bare matter, without motion eternal, motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be. For *it is impossible to conceive* that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in, and from, itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter, and every particle of it.”—*Locke’s Essay*. B. IV. ch. x. § 10.†

I shall add a parallel passage from *Cudworth*.—“ As no man can be so sottish, *as to conceive* himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so it is certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal.”—P. 749.

— Those passages are brought forward *not* as *authorities*, but as solemn appeals to the Court of Consciousness.

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## APPENDIX בב.

Alas! the *Zetetic* Society is no more. The *Zetetics* have lost their *particular* existence, in becoming members of “the *Universal Community Society*.” In finding (to the delight of their hearts) that *Socialism*, or *Owenism*, COMPLETELY SERVES THEIR PURPOSE, and in amalgamating themselves, accordingly, with the *Glasgow Branch* of the *Socialist* “Religionists”—Heaven preserve us from their *reli-*

† And in the 3d Chapter of the same Book, he had delivered the following as his sentiments:—“ I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have proved, *lib. 4. c. 10*.—it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking Being.” § 6.

gion!—do not those gentlemen afford new proof, (were new proof necessary,) that *Socialism* and *Atheism* are quite identical; identical in the sense that *Socialism* is at bottom *atheistical*?—Every *Atheist* is not a *Socialist*, but all *Socialists* are—in true propriety, or by strict logical consequence—*Atheists*, as far as *the root of the matter* is concerned.

— It is but due to *Antitheos* to state, that imagining *Socialism* would *si theavy on his stomach*, he refused pointblank to swallow the vile dose. From the very first, he lifted his voice (and it is understood, he may lift his pen) against the newly-found-out, humanly-invented, panacea for all the ills of life. He mercilessly takes away the best sources of human consolation, giving nothing in return. The *Socialists*, to do them justice, are more compassionate. What though they despoil a man of his goods, and children, in addition to all hopes of a happy hereafter: if they offer, in exchange, a wife for every year of his life (oftener, if agreeable,—) and *bed, board, and lodging*, free of all charges, in one of their *Communities*—and, as the “last scene of all,”† “*the burial of an ass*”‡—*Antitheos* has not, now, even *Zetetic* atheism to treat people with.—

A Society, then, of *dogmatic atheists* (as they were proud to call themselves) has ceased to exist. The world may be doomed to sustain losses as great.—We shall by no means lose an opportunity so very inviting, to mention, for the sake of such of our readers as may not be aware of the circumstance, that the great organ of *dogmatic atheism*, in *Britain*, is *dead also*. It is the “*Star in the East*” I speak of: “A regularly stamped newspaper, set agoing in *Cambridgeshire* about three years ago, for the double purpose of advancing the cause of ultra-radicalism, and of advocating, openly and unblushingly, out-and-out atheistical principles.”¶—The “*Star in the East*” (now set for ever in the West) has given way, and made room for a *new* periodical, having doubtless discovered, that the “*New Moral World*”, the grand mouth-piece of *Socialism*, was capitally adapted to express and to further its dearest objects. Are *Atheism* and *Socialism* not identical? is not the one contained in the other? *Socialism* is a lax and manageable enough thing, and verily supersedes the necessity for any form of *Atheism* besides its own:—Wherever *Socialism* appears and flourishes, it *eats out* the sub-

† *Shakspeare*.

‡ *Jeremiah*, Ch. xxii. v. 19.

¶ See the *Philalethean Society's* original Circular. Dated May, 1839.

stance of every other description of Atheism ; to swell its own—already overgrown—dimensions.

— I cannot quit this subject without remarking, that, contrary to what first appearances might indicate, *Socialist atheism* is much more dangerous and deadly than *dogmatic atheism*. *This* affirms,—I know, I prove, there *is no* God : Perhaps it declares with emphasis,—I prove, there *cannot be any* God. The *former* yawns out,—I know not very well, and I care not at all, whether there be any God or no. If it be a truth that there is a God, I know nothing about it. And I shall take no pains to know. I hold the whole question to be a “ puerile”† one. “ Local education”† may make some “ insane”† enough to trouble their heads with regard to such a topic—but I have been taught better. “ Let us eat and drink ; “ for to-morrow we die.”—In fine, a dogmatic atheist may be approached with reasoning, but a Socialist atheist cuts off your only resource when he treats your attempt as wholly insignificant. Your dogmatic atheist can be laid hold of : he presents a rough exterior. But your Socialist atheist is like a slippery eel, which slides through one’s fingers. It’s away, before one knows.—Few, indeed, if they can but be prevailed on to reason at all, will stand out against the *demonstration* of A God ; but (such is the mishap) too many may be got to refuse to give the question a fair hearing.

† See ROBERT OWEN’S “ Address and Challenge to the *Philalethean Society*.” September, 1839.









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